VIDEO: Finest Bolt Action Battle Rifle in History?

Yup, volley fire was irrelevant by WW1. Long range volley sights were not entirely irrelevant, as illustrated by the execution done to field artillery crews in open ground by massed distant riflemen (still, not quite what their shrapnel did to troops in open ground). Not something there was much call for once trench warfare set in though, and like the magazine cutoff they were deleted on the SMLE in 1915 with the MKIII*.

I feel the tactics of WW1 are being a bit oversimplified here though. By this stage everyone knew that massed infantry attacks against prepared positions Napoleonic style was not a good idea. Tactics developed and evolved constantly during the war.

Perhaps the archetypal mass slaughter after going over the top was the Somme - but the thing is the army genuinely thought, and not without good reason, that it would be a complete success. The biggest preparatory bombardment in history up to that point came before the attack, huge numbers of shells. We know with hindsight that these weeks long bombardments singularly failed to deliver the required results, they did not know that in 1916. The men making these decisions were not morons, nor were they any more careless with their men's lives than other generals in other large scale wars, they were adapting to vast technological changes.

From the first months of trench warfare the British, French and Germans all started developing innovative ways of breaking the deadlock; underground mining, massive bombardment, tanks, trench raiding, poison gas, infiltration tactics etc. The Germans and Australians developed the best infiltration tactics, the British the most advanced artillery concepts. It took a while to hit on the correct formula to win against entrenched opponents, but it was not for want of trying (despite the lamentable tendency of the British to insist on having the cavalry ready for the big breakthrough right up until 1917).The point is, tactics evolved constantly as the war went on.

Anyhoo, still reckon the SMLE was the best bolt action battle rifle.
 
Lee Enfield

Over the years I've heard and read so much BS about how terrible the British SMLE is. It is BS. The Lee-Enfield rifle and concommitant round of ammunition was absolutely fantastic. All the naysayers should just can it! The rifle feels good in the shoulder, the round goes bang and hits what you're aiming at. I shot a 5" balloon at 300 yards with a vintage 1918 No 1 MkIII. That rifle is one of the most accurate rifles I've ever fired.
Has anyone read verified accounts of the 'weak' bolt causing a shooter any harm? I haven't. I've heard it is dangerous, and I say BS to that! I reload and have had cases split after many reloadings. That's my fault, not the gun. i use .312" bullets to compensate for well worn barrels. It works, accuracy on all six of my Lee-Enfields is good. 2 x No 1 MkIII, 1 x No 4 Mk1/2, 3 x No5 Mk1.
If you want to hate the British, go ahead, they can take it. But, don't 'dis' the Lee-Enfield, you're wasting your time there too! Anyone who dislikes the Lee-Enfield probably dislikes the Spitfire. Don't waste your energy, that too was a fantastic British invention. Anyone who disagrees should read the history of the P51. It wasn't much good until a Merlin engine was put into it. Then it became a legend!
 
Hmm. My favorite is better than your favorite because I say so. OK. :rolleyes:

The British were handicapped by their government policies. They tried to adopt new rifles before WW1 and again before WW2, but failed due to the outbreak of war in both cases. Even they realized that the Lee Enfield was not the greatest rifle in the world (I am not sure why literate and illiterate armchair historians still argue about it). And yet, they fought very well with it. More of a case of using what you have rather than whining about what you wished you had (this latter one is something that seems to plague many armies, even the US). And the fact that it enjoyed a long service life had more to do with the aforementioned government policies and the starry-eyed belief that the last war was so horrendous that no one would think of starting another (if you doubt this, read up on British history, the peace movement, and Neville Chamberlain).

As Kraig pointed out, by 1917 most of the combatants were stalled by tactics, supply shortages, and just tired. At that point, the Germans held more ground, had fewer casualties, had better morale, and were generally "winning". Then the US joined in, and although they were not welcomed with open arms, they brought new men, new weapons, and most importantly, new supplies of food and materiel. US soldiers were used to relieve French and British soldiers from cooking, laundry, stablery, drive trucks and ambulances, fill in and dig trenches and fortifications, and in general just pushed out of the way and into menial jobs by both the British and French in a huge display of nationalistic pride. The French and British had agreed to arm and house them, and did so initially until Pershing managed to tick everybody off. Once in battle, our tactics were a huge surprise to all parties in the war, mostly because we had little or no formal battlefield training, we just came in with enthusiasm, operated unconventionally, went around obstacles instead of trying to go up against them, and started killing Germans. We learned, we adapted, we overcame. That's kind of what happens when you throw 2 million men into a stalled war. The French and British should be grateful we did not join the Germans instead.

