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Why did the U.S. army turn their back on the lever gun after the Civil War?
- Thread starter kcub
- Start date
kcub said:Not every battle is engaged beyond 300 yards.
That is actually kind of a funny statement, if you consider small arms design post StG44.
Man, this one has gone on a lot longer than I thought it would . . . .
OK, this is an overview of US military firearms history according to me (for better or worse):
The first thing I would mention is that lever action rifles of the CW era fired very low power cartridges, something like an overgrown 22 Long Rifle in energy. An infantryman's rifle was expected to be able to fire 500 yds and kill a horse. Yes, a horse, because cavalry (you know, those guys on horses we always think of as the US Army in old Western movies) were the tanks of the era, and a cavalry charge was a terrible thing to have happen to your infantry unit. So, you needed to keep the cavalry, lancers, and dragoons (mounted infantry, kind of like our airborne units today) at bay, and you did that with long-range firepower. You can't kill a horse or stop a cavalry charge with a Volcanic rifle, in spite of its magazine capacity.
An infantryman's rifle was primarily a mount for a bayonet, and infantry engagements were men in long lines, volleys of cannon and rifle fire followed by a charge, and wrapped up with hand-to-hand fighting with bayonets and swords. Rifles had to be sturdy so you could use them as a pike, a lance, or a club. Along those lines, even the best lever action rifles were fairly flimsy mechanical contraptions that required well-trained armorers to keep them working. Would you go to war with a rifle that would not kill the enemy and might break right when you needed it most?
The next thing I would mention was that the regular US Army was very small until after WW2. In case of war, civilians were enlisted or drafted, or units of state or private militia were mobilized, trained, and sent to war, which often took months. When militias fought, they fought as their own units, not as US Army units (they were directed by US Army officers in many cases). Most of the units armed with the "miracle weapons that you loaded on Monday and fired all week" were armed by militias, very few by the US Army or the War Department (yes, that's what it was called back before we emasculated them in the 1960s). It was that way until World War I, rich investors would arm a bunch of troops and send them off to fight for glory. Old Teddy Roosevelt was in one of those private militias during his famous charge up Kettle Hill.
Probably the first lever action rifles to have the reliability and energy needed to serve as a military rifle at that time was the 1881 Marlin and the 1886 Winchester (20 years after the end of the war!!), the rest were okay for civilians who could pamper them, but would not hold up under field conditions. I see posters on here claiming great things for lever action rifles, but until the 1880s and solid-frame rifles, they were pretty frail things. And by that time, bolt action rifles were on the scene and lever rifles were once again outclassed.
End of rant. Thank you for not throwing rotten tomatoes.
OK, this is an overview of US military firearms history according to me (for better or worse):
The first thing I would mention is that lever action rifles of the CW era fired very low power cartridges, something like an overgrown 22 Long Rifle in energy. An infantryman's rifle was expected to be able to fire 500 yds and kill a horse. Yes, a horse, because cavalry (you know, those guys on horses we always think of as the US Army in old Western movies) were the tanks of the era, and a cavalry charge was a terrible thing to have happen to your infantry unit. So, you needed to keep the cavalry, lancers, and dragoons (mounted infantry, kind of like our airborne units today) at bay, and you did that with long-range firepower. You can't kill a horse or stop a cavalry charge with a Volcanic rifle, in spite of its magazine capacity.
An infantryman's rifle was primarily a mount for a bayonet, and infantry engagements were men in long lines, volleys of cannon and rifle fire followed by a charge, and wrapped up with hand-to-hand fighting with bayonets and swords. Rifles had to be sturdy so you could use them as a pike, a lance, or a club. Along those lines, even the best lever action rifles were fairly flimsy mechanical contraptions that required well-trained armorers to keep them working. Would you go to war with a rifle that would not kill the enemy and might break right when you needed it most?
The next thing I would mention was that the regular US Army was very small until after WW2. In case of war, civilians were enlisted or drafted, or units of state or private militia were mobilized, trained, and sent to war, which often took months. When militias fought, they fought as their own units, not as US Army units (they were directed by US Army officers in many cases). Most of the units armed with the "miracle weapons that you loaded on Monday and fired all week" were armed by militias, very few by the US Army or the War Department (yes, that's what it was called back before we emasculated them in the 1960s). It was that way until World War I, rich investors would arm a bunch of troops and send them off to fight for glory. Old Teddy Roosevelt was in one of those private militias during his famous charge up Kettle Hill.
