Trapdoor Springfield

Regardin the M-16 rifle's problems early on, it was a situation that was FAR more complex than just unsuitable ammunition. There were a whole host of problems -- issues with the ammo, issues with the rifle's design, issues with maintenance, and issues with training.
 
Regardin the M-16 rifle's problems early on, it was a situation that was FAR more complex than just unsuitable ammunition.

Agreed, but if you take the unsuitable ammo out of the picture, the other problems would have had a lesser effect.

There were a whole host of problems -- issues with the ammo,
Absolutely.

issues with the rifle's design,
Not sure exactly what you are referring to here.

issues with maintenance, and issues with training.
Agreed, and 100% entirely the Army's fault, and responsibility.

Stories I've heard, from people who were there, range from the kind of thing that raises an eyebrow to things that seem impossible and unbelievably stupid. Some of them, no doubt are ..embellished, but others have the ring of truth, despite the apparent idiocy they describe.

One guy told me he got his M16 in "Nam", fully 6months before cleaning kits were available "in country". Another told me about how his NCOs told them the new rifles were "magic" and didn't need cleaning! :eek:

Factions in the Army tried very hard to sabotage the M16, in the (misguided) hope that it would be replaced with a "proper" rifle. They failed, but cost a number of GIs, their lives in the process.

As to the .45-70 ammo, I will send my research gnomes back into the vaults, to re-check the ancient scrolls. It's not impossible they gave me flawed information, or partially accurate information, that was not the answer I was seeking. Either way, the floggings will continue, until morale improves!
;)
 
The primary flaw with the rifles design was the unchromed bore. It allowed corrosion in the bore that was aggravated by the climate , which greatly contributed to cartridges sticking in the chamber.

That problem alone would have caused a significant number of issues with the early M-16s, with or without the powder issues.



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I've seen many cases recovered from the Little Bighorn battlefield and not a single one was a composite built up round.

I think you may be confusing the Little Big Horn fight with the British experience at Isandlawana and Rorke's Drift.

In both battles the British experienced issues with the composite built up cartridges sticking in the Martini-Henry's chamber when the rifle got hot and the bore and chamber was fouled.

The picture here (http://i120.photobucket.com/albums/o191/aoe276/Ball.jpg) shows 4 such composite cartridges.

The first three have iron washer rims, the fourth appears to have a brass washer rim.

One result of the rounds sticking in the chamber was the adoption of the Long Lever Martini-Henry Mk IV around 1885 and adoption of drawn brass cartridges.

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Here's an extract from a book that discusses the archaeological findings from the Little Big Horn battlefield.

The discussion of cartridges starts on the previous page.

https://books.google.com/books?id=q...IMDAB#v=onepage&q=benet primer system&f=false

It's interesting to note that there were apparently a fairly significant number of commercially made brass .50-70 cases recovered from the battlefield, apparently mostly used by the Indians.



This book has a much greater discussion of the cartridges recovered from the battlefield, starting on page 153.

https://books.google.com/books?id=-...=onepage&q=winchester-millbank primer&f=false



While not all of the pages in the section are in the preview attached above, there are several illustrations of .45-70 cartridges. None is a composite built up case.

One case even shows a rim tear through caused when the case stuck in the chamber.

If the cartridges had been composite built up, or as you initially stated, copper foil wrapped AROUND an iron washer rim, that sort of failure would have been impossible as the small extractor on the Springfield couldn't have torn through the iron.
 
Everybody was doing it. We had the Trapdoor, chosen from a dozen contenders for conversion of muzzleloader to breechloader, the British had the Snider, The French had the Tabatiere, most often seen now as the Zulu trade gun, no doubt other Powers had their own designs.

Interesting thing to me is how small a proportion of the many rifle muskets were converted. Flayderman says 5000 1865 Allins and 25,000 1866 Allins out of the half million plus 1861 and 1863 muzzleloaders. Were so many worn or damaged too badly to bother with?
 
No worries, I ordered some Starline brass. I have my brother's 1884 (mfg 1891) on loan, and will try both 405 and 500 gr close copies of the original bullets. He hasn't fired this rifle, but it is in excellent condition.

From what I've read, better ammo wouldn't have saved Custer. And Reno, though he took severe casualties, did manage to hold off the natives and escape.
 
"Interesting thing to me is how small a proportion of the many rifle muskets were converted. Flayderman says 5000 1865 Allins and 25,000 1866 Allins out of the half million plus 1861 and 1863 muzzleloaders. Were so many worn or damaged too badly to bother with?"

Well, it's a complicated answer.

The big difference, I think, between the US and Britain is that the British simply converted to a cartridge (.577 Snider) that worked with the existing barrel.


The US originally tried that, with a .58 rimfire, but decided to go with a smaller caliber bullet with better ballistics -- the .50-70.

So, they started by relining the barrels to .50.

That worked. Until the liners started detaching.

So, they decided to manufacture new barrels.

That sort of worked better.

Then the decision was made to go with an even smaller caliber cartridge, the .45-70. At that point, it was cheaper to come up with an entirely new rifle instead of trying to make do with converted rifled muskets.

And, finally, there was never the intent to convert all US rifled muskets because the number of available guns to convert FAR outstripped the number of soldiers in the post civil war Army.
 