As far as who won the war, the French and British had pretty much used up their available pool of conscripts and could not move the Germans, so they could not win the war. Germany started the war with a huge technological and logistical advantage (French had little heavy artillery, British still used black powder in their artillery shells, and Germany had huge rail networks to supply the army with what they needed) but lost the war by not paying attention to where their food was supposed to some from, their crops were insufficient to supply the vast army they had to have sitting in trenches from Holland to the Swiss border and along the Russian border. They could no longer buy the food they needed, they could not grow more, and they were stuck in trenches and could not displace the British and French. The US did do a lot to end the war with its additional troops, no doubt, but they also had maintained diplomatic contact with Germany during the war and had the contacts and trust to be able to get the combatants to the table to discuss terms of an armisitice. Arguing over who won and who lost the war was the seed that started the next war.

The "War To End All Wars" started 98 years ago. It ended 94 years ago. And you are still arguing about which rifle is best, as if the rifle won or lost the war?
 
" By this stage everyone knew that massed infantry attacks against prepared positions Napoleonic style was not a good idea."

And yet, they continued to do EXACTLY that up until almost the end of the war.

The problem was that tactics were evolving, that is true, but the commanders were not evolving quickly enough to take advantage of those changes.

Why do you think the French Army mutinied in 1917?

Yes, the tactics were supposed to be new (soldiers following a creeping barrage), but even the French commanders knew that that provided little protection against German artillery counter fire, and they even expected heavy casualties from their own artillery.

Essentially, the French plan was "Lets toss these guys over the top to advance Napoleonic style and we'll see where it goes from there."

Earlier attempts to do something similar - not lifting the barrages until the troops were within X meters of the German trenches was also only marginally successful -- largely because they still couldn't figure out ways to deal with the heavily fortified, well hidden machine gun positions that could remain manned even during a suppression barrage.

Regarding the commanders issue...

Tony Ashworth's book on trench warfare indicates that while the French refused to return to the trenches, in effect mutinied, they didn't really refuse to fight -- they wanted tactical decisions made by commanders who knew the conditions on the battlefield first hand; which the French largely didn't have.
 
"They tried to adopt new rifles before WW1 and again before WW2"

The British didn't attempt to adopt a new rifle before World War II. They modified the basic Lee Enfield into the No. 4 Mark I. There wasn't money to adopt a whole new rifle, and there was virtually no political will to do so.

When it became blindingly clear that The War to End All Wars.... hadn't done so, there was no time to adopt an entirely new rifle.

"Even they realized that the Lee Enfield was not the greatest rifle in the world (I am not sure why literate and illiterate armchair historians still argue about it)..."

Because it was, by far, the best rifle of its type as a combat arm -- that was proven time and again by action, not words. In the run up to World War I, when the British were looking at adopting the P13/14 rifle and a rimless .276 cartridge, there were numerous complaints against the rifle that it was not as capable a battle rifle as the Lee Enfield.



" And you are still arguing about which rifle is best, as if the rifle won or lost the war?"

Well what the hell else do you want us to do? Roam the streets in packs?

Geesh!
 
haha, mike I needed that laugh, thank you.

this is a firearms related forum after all, what else is there to do but argue over which was best.

the enfield no1 was a great weapon but lacking in certain areas.

1. it was heavy and poorly balanced.
2. it had a weak action which, unless the british military wanted to ugrade to a stronger cartridge was not that big of deal.
3. it took a long time to manufacture.

the Brits were concerned because just about every major military that they knew of had switched to either Mausers or modified mauser action types so they commissioned Remington, and by extension Eddystone to make them a newer design similar to a mauser and what came out was the P14. also a number of Japanese Arisaka Type 30 rifles were purchased during the war however when you pit a 5 or 6 round fixed mag gun against a 10 round detachable mag gun, regardless of action type the 10 round is going to be more sought after when you are stuck in a poorly supplied trench.
by the time WWI had ended it was obvious that the Enfield no1, even with all it's shortcomings was a better option so rather than continuing to pursue other options they decided to update the enfield design and what came out of that was the enfield no4
1.less front heavy
2. faster to produce(a process made even faster by savage and longbranch with the introduction of the NO4MK1*)
3. stronger action(again pointless because england never changed from 303)
4. longer sight radius/better sight posts
5. same 10 shot superiority.

there was never a huge problem with the enfield nor was england in a huge scramble to ditch them and find something else, in the same manner that the 1903 springfield was updated to the 1903A3 to make it faster to build and easier to shoot or the M1 garand being upgraded to full auto in the M2, the enfield just needed tweaked.
 