Probably the first lever action rifles to have the reliability and energy needed to serve as a military rifle at that time was the 1881 Marlin and the 1886 Winchester (20 years after the end of the war!!), the rest were okay for civilians who could pamper them, but would not hold up under field conditions. I see posters on here claiming great things for lever action rifles, but until the 1880s and solid-frame rifles, they were pretty frail things. And by that time, bolt action rifles were on the scene and lever rifles were once again outclassed.
End of rant. Thank you for not throwing rotten tomatoes.
mapsjanhere
New member
An army doesn't plan for "what works best in a specific engagement" but "what works sufficiently in all engagements".Originally Posted by kcub
Not every battle is engaged beyond 300 yards.
mapsjanhere
New member
Set infantry in blocks didn't have anything to fear from cavalry charges. A dispersed unit or skirmishing line did. Which is why they kept the battalion or larger blocks in battle even with the improved accuracy and firepower of rifled percussion guns taking big chunks out of them.
But US cavalry was typically used as mounted infantry anyway, Custer famously left his sabers behind.
But US cavalry was typically used as mounted infantry anyway, Custer famously left his sabers behind.
mapsjanhere
New member
Then why don't they all carry 50 BMG Barretts?
Because the gun and its combat load of 120 rounds weigh a whopping 50 lbs. How far do you carry that?
I recall reading that cavalry was more about reconnaissance; that infantry had very little fear of them other than perhaps mobility/flanking. Unless you are talking about indigenous enemies with inferior edged or even stone age weapons.
This is one of those "sort of" answer. Recon is one of the jobs of cavalry. So is raiding, along with the traditional "guard, screen, cover" missions. In fact the Confederate Cavalry units under John Morgan and John Mosby were quite celebrated for deep raids.
The thought of the day was to not use Cavalry against unbroken Infantry or an unexposed flank. The close order formations Infantry units fought in allowed a formation to repel a Cavalry charge, but a broken formation couldn't mass fire on the Cavalry to break the charge. An exposed flank is one where an attacking unit (Infantry or Cavalry) could attack without the bulk of the enemy force being able to respond. In a classic 10x10 Infantry Century, three Centuries abreast, the exposed flanks at any given time was the response of 10 men. The threat of enemy cavalry generally caused commanders to always be concerned about flank security so that they didn't fall victim to "defeat in detail."
It was this classical thinking of Cavalry that put so many Officers in the mindset that the tank was going to just be another support tool for the Infantry, and not a maneuver asset on its own. Rommel and Patton put that thinking to rest, but old habits die hard, which is why the Polish horse Cavalry school was still operating when the Third Reich took over Poland.
Even then, American Cavalry has traditionally been more "Dragoon" oriented than true Cavalry oriented. Dragoons are "mounted Infantry" in that they have the strategic mobility of Cavalry but dismount to fight as Infantry. The benefit of "Dragoons" is that you can deploy them organically and get the best of both formations.
Jimro
Let's not overlook two other factors, not yet (I think) mentioned. In the CW period, there was NO factory capable of producing enough repeating rifles/carbines to even begin to equip the Federal forces. (The CSA had no rifle factory capable of making any Spencers or Henrys.)
Further, the factories that did exist made only one kind of gun. The idea of the Army adopting a rifle, buying the rights, and then contracting production had a beginning with the Spencer-Burnside arrangement, but that was the exception.
The other is that U.S. ordnance officers knew that the enemy had nothing better than the rifle musket and was unlikely to ever have anything better. Since the U.S. forces were superior in numbers, there was no overriding need tor superior weaponry. Spencers all around would have been nice to have, but if your army has superiority in numbers you don't NEED superior weapons, only weapons as good as the enemy's.
Jim
Further, the factories that did exist made only one kind of gun. The idea of the Army adopting a rifle, buying the rights, and then contracting production had a beginning with the Spencer-Burnside arrangement, but that was the exception.
The other is that U.S. ordnance officers knew that the enemy had nothing better than the rifle musket and was unlikely to ever have anything better. Since the U.S. forces were superior in numbers, there was no overriding need tor superior weaponry. Spencers all around would have been nice to have, but if your army has superiority in numbers you don't NEED superior weapons, only weapons as good as the enemy's.
