Try reading the whole thread, Mr. Bill, and you'll see that no one ever claimed that the French & British were about to finish off the Germans.
What was claimed (by me) is that any competent military commander knows that:
1) when you push enemy troops into a position from which retreat is exceptionally difficult, you raise the level of resistance your own forces meet. Think the Pusan Perimeter or Bastagone.
2) Headlong unchecked advances over long distances can be dangerous.
3) That if one and two have happened, it's time to slow down, regroup, and reestablish your lines, combat, supply, and communications.
Unique,
I'd be very curious about where you saw a reference to von Rundstedt being "ready to roll." While it's very likely that yes, they could have, and could have driven through the British/French line based on sheer numbers, the losses would have likely been significant, as both Hitler and von Rundstedt knew.
As I've noted, German supplies moved at the speed of horses, German infantry moved at the speed of foot. But the German Panzers and what infantry that was motorized was advancing in some cases upwards 50 miles a day. Horses and infantry can't even come remotely close to keeping that kind of pace.
"Don't put too much reliance on the "truth" about policies being in orders to and amongst Wehrmacht generals, they were often not let in on the truth..."
Tell me, then, who would know the "truth" better? Adolf Hitler, observing the battle from Berlin, or von Rundstedt, who was at or near the front during the entire battle? Who would better know the truth of troop dispositions and locations, locations of supplies, etc.?
What we still have, though, is a connundrum, one which you've not even attempted to answer.
That connundrum?
If the Germans "allowed" the British Expeditionary Force to escape as a prelude to negotiated peace, then why...
1. Throw the full weight of the Luftwaffe against the beach heads and the ships that were evacuating British and French personnel? Why not just allow them to leave against either token resistance, or against no resistance at all?
2. If Hitler wanted to attempt to negotiate peace from a position of strength, do he allow the core of the British regular army to escape, instead of taking them prisoner and attempting to ransom them back in exchange for peace concessions?
3. If negotiated peace is the aim, and even after the last of the Franco-British opposition was quashed in mid-June, why were there NO, and I repeat NO, German overtures to Britain regarding a "negotiated peace with honor?"
4. If Hitler truly wanted to negotiate peace with Britain, why did he immediately proceed with deploying even more Luftwaffe resources to Western France in preparation for the invasion of the British isles, and in fact launch air operations against Britain in July, only a little over a month after driving the British from the continent?
Here's a bit of a passage from the Rand McNally Encyclopedia of World War II, general editor John Keegan (himself a recognized expert in the history of operations on the Western front in WW II).
"The achievement [the evacuation], remarkable in result and heroic in execution, was nevertheless very much Hitler's doing [I don't think we disagree on that]. By ordering a final push by Hoth's and Kleist's Panzer Groups, he most certainly could have broken the canal line and captured much of the BEF intact. On 24 May however, he visited Rundstedt at the headquarters of Army Group A to ask if he (Rundstedt) did not think it wiser to preserve the Panzer Groups for the coming battle on the Weygand Line. Rundstedt agreed and Hitler therefore took up Goering's offer to finish the Dunkirk bridgehead by air attack."
OK, that does conflict a bit with what I've said previously in that von Rundstedt demanded a stop to the advance, but ultimately, that's not important.
From that passage we see that Hitler is concerned about preserving his Panzer forces largely intact for coming battles (remember, he knew how difficult it was to assault an enemy in a defensive position -- he did it during WW I). von Rundstedt agreed with Hitler, at this point likely not out of fear (that would come later when the war started going badly), but out of concern for the disposition of his troops.
The French, especially, have apparently long been suspicious of the supposed ease with which the BEF was withdrawn from France, and I have little doubt that the rumor that the Germans allowed the British to escape in an attempt to broker a peace plan.
However, like most conspirorumors, it simply can't be supported by the facts in evidence, the most convincing point against such a plan being simply that absolutely no SERIOUS German peace overtures were ever made.
There's also well documented history of what happened when Rudlof Hess flew to Britain in May 1941, a year after Dunkirk, on a one-man peace mission. Hitler flew into a towering rage, disavowed Hess (who never claimed to be working on Hitler's orders), and disavowed Hess' plan.
There was, however, one other peace overture made by Germany during WW II, and that was by Heinrich Himler in the waning days of the war. This was also made without Hitler's authority or knowledge, but when Hitler did find out about it, he was furious and ordered Himler's arrest. What became of Himler's offer (essentially one of "I'll release lots of Jews and stop the executions in the camps if you call off the dogs and leave me in charge of Germany")? It was rejected out of hand by Winston Churchill, who never even bothered to consult either the war cabinet or Parliament about the offer.
