Leadership should be involved in all of this and not some staff Sergeant.
Interesting point, but the problem of too many hats comes into play. I worked the night shift most of the time at my interrogation/detainment facility. In one year, the MI battalion commander visited at night twice. The S3 visited twice (same time as the BC). The battalion sergeant major visited only during the day. Originally, our facility belonged to HHC, but the HHC commander and first sergeant never visited at night. The MP commander never visited. We became a provisional MP/MI company six months into the deployment. The company commander visited less than ten times in six months at night. The first sergeant visited almost every night, but always before or around midnight. So, the two people in charge of the facility were myself and the MP night shift squad leader, both staff sergeants. Everybody who should have been checking up on us was too busy doing other things to do it often. However, leaving a shift in the hands of a staff sergeant is supposed to mean that it will run smoothly with a 99% success rate. I think the AG leadership assumed that it was running smoothly and didn't bother checking, because with a staff sergeant in charge, it should have. They didn't realize that the staff sergeant in question was a sick individual who would get his rocks off on beating prisoners and would subvert his troops into doing the same, with great success in twisting Graner around. So great, in fact, that Graner would be described as the "ringleader".
So how high up should this go? One would need a copy of their chain of command to determine that, since I don't know how many levels there were between the SSG and BG Karpinski. On the interrogator side of the house, the same problem exists: How close were COL Pappas and LTC Jordan to the interrogators that were listed in the intelligence review, especially the civilian ones? Was LTC Jordan calling the shots when it came to the day-to-day interrogation operations, i.e. assigning interrogators, suggesting approaches, and personally supervising interrogations? Probably not, but none of us know for sure. I think a suitable punishment would be jail for those directly involved in actual criminal behavior or with unreported first-hand knowledge in the case of supervisors; dismissal from service and fines equal to the amount of pay they earned in Iraq for the next supervisor, both officer and NCO; dismissal from service for the next higher echelon; and administrative reprimand for the next higher. People keep saying that SECDEF Rumsfeld or LTG Sanchez should be doing time for these incidents. I don't think either had "visit the Abu G night shift and check for human rights violations" on their daily to-do list. If either fall within the echelons I listed above, levy the appropriate punishment, but if not, get off their backs. They did the job the best they could with the troops that they were given. It's not their fault that they couldn't be everywhere at once.
I've heard that photos were used to bribe these Arab men into becoming informants.
I was going to make a point here, but it would probably violate methods and sources. But as a trained human intelligence collector, I can tell you that your statement is wrong.