Jim
Union Col John Wilder had to make a private purchase of Spencers to equip his Cavalry Brigade. His unit having repeating rifles made huge differences in desiring to fire the Confederates, and the ability of small Cavalry units being able to hold on against large enemy formations until the Infantry moved up to held.
http://www.historynet.com/battle-of...ightning-brigade-prevented-total-disaster.htm
As has been said earlier, early lever actions were not able to shoot the higher power black powder cartridges the Army wished to use as universal cartridges. The Spencer was an example, it fired a short, stubby round.
Something else was the level of lever action technology in the late 1860's. There was of course the innate conservatism of the Army, they don't like change. They also thought of repeaters as "wasting ammunition". The primary factor for a lack of firearms innovation in the post Civil War Army was the tremendous cost of the CW, and the lack of funds afterwards.
I have a recent issue of the Arms and the Man, it shows all sorts of single shot cartridge conversions to the M1861 Musket. A number of companies submitted designs so this issue was very important, and it was due to the fact that almost no money existed post Civil War, and yet the Army had this huge stock of obsolete Muskets. Given the conservative nature of the Army, this just plays into the hands of the types who want to roll the calendar back to a simpler time. Like one hundred years. No change is good change for these types. Money is always the first and best defense against change. Change is expensive and cost is routinely used to beat down those who want to buy the latest and greatest. Historically, the Army did come up with conversions that used this vast stock of old obsolete muskets. The M1865 appears to be the first trapdoor conversion the Army. About 5000 of the things were made, but you can see from the very start the little incremental changes that showed this approach was flawed.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Springfield_Model_1865. Then the 1866, then the 1868, 1869, 1870, 1871, etc. The starting approach was flawed, the Army kept on making changes, but kept the same basic rifle: a cartridge version of the M1861 musket. At some point the M1873 was a new rifle, I don't know how many parts could be used from Civil War M1861's, but I will bet, darn few.
The civilian world was producing more advanced single shot designs and European countries were producing more advanced single shot designs, but luckily for the US, we no longer had a war to fight with anyone outside of the American Indians. These guys of course would not be in the same armament Class as a Russian, British, French, or German Army, so there was no real forcing function to improve on the basic side arms of the average Infantry Soldier. It is instructive that the M1873 was carried into combat in the 1890's against the Spanish. The Spanish were armed with the latest Mauser repeating rifles. Seven hundred and sixty Spanish regulars took on 15,000 Americans in the Battle of San Juan Hill inflicting five times as many causalities on the Americans before human wave tactics finally overwhelmed them. That made a huge impression on the American Ordnance Department.
I doubt lever actions would have been used anyway. There have been very few lever actions used as service weapons for any length of time. Lever action mechanisms are not as simple or study as the better single shots or even the good bolt action designs. There were bolt actions with tubular magazines but they were replaced as the tube magazine was not as rugged as the Mauser type magazine.
http://www.historynet.com/battle-of...ightning-brigade-prevented-total-disaster.htm
As has been said earlier, early lever actions were not able to shoot the higher power black powder cartridges the Army wished to use as universal cartridges. The Spencer was an example, it fired a short, stubby round.
Something else was the level of lever action technology in the late 1860's. There was of course the innate conservatism of the Army, they don't like change. They also thought of repeaters as "wasting ammunition". The primary factor for a lack of firearms innovation in the post Civil War Army was the tremendous cost of the CW, and the lack of funds afterwards.
I have a recent issue of the Arms and the Man, it shows all sorts of single shot cartridge conversions to the M1861 Musket. A number of companies submitted designs so this issue was very important, and it was due to the fact that almost no money existed post Civil War, and yet the Army had this huge stock of obsolete Muskets. Given the conservative nature of the Army, this just plays into the hands of the types who want to roll the calendar back to a simpler time. Like one hundred years. No change is good change for these types. Money is always the first and best defense against change. Change is expensive and cost is routinely used to beat down those who want to buy the latest and greatest. Historically, the Army did come up with conversions that used this vast stock of old obsolete muskets. The M1865 appears to be the first trapdoor conversion the Army. About 5000 of the things were made, but you can see from the very start the little incremental changes that showed this approach was flawed.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Springfield_Model_1865. Then the 1866, then the 1868, 1869, 1870, 1871, etc. The starting approach was flawed, the Army kept on making changes, but kept the same basic rifle: a cartridge version of the M1861 musket. At some point the M1873 was a new rifle, I don't know how many parts could be used from Civil War M1861's, but I will bet, darn few.