Mike - looks like I may have got a bit carried away with my argument, though I would maintain that tactics were not Napoleonic and were constantly evolving, just not quickly enough perhaps. The way I see it the problem was a constant reinforcing of failure, so to use the example I used earlier, continuing wasteful attacks on the Somme long after it was clear a breakthrough was impossible. If half the attacks made by either side in that war had been ended after initial, limited success, then it would likely be remembered very differently.

The French Army mutinies are a good point, seasoned troops responding to what they saw as stupid attacks that wasted their lives for no reason - stupid wasteful attacks are not really a sign of tactical sophistication I guess! Still, the French commanders thought the creeping barrage would work, later estimating 10% casualties from friendly artillery. Like the British though, when it became clear it wasn't working, they lacked the flexibility to stop and try something new or refine it further.

Scorch - correct me if I am wrong here, but the reason US troops did not go into combat immediately in France is that Pershing refused to allow them to go piecemeal, unit by unit, into the line under Anglo-French control and insisted on fully concentrating his army to operate in its own right? Not sure about this ''pushed into menial jobs in a huge display of nationalist pride.''

I am also intrigued by these unconventional tactics etc you ascribe to the American forces. I recall a quote by German troops in 1918 that the Americans were the bravest men they had ever seen, because they attacked them head on, hey diddle diddle straight up the middle . . . exactly like all powers had in 1914, but had since learned not to. By 1918, German, British and French troops were amazed by this, since most of them would not have seen the battles of 1914. As a result the American forces suffered disproportionately heavy casualties in this period. This ''learned, adapted, overcame'' seems like rose tinted spectacles a bit.

Personally my view on the end of the war is this: I reckon the combination of the blockade and American entry meant that Germany had to gamble on ending the war in 1918. The gamble failed and the German Army was defeated during the Hundred Days Offensives - they were in that position because the home front could not sustain another turnip winter and may have actually faced mass starvation all the while facing the prospect of millions of reinforcements for their enemies.

On the rifle discussion, since we apparently can't avoid getting into WW1 history (me at least as much as anyone else :p) the British attempts to bin the Lee Enfield before WW1 were misguided, and as such have no bearing on the abilities of the Enfield. They wanted to adopt a Mauser action on the basis of the experiences of the Boer War: being repeatedly shot to pieces by a Mauser-armed nation of superb marksmen operating on their own turf. They misdiagnosed the issue as one of equipment when it was not, it was one of tactics and training. Fate intervened and it was deemed expedient to keep the SMLE, which would have been the correct decision anyway.
 
Scorch - correct me if I am wrong here, but the reason US troops did not go into combat immediately in France is that Pershing refused to allow them to go piecemeal, unit by unit, into the line under Anglo-French control and insisted on fully concentrating his army to operate in its own right? Not sure about this ''pushed into menial jobs in a huge display of nationalist pride.''
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Pershing did not want American troops used mixed with other nation's troops, commanded by other nations' officers, ostensibly to claim victory for that other nation (whether British or French). He wanted American troops commanded by American officers to go into battle as American troops, exactly what our allies did not want (for PR reasons, they had already been fighting over who got credit for what action). Pershing was considered uncoopertive at best, insubordinate by others. So our allies, who had agreed to arm and billet our troops (many of whom arrived unarmed and unequipped), put them into non-combat positions so that they were otherwise occupied as the war was conducted. But they eventually figured out how to get weapons and get into action.
the British attempts to bin the Lee Enfield before WW1 were misguided, and as such have no bearing on the abilities of the Enfield. They wanted to adopt a Mauser action on the basis of the experiences of the Boer War: being repeatedly shot to pieces by a Mauser-armed nation of superb marksmen operating on their own turf.
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So much for the superiority of the Lee-Enfield's 10-round magazine. It had to be fed with 5-round chargers. Anyway . . .

