Better Late Than Never
I apologize for the rescuscitation, but I just spotted this thread and wished to address where one forum member opted to address my comments.
“Nonsense” would be the DECISION, active or passive, that led to FBI agents carrying inadequate firepower resulting in their getting themselves shot to pieces. The FACT is that these agents were attempting to LOCATE and perform surveillance on two known heavily armed and dangerous suspects. They had to recognize that their cover might be blown and if so, that they might not be up to the task of engaging the suspects head-on on an immediate basis. What OTHER agents had in other parts of town has nothing to do with the agents on the actual battlefield that day. History regarding strategy and tactics is written primarily from the presence, actions and experience of the units in the engagement. NOT units arrayed elsewhere. How many books have been written about the German panzer units deployed well behind the beaches at Normandy on D-Day? A little focus here might prove helpful.
What happened to the bad guys as a result of the force of impact during the chase/impact or after they may have been hit by projectiles or fragments is pretty inconsequential. It is the weapon retention (or lack thereof) on the part of the FBI agents that is the focus of that discussion.
Then we are in agreement here. It was the lack of weapon retention on the part of the FBI officers that reduced their ability to fight.
Where they HAD to anticipate that they might encounter the suspects under less than ideal circumstances and might be forced to exchange fire with them. What you neglect to observe is that these few agents, conducting “surveillance or street duty” CHOSE to pursue and ram or attempt to corner ARMED and DANGEROUS suspects armed with no more than what you state were typical service weapons for their posture. It was a DUMB move and the results of the pressed encounter are evidenced fully.
“Trying to work with”? What? The element of surprise having been compromised and at a tactical disadvantage? The bad guys did not “push” the situation. The FBI agents did. They inadvertently detected the suspects and pushed for a “tail” and stop AFTER they knew they also had been detected. Had the agents backed off, there is little doubt the suspects would have fled. Gee, it’s just too bad that the suspects decided not to simply jump into the net, huh?
The “facts” are that the Miami Shootout went down in the annals as one of the worst law enforcement shootouts in history and was studied as such. It was recorded that way because of the mistakes made by law enforcement, NOT any other participants, tools or circumstances.
That is PRECISELY what happened here. Perhaps you extracted some other conclusion, but the sequence of events and decisions on the part of the agents on scene disagrees with whatever that might be.
Really? How could the bad guys eluding the officers (and as a result, having an unplanned shootout in a residential area where agents were killed) have been a worse outcome? The agents would have now known the suspects were still operating in the area and could have tightened the “60 block” net just a bit more in the hours following the escape, don’t you think? Etcetera this to death, but forcing a unplanned and unexpected confrontation with heavily armed and violent suspects in a residential area is NOT a prudent decision, given the option to back off and cordon off a much more restricted area, with the perpetrators having exposed themselves.
Ad hominem? I’ve made my point. You failed to make anything of the sort. You are the one projecting the outcome had the agents used some common sense and backed off (The BGs could have escaped, there could have been civilians injured, more agents could have been killed, etc.) The fact remains – agents died and the incident has been recorded as a large blunder on the part of the bureau and an example of what NOT TO DO under such circumstances.
We are not discussing what might happen today. We are discussing what happened THEN. The agents were perfectly capable of avoiding a firefight with heavily armed suspects in a residential area where they should have known their training, tools and deployment were lacking what might be required should things get ugly. Common sense was as available then as it is today. Someone just needed to ensure it made its way into policy or procedure. Absent that, a ‘gung-ho’ mentality prevailed and we see the net result.
They WERE lightly armed for the MISSION they chose to take on. Even you state that it was their mission to perform detection and surveillance until the prepared units could arrive. Are you claiming that they had no policy or procedure in place in the event the bad guys detected the surveillance and might attempt to flee? What the agents “thought best” was either procedure/policy, wasn’t procedure policy or was a blatant lack of common sense under either circumstance.
This has nothing to do with my level of experience in similar situations. These were trained (supposedly) FBI agents that were assigned and tasked to detect, perform surveillance and apprehend specific suspects who were provided intelligence and a PLAN to do so. It’s pretty obvious that their training, tools and tactics were not up to the task. They CHOSE to pursue the suspects and attempt to detain and apprehend them where the suspects had ample warning that a confrontation was coming. The results of such poor planning and tactics speak for themselves.
It's not that it "didn't work out this time". It's because they made a conscious DECISION to deviate from the plan and they got their backsides handed to them on a platter. As a result, the Bureau, and LE in general, learned some valuable lessons.
I apologize for the rescuscitation, but I just spotted this thread and wished to address where one forum member opted to address my comments.
Nonsense. The Feds have always had lots of neat toys to play with, but usually they are left in the safe. The FBI agents, as stated, were armed as was typical for officers on surveillance or usual street duty--handguns and shotguns. Some agents did apparently have subguns, but were doing surveillance in another part of town.
“Nonsense” would be the DECISION, active or passive, that led to FBI agents carrying inadequate firepower resulting in their getting themselves shot to pieces. The FACT is that these agents were attempting to LOCATE and perform surveillance on two known heavily armed and dangerous suspects. They had to recognize that their cover might be blown and if so, that they might not be up to the task of engaging the suspects head-on on an immediate basis. What OTHER agents had in other parts of town has nothing to do with the agents on the actual battlefield that day. History regarding strategy and tactics is written primarily from the presence, actions and experience of the units in the engagement. NOT units arrayed elsewhere. How many books have been written about the German panzer units deployed well behind the beaches at Normandy on D-Day? A little focus here might prove helpful.
