Wildalaska
Moderator
Tha t case supports my assertion.
WildreaditAlaska
WildreaditAlaska
Two police officers, while cruising near noon in a patrol car, observed appellant and another man walking away from one another in an alley in an area with a high incidence of drug traffic. They stopped and asked appellant to identify himself and explain what he was doing. One officer testified that he stopped appellant because the situation "looked suspicious and we had never seen that subject in that area before." The officers did not claim to suspect appellant of any specific misconduct, nor did they have any reason to believe that he was armed. When appellant refused to identify himself, he was arrested for violation of a Texas statute which makes it a criminal act for a person to refuse to give his name and address to an officer "who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information." (emphasis added)
The application of the Texas statute to detain appellant and require him to identify himself violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct. Detaining appellant to require him to identify himself constituted a seizure of his person subject to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment that the seizure be "reasonable." Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 . The Fourth Amendment requires that such a seizure be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require such action, or that the seizure be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 . Here, the State does not contend that appellant was stopped pursuant to a practice embodying neutral criteria, and the officers' actions were not justified on the ground that they had a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that he was involved in criminal activity. Absent any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest in crime prevention and appellant's right to personal [443 U.S. 47, 48] security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference.
Sorry you feel that way. But if I'm out and about, minding my own business, it most assuredly is an imposition to be stopped in whatever I may be doing, to demand my ID. Without reasonable suspicion, it becomes an infringement. That's the very definition of those two words.trainman said:Divulging Identification to LEOs isn't an imposition or an infringement.
Overused; Overworked; Non-sequitur... Over and above that, why should such a concept even matter?If you have nothing to hide.
How can a case which bans the police from stopping people legitimately on the street from checking ID's support your position that there isn't any prohibition to such practices?
Rich Lucibella
Boynton Beach, FL 33435
You insist on anonymity in a claim that it is non-invasive to provide your personals to those with a "need to know".
By your own definition, you "may" have something to hide; I don't; nor do I have any felt need to prove that fact to any agent of the government in my daily routine.
See the difference in our positions? I think I should be free to go about my business; you don't.
Of course, you don't deny me that "right" under your name, but under the respectability of anonymous internet handle.
WA, please tell me how any LEO can have a "reasonable suspicion" that someone is "about to commit a crime"?
Or is too remote a possibility that some LEO may just "manufacture" a reason to stop people and ask for ID.
of the ocean, relentless.
Just a quick address for you. http://www.stormfront.org/whitehistory/usacrime.htm
It is just one of many, you can do your own search if truly interested.
Happy Holiday, Peter Rabbit.
Harley
WA, please tell me how any LEO can have a "reasonable suspicion" that someone is "about to commit a crime"?