Misguided? I think not. The Lee-Enfield was an oddity. At a time of rapid weapons evolution, the british wanted to field a 30-year old rifle. Every other army in the world wanted Mausers, they were the best rifle available. The British wanted to go into battle armed at least as well as their adversaries. But the way the British army was funded would not allow a massive rearmament, and by the time the Exchequery realized they were going to be in another war soon, it was too late to field a new weapon and rearm and resupply.

And as far as the Boers being superb marksmen and shooting the British troops to pieces, they were guerilla fighters using hit and run tactics. The British had run into this issue before. In 1776 and 1812. The British were superb at subjugating poorly armed peoples, and when they ran into ones that fought back well, they were quite amazed at the ingratitude of those people to refuse to accept the Crown.
 
"So much for the superiority of the Lee-Enfield's 10-round magazine. It had to be fed with 5-round chargers. Anyway . . ."

Wrong answer, so your dig has no merit.

The Enfields used by Britain in the Boer war didn't have charger guides.

British tactics at the time were to use the guns as single-shot weapons with the magazines held in reserve and used ONLY upon command of the officer in charge.

It was felt that if you gave men access to a full magazine they would immediately shoot it randomly and waste ammunition instead of carefully aim...

The first Lee Enfield to have charger loading capability was the Rifle No. 1, adopted in 1902.


"the british wanted to field a 30-year old rifle. Every other army in the world wanted Mausers..."

Know why every other nation wanted Mausers? Yes, they were good, and Mauser's sales force never stopped telling people that. Mauser rifles sold so well because they were marketed.

The Lee-Enfield never was. It was a product of the state, not of a private corporation, so the L-E was never actively marketed around the world.

In other words, we don't have any idea what the true reception between the two would have been on the open market.

I submit that the British wanted to rearm with a Mauser-style rifle because the people in charge of making such decisions were also blinded by the Mauser marketing hype and didn't realize just how effective the rifle they had on hand was.

In part, it's the military mentality to "evolve at all costs, no matter what, even if it's not a clear forward path." If you don't evolve, your funding gets cut.

That was the true driver behind the development of the P13/14 rifles, NOT any great and pressing need to solve a major problem with the Lee-Enfield.
 
"1. it was heavy and poorly balanced."

Hum... Where do you come up with that?

The Lee-Enfield family of rifles weighed roughly between 8 and 9 pounds, depending on exact model, density of the wood used in the stock, etc.

The K98 Mauser? It weighed between... 8 and 9 pounds based on the same criteria.

The Springfield 1903? Between 8 and 9 pounds.

The Moisin Nagant? Between 8 and 9 pounds.

The M1917 Enfield? Betweeen 9 and 11 pounds.

So, in other worlds, the Lee Enfield wasn't any heavier than the bolt action rifles used by other nations.

And, just for grins and giggles? The M1 Garand? It was by far the fattie of the group, coming in at 9.5 pounds more or less.

The Lee-Enfield also, depending on the model, had a medial balance point around the magazine, as is to be expected of a properly designed bolt action rifle, and just as the others did, as well.

Sorry. That complaint doesn't hold water.


"2. it had a weak action which, unless the british military wanted to ugrade to a stronger cartridge was not that big of deal."

You're right, it's not a big deal. Nor is it really true, considering that the Lee Enfield was later upgraded to the 7.62x51mm cartridge, which is a full-power cartridge operating in the 50,000 to 60,000 psi range.


"3. it took a long time to manufacture."

Another canard, really. The continual evolution of the Lee-Enfield was done in large part to ease manufacturing.

That reached its pinnacle with the adoption of the No. 4 Mk I rifle in the early 1930s. While figures are really hard to come buy, it would appear that the M1 Garand and the No. 4 could be manufactured in about the same amount of time.

Was either rifle (or the K98k for that matter) as easy to manufacture as later, largely stamped and welded guns?

No.

But it certainly wasn't a case of taking an inordinate amount of time to manufacture one rifle before moving on to the next one.



"the Brits were concerned because just about every major military that they knew of had switched to either Mausers or modified mauser action types so they commissioned Remington, and by extension Eddystone to make them a newer design similar to a mauser and what came out was the P14."

See my comments about being sold a bill of goods in my previous post...

Britain did NOT commission Remington to design a rifle for them.

The intended replacement for the Lee-Enfield, the Pattern 1913, was developed at the Royal Small Arms Manufactory, Enfield Lock (what we call Enfield Armory), where the majority of British small arms development has gone on since the early 1800s.