The civilian world was producing more advanced single shot designs and European countries were producing more advanced single shot designs, but luckily for the US, we no longer had a war to fight with anyone outside of the American Indians. These guys of course would not be in the same armament Class as a Russian, British, French, or German Army, so there was no real forcing function to improve on the basic side arms of the average Infantry Soldier. It is instructive that the M1873 was carried into combat in the 1890's against the Spanish. The Spanish were armed with the latest Mauser repeating rifles. Seven hundred and sixty Spanish regulars took on 15,000 Americans in the Battle of San Juan Hill inflicting five times as many causalities on the Americans before human wave tactics finally overwhelmed them. That made a huge impression on the American Ordnance Department.
I doubt lever actions would have been used anyway. There have been very few lever actions used as service weapons for any length of time. Lever action mechanisms are not as simple or study as the better single shots or even the good bolt action designs. There were bolt actions with tubular magazines but they were replaced as the tube magazine was not as rugged as the Mauser type magazine.
The problem with San Juan Hill wasn't just the rifles, it was:
1. The Spanish had a prepared defensive position.
2. The American force didn't use indirect fires effectively to weaken the prepared defenses.
3. The lack of artillery support caused the Gatlings to be re-allocated to support the Infantry, which was able to provide enough suppression to get the Infantry within charging distance of the Spanish line.
Given the battlefield geometry, giving every Infantryman a repeating rifle wouldn't have done much good as in order to maneuver close in the Infantry would have still needed some sort of fire support to suppress the defenders.
But the totality of the Spanish American war showed a large number of shortcomings across all aspects of military equipment. Even the Navy got into the act with the 1907 "Great White Fleet."
Shortly after the Spanish American War the US Army would upgrade Machine Guns and field artillery (M1902/1905 3" field guns), but those upgrades would be short lived after the lessons of WWI were hammered home and the need to modernize the new field of Armor and Aviation as well.
Jimro
1. The Spanish had a prepared defensive position.
2. The American force didn't use indirect fires effectively to weaken the prepared defenses.
3. The lack of artillery support caused the Gatlings to be re-allocated to support the Infantry, which was able to provide enough suppression to get the Infantry within charging distance of the Spanish line.
Given the battlefield geometry, giving every Infantryman a repeating rifle wouldn't have done much good as in order to maneuver close in the Infantry would have still needed some sort of fire support to suppress the defenders.
But the totality of the Spanish American war showed a large number of shortcomings across all aspects of military equipment. Even the Navy got into the act with the 1907 "Great White Fleet."
Shortly after the Spanish American War the US Army would upgrade Machine Guns and field artillery (M1902/1905 3" field guns), but those upgrades would be short lived after the lessons of WWI were hammered home and the need to modernize the new field of Armor and Aviation as well.
Jimro
The problem with San Juan Hill wasn't just the rifles, it was:
1. The Spanish had a prepared defensive position.
2. The American force didn't use indirect fires effectively to weaken the prepared defenses.
3. The lack of artillery support caused the Gatlings to be re-allocated to support the Infantry, which was able to provide enough suppression to get the Infantry within charging distance of the Spanish line.
Don't disagree. Something else that is not touched on, is the guts of the Spanish defenders. Seven hundred Spanish stayed and fought against 15,000 Americans instead of doing the smart thing of 1) running away, or 2) quitting before things got out of hand. Chances of surviving an encounter where the attacker has 15:1 odds is pretty darn slim. But they stayed and fought. That's guts.
Yup, can't fault the Spanish defenders for holding on. Their Maxim guns were in storage instead of where they should have been to break a mass charge.
In hindsight it is easy to see how dumb it is to put finicky machine guns into storage instead of doubling or tripling the number of guns per position. It's easy to be a Monday morning armchair quarterback with over a hundred years of military history since then to draw on for lessons learned, but at the time I'm sure the Spanish had their reasons.
Jimro
In hindsight it is easy to see how dumb it is to put finicky machine guns into storage instead of doubling or tripling the number of guns per position. It's easy to be a Monday morning armchair quarterback with over a hundred years of military history since then to draw on for lessons learned, but at the time I'm sure the Spanish had their reasons.
