Lightening the slide stop will help prevent it tripping as a mag is inserted.
So will inserting the magazine "correctly".
And by that I mean firmly and rapidly, so it securely locks in, but not "ramming" it in so hard that the shock to the pistol jars the slide stop free, overcoming both its natural inertia and the spring pressure it is under.
In a way, tis comparable to "dumping the clutch". Though in a car, the clutch will wear out (to the point of requiring replacement) much, much sooner than the pistol will, the idea is the same. It is a deliberate overstress of the mechanism, which designers know people will do, and they build so that the machine will survive it, for a time, but its not supposed to be the normal method of operation.
Designers, however brilliant, are very seldom the guys on the sharp end (though there have been exceptions), and therefore, some things guys do with their equipment come as a surprise to them.
The old saying "give a (insert branch of service here) an anvil and a rock, and drop them naked in the desert and within 3 days, they will have broken the anvil, and lost the rock" isn't without a grain of truth.
There are 3 main phases to the design and use of field equipment, whether a rifle, tank, backpack or a fighter jet. The initial design work, where the item is conceived, and where all foreseeable problems are taken into account.
Then there is the testing phase, where testers try everything they can think of, and come up with things the designers never thought of that affect the items performance. Newly discovered problems (hopefully) get fixed, and then it goes to the troops.
And it is in troop use that other, "new" (previously unthought of) problems arise, and new fixes are created, over and over until, finally, no other problems show up.
Sometimes (most of the time) the problems are relatively minor, but sometimes a small thing that the designers overlooked can have large consequences.
The M1 Abrams tank had a situation like that. Well designed, and rigorously tested under all conceivable conditions. Bugs were found, and fixed. Blessed, and issued to troops. Then after the troops played with them a bit, NEW problems were "discovered", specifically a much shorter than expected transmission life. They were failing at a much higher rate than expected or desired, and they are expensive. For a while designers were baffled, their transmission was good, the best they could make, and they couldn't understand why they were breaking too soon. All QC on parts and assembly were checked and rechecked, and there was simply no reason for it happening!
Until some bright fellow actually went out and spent time with the troops to see HOW it was being used. Turned out that the modern "shoot and scoot" tactics (the way to maximize survivability in combat) was the culprit. Drivers were slamming the tank into reverse, (and punching the gas) the instant the gun fired, no matter if the tank was sitting still, or moving forward at 30+ mph. The designers simply never expected that any one would actually do that, and the testers hadn't either. The additional, unexpected stress was causing premature failures.
Interior parts were redesigned, to take the additional stresses, and the problem was fixed. the point here is that troops in the field will do things the designers never thought of. Such as people slamming in the magazine as hard as they can, every single time. (train like you will fight).
Considering the 1911 design is well over a century old, (and the slide release is essentially unchanged) I'd say Browning did a damn fine job to begin with.