DocCasualty
New member
I honestly think this tragic story has little in the way of education for CPL holders. I will leave it to the LEOs to decide what it has for them but think there's plenty to take home from someone who was in that situation. I could not for one minute be critical of the officer and how he handled it. I laud him for his critical post-event self-analysis and mission to spread the word about what he learned from it.
The one thing I think he is trying to teach is how important having back-up ammunition is for off-duty LEOs. As I am not and have never been a LEO, I really don't know how to judge his handling of this situation. I would guess his mental preparation should have been better in contemplating the possibility of a second shooter/accomplice to the BG that confronted him, which he did not begin to contemplate until he had spent his mag + 1, however, I'm not sure the best of training prepares for all eventualities as he noted.
For those who think his "10 + 1" either signifies poor 9mm performance, poor marksmanship, a "spray and pray" philosophy or any other reason than what actually occured, I think you need to reassess the reality of this shooting and any shooting you hopefully will never be involved in. Once he decided to shoot, I think he did exactly what his training taught him: to keep firing at COM until the threat was neutralized. I don't see that whether he had a 6-shot .357 Mag or a 10mm semi-auto that his response would have likely been any different. For those who think their Mozambique drill training will result in three and only three shots being fired, I hope you never have to find out. However, I'd bet on 10 hits out of 11 shots fired COM at 15-20 yards any day.
I recently found this and thought it was very interesting and applicable here. Obviously someone has tried to take a more objective look at the core issue of number of shots fired here:
“Excessive” shots and falling assailants: A fresh look at OIS subtleties
The one thing I think he is trying to teach is how important having back-up ammunition is for off-duty LEOs. As I am not and have never been a LEO, I really don't know how to judge his handling of this situation. I would guess his mental preparation should have been better in contemplating the possibility of a second shooter/accomplice to the BG that confronted him, which he did not begin to contemplate until he had spent his mag + 1, however, I'm not sure the best of training prepares for all eventualities as he noted.
For those who think his "10 + 1" either signifies poor 9mm performance, poor marksmanship, a "spray and pray" philosophy or any other reason than what actually occured, I think you need to reassess the reality of this shooting and any shooting you hopefully will never be involved in. Once he decided to shoot, I think he did exactly what his training taught him: to keep firing at COM until the threat was neutralized. I don't see that whether he had a 6-shot .357 Mag or a 10mm semi-auto that his response would have likely been any different. For those who think their Mozambique drill training will result in three and only three shots being fired, I hope you never have to find out. However, I'd bet on 10 hits out of 11 shots fired COM at 15-20 yards any day.
I recently found this and thought it was very interesting and applicable here. Obviously someone has tried to take a more objective look at the core issue of number of shots fired here:
“Excessive” shots and falling assailants: A fresh look at OIS subtleties
On average, additional findings show, officers may “reasonably” fire 6 rounds or more into suspects who initially are standing and then begin falling and who, in fact, may already be mortally wounded. And that’s 6 rounds per officer involved in the confrontation.
http://www.forcescience.org/fsinews/2010/03/force-science-news-144-%E2%80%9Cexcessive%E2%80%9D-shots-and-falling-assailants-a-fresh-look-at-ois-subtleties/
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