It wasn't until Britain became involved in WW I and needed more rifles that Britain approached Remington and Winchester to manufacture P1914 rifles.
 
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Let's talk about why the British looked to adopt a rifle based on the Mauser design, in large part based on their experiences in the Boer War...

It wasn't because of any major and inherent deficiencies in the rifle... It was because the 7mm Mauser that the Boers were using had better long-range trajectory and ballistics than the Mk. II ball cartridge (215-gr. or so grain blunt round nose, rather short and lacking in ballistic coefficient).

The British response was, over time, and based on developments in France and Germany, to adopt the Mk VII bullet in 1910, a 174-gr. flat base that showed, excellent long-range accuracy and ballistics.

At the same time, though, Britain was working on a "solution" to the pesky Boer long range problem -- the .276 Enfield and the Pattern 1913 rifle.

The .276 cartridge specifically built for long-range aimed, and accurate, fire. It had a wonderfully profiled bullet that gave it excellent long-range ballistics.

Couple of problems with that concept, though...

1. The cartridge as it ended up had a 165-gr. bullet and ballistics that put it damned close to the 7mm Remington Magnum. Recoil was pretty stout and troops were not happy, especially cavalry troops who were sometimes required to fire from horseback. In fact, earlier versions of the cartridge used bullets up to 190-gr., making recoil really objectionable.

2. Muzzle blast was also substantial and was noted as a potential issue during troop testing. I bet the horses were even less thrilled...

3. The heavy charge of cordite (nearly 50 grains, or something like 20 grains more than the comparable .303) heated the barrel quickly and excessively, leading to major issues with wear and excessive pressures.

4. Long range accuracy was considered to be very good. Why have I listed that as a problem? Because this, combined with the sheer power and long-range ballistics of the round, indicate very clearly that British small arms thinking was ONLY on long-range battles in the desert, or similar relatively flat terrain when already there was more than ample indication that combat was not a long-range affair between superbly trained marksmen... It was close up, which the trench warfare of World War I proved in spades.

You may be wondering just why the British decided to go with the Mauser-style action instead of the Lee-Enfield when looking to adopt the .276...

There were a number of issues, some of which I've noted above, primarily a "we need to buy a bill of goods," and "MOMMMMMM! Everyone else has Mausers, and I want a Mauser too!"

First was the Lee's rear locking action. While more than adequate for the .303 and capable of excellent accuracy, when combined with the extreme ballistics of the .276, it wouldn't have given the desired accuracy and it probably would have given long-term durability issues.

Additionally, due to the extreme nature of the .276's loading, it's likely that the Lee-Enfield action would have had to have been significantly redesigned, including being lengthened (which would have exacerbated the "whippiness" of the bolt).

Realistically, it simply wouldn't have been suitable for a cartridge developing those power levels.

In that sense yes, the Mauser-style action is superior. But was it a superiority that the British truly needed?

No. The .276 was a cartridge that was designed to address a problem that, when World War I came, didn't exist, and which in any event had been largely mitigated by the adoption of the Mk VII bullet in 1910.
 
Scorch - so which is it then Pershing held them back or the Anglo-French made them dig ditches?

The Americans were not in noncombat positions because the Anglo-French wanted them there, but because the decision of their leader required it. You make it sounds like the Allies did everything to stop the plucky Americans from getting into the thick of it, until the Doughboys finally begged borrowed or stole rifles and immediately beat the Germans into submission.

Respectfully, you are wrong on the Boer War. There were distinct phases to that conflict, the initial phase where there were minimal British troops available and the Afrikaaners were on the offensive, the middle phase where British troops arrived and pitched battles were fought, and the final phase of guerilla warfare which was finally ended by counter-guerilla tactics involving mobile flying columns and the tragic policy of internment of the civil population.

The middle phase saw the British Army repeatedly launch frontal attacks against strongly held Boer positions, usually on hills or ridge lines, only to be decimated by an army of good riflemen who were equipped with both machine guns and artillery. The British had more artillery (borrowed from the Navy) but no particular advantage in machine guns. Battles like Colenso, Spion Kop and Magersfontein. The Boer Army operated in large formations during that phase, not as guerillas. Irregulars they certainly were, but they only resorted to guerilla war when it was forced upon them by massively superior forces.