It has everything to do with: "The criminals had full control of their weapons at all times. They (criminals) had no problem with weapon retention." Hard to be in full control of your weapons when you are unconscious during most of the incident.
What happened to the bad guys as a result of the force of impact during the chase/impact or after they may have been hit by projectiles or fragments is pretty inconsequential. It is the weapon retention (or lack thereof) on the part of the FBI agents that is the focus of that discussion.
Why? Do you think it was an issue?
Then we are in agreement here. It was the lack of weapon retention on the part of the FBI officers that reduced their ability to fight.
Yep, and Florida is a pretty big place. In this particular place there were 14 agents covering a 60 block urban area.
Where they HAD to anticipate that they might encounter the suspects under less than ideal circumstances and might be forced to exchange fire with them. What you neglect to observe is that these few agents, conducting “surveillance or street duty” CHOSE to pursue and ram or attempt to corner ARMED and DANGEROUS suspects armed with no more than what you state were typical service weapons for their posture. It was a DUMB move and the results of the pressed encounter are evidenced fully.
Sigh. For about the umpteenth time, the agents didn't go out planning to engage the suspects, they were made by the suspects and that changed the dynamics significantly. The agents were out looking for potential hit sites and with the intentions of tailing the BGs back to their home. Actually encountering them was a bit of a surprise at that time, and one they were trying to work with. In fact, contrary to what some here have claimed, the agents on the scene were trying to get some help from marked units to conduct the takedown. The BGs pushed the situation too fast.You are certainly entitled to your opinion, no matter how much it seems to disagree with the facts.
“Trying to work with”? What? The element of surprise having been compromised and at a tactical disadvantage? The bad guys did not “push” the situation. The FBI agents did. They inadvertently detected the suspects and pushed for a “tail” and stop AFTER they knew they also had been detected. Had the agents backed off, there is little doubt the suspects would have fled. Gee, it’s just too bad that the suspects decided not to simply jump into the net, huh?
The “facts” are that the Miami Shootout went down in the annals as one of the worst law enforcement shootouts in history and was studied as such. It was recorded that way because of the mistakes made by law enforcement, NOT any other participants, tools or circumstances.
I'd agree. But as that scenartio has nothing in comon with what happened here, I fail to see its relevance.
That is PRECISELY what happened here. Perhaps you extracted some other conclusion, but the sequence of events and decisions on the part of the agents on scene disagrees with whatever that might be.
The BGs could have escaped, there could have been civilians injured, more agents could have been killed, etc.
Really? How could the bad guys eluding the officers (and as a result, having an unplanned shootout in a residential area where agents were killed) have been a worse outcome? The agents would have now known the suspects were still operating in the area and could have tightened the “60 block” net just a bit more in the hours following the escape, don’t you think? Etcetera this to death, but forcing a unplanned and unexpected confrontation with heavily armed and violent suspects in a residential area is NOT a prudent decision, given the option to back off and cordon off a much more restricted area, with the perpetrators having exposed themselves.
Your ability to 2nd guess after the fact and perform the Monday morning quarterback drill are duly noted.
Ad hominem? I’ve made my point. You failed to make anything of the sort. You are the one projecting the outcome had the agents used some common sense and backed off (The BGs could have escaped, there could have been civilians injured, more agents could have been killed, etc.) The fact remains – agents died and the incident has been recorded as a large blunder on the part of the bureau and an example of what NOT TO DO under such circumstances.
Again, could-would-should. The reality is that stuff didn't happen then and wouldn't happen now given the same situation.
We are not discussing what might happen today. We are discussing what happened THEN. The agents were perfectly capable of avoiding a firefight with heavily armed suspects in a residential area where they should have known their training, tools and deployment were lacking what might be required should things get ugly. Common sense was as available then as it is today. Someone just needed to ensure it made its way into policy or procedure. Absent that, a ‘gung-ho’ mentality prevailed and we see the net result.
Again, it might be nice if your accusations and claims had some relationship to reality. The agents were not lightly armed FOR THE TIME. The assault was not uncoordinated or impromptu, it was done in a coordinted manner at a time the agents thought was best in that situation.
They WERE lightly armed for the MISSION they chose to take on. Even you state that it was their mission to perform detection and surveillance until the prepared units could arrive. Are you claiming that they had no policy or procedure in place in the event the bad guys detected the surveillance and might attempt to flee? What the agents “thought best” was either procedure/policy, wasn’t procedure policy or was a blatant lack of common sense under either circumstance.
Let's see now...they got several hits on that man, some fairly early in the fight, which were fatal. They did this in an environment with lots of cover and concealement, obscured by a fair amount of smoke, lots of dust, and a huge difference in light levels. All while being shot at. And the area included much more than a 50 foot limit. Perhaps you could have done better. Maybe you will share with us your experience in similar situations?
This has nothing to do with my level of experience in similar situations. These were trained (supposedly) FBI agents that were assigned and tasked to detect, perform surveillance and apprehend specific suspects who were provided intelligence and a PLAN to do so. It’s pretty obvious that their training, tools and tactics were not up to the task. They CHOSE to pursue the suspects and attempt to detain and apprehend them where the suspects had ample warning that a confrontation was coming. The results of such poor planning and tactics speak for themselves.
Because the agents hadn't intended to pounce on the goons. The FBI wasn't ready for a shootout, and hadn't planned on a shootout. They were out doing surveillance, with the idea that they would follow the BGs home, then get a team in to take them down. That was fairly standard procedure. Just didn't work out this time.
It's not that it "didn't work out this time". It's because they made a conscious DECISION to deviate from the plan and they got their backsides handed to them on a platter. As a result, the Bureau, and LE in general, learned some valuable lessons.
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