With the lever action Winchester available I am at a loss to understand why the Army chose the Trapdoor. Some say the brass wanted a slower rate of fire for economy. I dunno. I have a modern H&R Trapdoor and it's cool but if I have to choose between it and an 1973 Winchester for fighting there would be no hesitation in picking the lever gun.
 
FWIW, I got my supplies this week, loaded 10 each 405 and 500 gr (Buffalo Arms), and took my brother's Trapdoor to the range. I loaded Alliant Black MZ, a BP substitute I really like, and fit 65 gr under both bullets. This rifle is a model of 1884 with the improved sights. At 100 it shoots high, but once I figured out the sight picture, I was putting them in the black. The 405s seem more accurate. I got almost no lateral variation with them. Fun rifle.
 
> And in that time, cheap was a big deal for the Army.

Just because they were supposed to save their empty brass and send it back to the depot to be reloaded doesn't mean th... wait. Yep, the Army was definitely cheap.
 
One thing we often forget is that c. 1866 and after, the U.S. Army had no significant enemy except the native Americans, whose firearms were, at best, obsolete and poorly maintained. (The myth of every "Injun" having a brand new repeating rifle and cases of ammunition was just that - a myth. Most had no firearms at all, only spears and hatchets, and ammunition for the few firearms they did have was scarce.)

But the Army planners always feared falling far behind the European powers in weaponry, a fear that turned real enough when war came with Spain. So the Army had (it believed) to think about a weapon that would at least have a range equal to that of a British or French rifle, not just match the miscellaneous carbines and muskets the Indians had. Hence the desire for long range over rapid fire (the same arguments made with other guns at later times).

There have been numerous analyses of the LBH battle, but among historians (not the gun "nuts") there seems a general consensus that the Army's weapons and ammunition troubles, while real enough, were secondary to a lack of fire discipline, poor command and control in general, and the simple fact that there were just too darned many Indians.

Jim
 
There have been numerous analyses of the LBH battle, but among historians (not the gun "nuts") there seems a general consensus that the Army's weapons and ammunition troubles, while real enough, were secondary to a lack of fire discipline, poor command and control in general, and the simple fact that there were just too darned many Indians.

Some of us gun nuts agree with this. It wasn't the Trapdoor that lost at Little Big Horn, it was Custer's tactics. The ammo problems certainly didn't help any but mostly it was "too many Indians".

Look at the battles of Isandlwana, and Roarke's Drift. British armed with single shot .45 caliber rifles. Huge disparity in numbers. Troops in the open, wiped out by the natives. Small number of troops in a defensive position, held out. Tactics matter.

One interesting tidbit I heard was that when the relief column reached Roarke's Drift, they were down to the basic load of ammo for their troops, and expect resupply because it was known that there was 25,000 rounds stored there. There was no ammo resupply for them, because the 200 some odd defenders had used it up!!!
 
"The ammo problems certainly didn't help any but mostly it was "too many Indians"."

Judging by what I've seen from battlefield recovery, the number of "ammunition problems" as in extractors tearing through the rims of cartridges, was low to the point of it having no applicable or practical effect on the course or outcome of the battle.

What is known is that the first .50-70 conversions (which apparently had an even smaller extractor bearing surface) did have a greater issues with the extractor tearing through the cartridge rims.
 
Libby would be rolling in her grave to hear it said- but the cause of the death of Custer's command was Custer.
Denis
 
Too many Indians, little if any reconnaissance, dividing of forces and not mutually supporting, poor choice of position....
 
With the lever action Winchester available I am at a loss to understand why the Army chose the Trapdoor. Some say the brass wanted a slower rate of fire for economy. I dunno. I have a modern H&R Trapdoor and it's cool but if I have to choose between it and an 1973 Winchester for fighting there would be no hesitation in picking the lever gun.
I remember one of the gun rags (years ago) doing a comparison test of the sustained rate of fire for the trapdoor Springfield and a lever-action. Their results demonstrated that, despite being a single shot, the Trapdoor had a higher rate of fire over time. It seems that despite being faster in firing multiple shots, the time it took to reload the magazine of a lever -action negated that advantage. The article also stated that was true until the advent of stripper clips for bolt actions.
 
Too many Indians, little if any reconnaissance, dividing of forces and not mutually supporting, poor choice of position....

Don't forget human ego. Particularly Custer's.

IF, on finding out that they were hugely outnumbered (something on the order of 10 to 1), the entire command had ridden hell for leather AWAY, until they found a defensible position, and let the Indians come to them then, the battle could have turned out quite differently.

But the US CAVALRY (and particularly a unit commanded by Custer) simply could not run. Nor would they envision a fighting retreat in the face of "mere savages".

I've heard Custer had a couple of Gatling guns available to him before he set out. He intentionally left them behind, believing the mules they were packed on would slow him down. If he had taken them with him, would they have made a difference in the end? Would his troops have had the time to unpack and set them up, and defend them long enough to matter?? We'll never know.
 
Theories vary, but I suspect the Gatlings COULD, if used as part of a better strategic plan (or pretty much ANY strategic plan), have made quite a difference.
Denis
 
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