As for the Enfield having to be fed with 5 round chargers (as Mike points out, not until after the Boer War), so what? Yup, this is less good than if all 10 could be loaded at once but for my money it is still better than the 5 everyone else had.

It has been nailed above: the attempt to adopt the P13/14 was the people who made the decisions getting it wrong, misdiagnosing the causes of failure and being blinded by hype and marketing.

The rifles the Boers used were 1888 models, an action entirely inferior to the Enfield (NOT the 98 action that is the ancestor of most bolt rifles in the world today - which are sporting rifles, not battle rifles).

As for the rest of your last paragraph, you seem to have some personal dislike of the British, or at least some desire to make barbed remarks based on your own, er, interesting version of history. Thats fine, I am sure as a nation the British will get over it, but I won't bother engaging with you on it.
 
Re. Americans in WWI.

There is a reason the United States Marines earned the name "Devil Dogs" ....

Here's an interesting summary:

As the Marines dug in, a French officer suggested that they withdrawal. To this Captain Lloyd Williams of the 5th Marines famously replied, "Retreat? Hell, we just got here." Two days later elements of the German 347th Division from Army Group Crown Prince occupied the forest. With their attack at Chateau-Thierry stalling, the Germans launched a major assault on June 4. Supported by machine guns and artillery, the Marines were able to hold, effectively ending the German offensive in Aisne.
Marines Move Forward:

The following day, the commander of the French XXI Corps ordered Brigadier General James Harbord's 4th Marine Brigade to retake Belleau Wood. On the morning of June 6, the Marines advanced, capturing Hill 142 to the west of the wood. Twelve hours later, they frontally assaulted the forest itself. To do so, the Marines had to cross a wheat field under heavy German machine gun fire. With his men pinned down, Gunnery Sergeant Dan Daly called "Come on ya sons-of-bitches, ya want to live forever?" and got them on the move again. When night fell, only a small section of forest had been captured.

In addition to Hill 142 and the assault on the woods, the Marines attacked into Bouresches to the east. After taking most of the village, the Marines were forced to dig in against German counterattacks. All reinforcements trying to reach Bouresches had to cross a large open area and were subjected to heavy German fire. When night fell, the Marines had suffered 1,087 casualties making it the bloodiest day in the Corps' history to date.
Clearing the Forest:

On June 11, following a heavy artillery bombardment, the Marines pressed hard into Belleau Wood, capturing the southern two-thirds. Two days later, the Germans assaulted Bouresches after a massive gas attack and almost retook the village. With the Marines stretched thin, the US 23rd Infantry extended its line and took over the defense of Bouresches. On the 16th, citing exhaustion, Harbord requested that some of the Marines be relieved. His request was granted and three battalions of the US 7th Infantry moved into the forest. After five days of fruitless fighting, the Marines retook their position in the line.

On June 23, the Marines launched a major attack into the forest, but were unable to gain ground. Suffering staggering losses, they required over two hundred ambulances to carry the wounded. Two days later, Belleau Wood was subjected to a fourteen hour bombardment by French artillery. Attacking in the wake of the artillery, US forces were finally able to completely clear the forest. On June 26, after defeating some early morning German counterattacks, Major Maurice Shearer was finally able to send the signal, "Woods now entirely -US Marine Corps."
Aftermath:

In the fighting around Belleau Wood, American forces suffered 1,811 killed and 7,966 wounded and missing. German casualties are unknown though 1,600 were captured. The Battle of Belleau Wood and the Battle of Chateau Thierry showed the United States' allies that it was fully committed fighting the war and was willing to do whatever was required to achieve victory. In recognition of their tenacious fighting and victory, the French awarded citations to those units that participated in the battle and renamed Belleau Wood "Bois de la Brigade Marine."

Belleau Wood also showed the Marine Corps flare for publicity. While the fighting was still going on, the Marines routinely circumvented the American Expeditionary Force's publicity offices to have their story told, while those of Army units engaged were ignored. Following the Battle of Belleau Wood, Marines began being referred to as "Devil Dogs." While many believed that this term was coined by the Germans, its actual origins are unclear. It is known that the Germans highly respected the Marines fighting ability and classified them as elite "storm troopers."
 
The Boers were armed with a wide variety of firearms.

Many Boers armed themselves with their own rifles and, often, shotguns, while the governments of the Boer Republics contracted with European nations to supply small arms and heavy weapons.