Jimro
1873 Panic
http://study.com/academy/lesson/financial-panic-of-1873-causes-summary-quiz.html
A major economic downturn after the War Between the States may have contributed to the Federal government being frugal and re-working left over muzzleloaders?
http://study.com/academy/lesson/financial-panic-of-1873-causes-summary-quiz.html
In the United States financial depression came as a result of over-speculation in the railroad industry. Learn about the causes of the Panic of 1873 as well as the impact the event had on the nation.
Introduction
It is important to point out that the Panic of 1873 in the United States was part of a larger international economic depression. The pain the United States felt financially was matched across the ocean in Europe when the value of silver plummeted to uncontrollable levels. Our focus is going to be on the financial collapse in the United States.
Following the Civil War, the United States experienced a period of economic growth that was unmatched in its brief history. Employment rose substantially thanks to a remarkable business boom. Most of the economic success in the post-war years is attributed to the construction of railroads. Between the end of the war and the beginning of the financial collapse, railroad companies had laid over 30,000 miles of track, which included the major project of linking the Union Pacific and Central Pacific via the transcontinental railroad. When the aforementioned project was completed in 1869, investors began looking for an additional railroad project to invest in. This was the doomed Northern Pacific.
A major economic downturn after the War Between the States may have contributed to the Federal government being frugal and re-working left over muzzleloaders?
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Remember this was a time before income taxes went from a "wartime need" to a peacetime reality, when the Federal government got most of its revenue from tariffs and such. In fact the Grant administration was actively looking to end the income tax.
http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1986/winter/civil-war-tax-records.html
The same reason we are now on the M109A7 (two separate upgrades in the past gave it a completely new turret, the following upgrade gave it a completely new chassis so the current Paladin has neither turret nor chassis in common with the first Paladin) is that it is easier to purchase an upgrade for an existing system than a completely new system. It's already in the inventory, cheaper to upgrade than replace, right? Sometimes it's "penny wise, pound foolish."
Like the mistaken belief that the "joint strike fighter" would actually save money, despite the utterly failed previous joint strike fighter program, the F-111. Congress is often stupid about military procurement. Of course the military is also stupid about military procurement, which is why we keep flying B-52s that have had three generations of Airmen serve in the same tail number, and why the USMC is still swimming to shore in AAVs that are only slightly younger.
Jimro
http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1986/winter/civil-war-tax-records.html
The same reason we are now on the M109A7 (two separate upgrades in the past gave it a completely new turret, the following upgrade gave it a completely new chassis so the current Paladin has neither turret nor chassis in common with the first Paladin) is that it is easier to purchase an upgrade for an existing system than a completely new system. It's already in the inventory, cheaper to upgrade than replace, right? Sometimes it's "penny wise, pound foolish."
Like the mistaken belief that the "joint strike fighter" would actually save money, despite the utterly failed previous joint strike fighter program, the F-111. Congress is often stupid about military procurement. Of course the military is also stupid about military procurement, which is why we keep flying B-52s that have had three generations of Airmen serve in the same tail number, and why the USMC is still swimming to shore in AAVs that are only slightly younger.
Jimro
This is one of the most interesting articles I've read about the evolving role of cavalry in the Civil War.
http://www.cincinnaticwrt.org/data/ccwrt_history/talks_text/starr_cavalry_tactics.html
http://www.cincinnaticwrt.org/data/ccwrt_history/talks_text/starr_cavalry_tactics.html
Within an hour after their arrival the men were in position, the reconnaisances had been made, and everything was ready for the assault, when chance intervened. Chalmers' division of Forrest's cavalry arrived on the scene and launched an attack against the regiment protecting the rear of Longs' division. Most commanders in Long's position, in the Civil War or in any other war, would have given up all thought of proceeding with their own attack and would have faced about to defend themselves against the threat from the rear. (39) But not Long. He detached a second regiment to help stop Chalmers, and then, without waiting for Upton's attack, led the rest of his men, 1,550 dismounted troopers, in a headlong rush across the 600 yards of open ground in front of the works, in the teeth of the artillery and muskets of 1,500 men of Forrest's best brigade. Upton advanced as soon as he heard Long's guns, and the two divisions almost simultaneously breached the defenses in front of them. The inner redoubts, with Forrest personally in command, held up the Union drive, but only momentarily. Led by Wilson himself, four regiments, the Fourth Ohio and the Seventeenth Indiana among them, smashed their way through, and the Confederates became a mob, pursued through the town and captured in droves by the one Union regiment whose horses were near enough for immediate use. Forrest himself, some of his generals and a fraction of his force managed to escape in the darkness, but 2,700 officers and men, 31 field guns and immense quantities of stores were captured, at a cost to the Union of only 40 killed and 260 wounded. (40) Strong fortifications, adequately manned by good troops, had been carried by cavalry alone in a single assault lasting barely an hour. The assault succeeded because of the rate of fire of three or four thousand Spencer carbines in the hands of men who were not to be stopped by anything.