It's not true that all organized Boers units were armed with Mauser rifles.

They also had cast offs like the Portugese Guedes single shot rifle as well as Krag Jorgenson rifles.

Also, there were numerous model Mauser rifles in use, not just 1888 Commission rifles. The Boers also had Model 1893s and 1897s.

Given that the Second Boer War happened from 1899 to 1902, it's also possible that they had K98s at some point, as well.

And, here's a very interesting tidbit...

Boers also had Martin-Henry single shot rifles that had been manufactured in Belgium by Westley Richards for supply to the Boer Republics at a time when Britain and the Boer Republics were still amicable.

The one big problem that the British ran into was artillery. British artillery was still black powder at the time, making sighting their guns very easy.

The Boers, on the other hand, were armed with Krupp rapid firing (1 lb Pom Pom) guns which used smokeless powder, making them very difficult to spot and neutralize.

One favored Boer tactic was to fire slow ranging shots, walking them onto target.

Once they were on target, they would use the Pom Pom's automatic mode to drop an entire belt into the British guns to devastating effect.

The Boer Pom Pom was so effective that the British and commonwealth forces took them into service when they captured them.
 
tahunua001 brought up a good point regarding service rifles, that being parts interchangeable, that is a critical aspect when you have to deal with logistics during war time.

Americans always see to insist on parts interchangeability, some times causing production delays, such with trying to standardize the M1917 while also trying to produce enough for the troops who were on the ships heading to Europe.

Some times that creates sloppy but reliable guns which also can still be quite accurate as in the case of the M1911, M1917, 1903s and on to our present M9 and M16 series.
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Hmm, you might want to read the history of RR and the Chevy Turbomatic 400 Transmission. They licensed it initially, decided those silly America sloppy Americans and tightened it up.
After a miserable failure they went on to have GM supply them with the Turbo 400 (and yes it is true, at least in the 80s the RR used the GM trany)

The point being that you don't want needless tight tolerances in some sitautions and some things simply do not work when you do
Combat weapons are a case in point as they have to work in the muck, dirt, dust and fouled chambers in combat.
Was testing some 9mm rounds in my gauge that would not gauge up right. I was curious as they had been running fine inthe Sig. Pulled the barel and they seated very nicely in the Sigs chamber.
Now Sig does not make a sloppy junky gun, but where it counts for a semiu auto, tight is not necesarily good. The gauge is at the tight end and the chamber for the Sig is at the loose end for reliablity reasons. It shoots very accuarely.
Accuracy is not accidneal, its part of desing. We didn't accidentally wind up with sloppy but accurate guns.

The 1903 barel was too well made for what it needed to do but it sure made it a fine shooter when you needed it.

As the average American like the average Brit infantryman was not a stellar shot (unless in the case of the US he was from the country (and many did not shoot at all or badly) . Once the veterans were thinned out the follow on troops were never as good.

And any infantryman worth his salt is not going to stand out firing in the open when he (or she now) should be hiding behind cover.

Pretty rare case where you had a nice trench, just the right height where you could stand with cover and rapid fire to your hearts content.

And there really is no such thing as long distance accurate fire. It works for machine gusn because they can land a lot of rounds in the area and hit by pure scatter or walk them in (granted a single shot 50 cal di make an amazing shot in Vietnam but how many times had he tried before? ).

Throw enough stuff into an area and you will hit someting. Even excclent marksmen have a tough time hitting a human at 1000 yards let alone 2500+
 
Quite right about the Boer artillery - more speaking in terms of numbers and weight. The British could rely upon more consistent artillery support through the heavy naval detachments and horse artillery, though the Boer Nordenfeldts were very effective from defensive positions. I am interested to hear that the British put captured models into service - not that surprising I suppose given that a British equivalent was adopted in short order.

It makes sense that the Boers, as an irregular army put together for the war at hand, did not have common equipment. I thought that the point was worth making that the majority of Boer riflemen were likely armed with the 1888 Mauser (alongside many others like those you name) - as opposed to the 1898 which was unlikely to have gotten through in anything other than small numbers, so the war was not fought with ''Mauser actions'' in the sense many people today will think of them.

I would think it pretty unlikely many 98's made it through to the Boers, given their isolated and landlocked country. Perfectly possible some arrived from German South West Africa and some beforehand along with the other materiel the Afrikaaners received, though. Be interesting to know how if many actually saw action.
 
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