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Maybe I've got it wrong but I always thought Lee should have just quit Gettysburg once it was established that the Union held the more favorable high ground. Just keep marching on Washington until he was able to secure the ground of his choosing. Sooner or later the Union army would have had to chase him down. That would have made him the great general he was purported to be.
kclub Washington DC was massively fortified. In spite of the rich land Lee was marching through his army was running out of supplies.
An attempt on DC would have been a running battle with large amounts of Union cavalry cutting at Lee's flanks and Mead's main body nipping at his heels.
When Lee got to the gates of Washington he would be between a hammer and an anvil.
Gettysburg was a Union victory, but it was a closer thing than most people realize. There are several occasions when we could say "if it weren't for" the Union would have lost.
Probably the most famous is the 20th Maine's stance on Little Round Top.
With the exception of Pickett's Charge on the final day you really need 20/20 hindsight to fault Lee.
Shelby Foote's three volume history of the Civil War would be a good place to start. There is an on line biography of Meade that might also be helpful.
http://www.amazon.com/Civil-War-Volumes-1-3-Box/dp/0394749138
https://books.google.com/books?id=B...lr=&hl=en#v=onepage&q=biography meade&f=false
Just be aware that Foote tends toward the Southern view point and the Meade bio is close to hero worship.
An attempt on DC would have been a running battle with large amounts of Union cavalry cutting at Lee's flanks and Mead's main body nipping at his heels.
When Lee got to the gates of Washington he would be between a hammer and an anvil.
Gettysburg was a Union victory, but it was a closer thing than most people realize. There are several occasions when we could say "if it weren't for" the Union would have lost.
Probably the most famous is the 20th Maine's stance on Little Round Top.
With the exception of Pickett's Charge on the final day you really need 20/20 hindsight to fault Lee.
Shelby Foote's three volume history of the Civil War would be a good place to start. There is an on line biography of Meade that might also be helpful.
http://www.amazon.com/Civil-War-Volumes-1-3-Box/dp/0394749138
https://books.google.com/books?id=B...lr=&hl=en#v=onepage&q=biography meade&f=false
Just be aware that Foote tends toward the Southern view point and the Meade bio is close to hero worship.
Read Gingrich's examination of what a turning movement [vice frontal attack] might have brought about.
http://www.amazon.com/Gettysburg-A-Novel-Civil-War/dp/0312987250
http://www.amazon.com/Grant-Comes-E...d_cp_14_1?ie=UTF8&refRID=1GBPEYWR2BC9MECPXNKD
Longstreet's flanking advice notwithstanding, Lee's Pennsylvania campaign was from
start-to-finish a political gambit -- banking on the effect of three successive devastat-
ing shocks (Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and final destruction of the Army of the
Potomac on its own soil and under strung-out/just-relieved command movement --
to sue for peace and get it.
With today's revisionist history's teaching that the North's goodness-of-cause meant
it was never teetering on a razor's edge of complete & total collapse just two years
into the war has done us a grave disservice.
.
http://www.amazon.com/Gettysburg-A-Novel-Civil-War/dp/0312987250
http://www.amazon.com/Grant-Comes-E...d_cp_14_1?ie=UTF8&refRID=1GBPEYWR2BC9MECPXNKD
Longstreet's flanking advice notwithstanding, Lee's Pennsylvania campaign was from
start-to-finish a political gambit -- banking on the effect of three successive devastat-
ing shocks (Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and final destruction of the Army of the
Potomac on its own soil and under strung-out/just-relieved command movement --
to sue for peace and get it.
With today's revisionist history's teaching that the North's goodness-of-cause meant
it was never teetering on a razor's edge of complete & total collapse just two years
into the war has done us a grave disservice.
.
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