Frank Ettin
Administrator
On the other hand, let's look at the applicable federal statutes:
It appears to me that unless a non-immigrant alien has a hunting license (or qualified for one of the other exceptions) he is a prohibited person.
A "transfer" is a change of physical possession -- not ownership.
- 18 USC 922(g), emphasis added:(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—
(1) ...
(2) ...
(3) ...
(4) ...
(5) who, being an alien—
(A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or(6) ...
(B) except as provided in subsection (2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(26)));
(7) ...
(8) ...
(9) ...
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
- 18 USC 922:Provisions Relating to Aliens Admitted Under Nonimmigrant Visas.—
(1) Definitions.— In this subsection—
(A) the term “alien” has the same meaning as in section 101(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(3)); and
(B) the term “nonimmigrant visa” has the same meaning as in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(26)).
(2) Exceptions.— Subsections (d)(5)(B), (g)(5)(B), and (s)(3)(B)(v)(II) do not apply to any alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa, if that alien is—
(A) admitted to the United States for lawful hunting or sporting purposes or is in possession of a hunting license or permit lawfully issued in the United States;(3) Waiver.—
(B) an official representative of a foreign government who is—
(i) accredited to the United States Government or the Government’s mission to an international organization having its headquarters in the United States; or(C) an official of a foreign government or a distinguished foreign visitor who has been so designated by the Department of State; or
(ii) en route to or from another country to which that alien is accredited;
(D) a foreign law enforcement officer of a friendly foreign government entering the United States on official law enforcement business.
(A) Conditions for waiver.— Any individual who has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa may receive a waiver from the requirements of subsection (g)(5), if—
(i) the individual submits to the Attorney General a petition that meets the requirements of subparagraph (C); and
(ii) the Attorney General approves the petition.
(B) Petition.— Each petition under subparagraph (B) shall—
(i) demonstrate that the petitioner has resided in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 180 days before the date on which the petition is submitted under this paragraph; and
(ii) include a written statement from the embassy or consulate of the petitioner, authorizing the petitioner to acquire a firearm or ammunition and certifying that the alien would not, absent the application of subsection (g)(5)(B), otherwise be prohibited from such acquisition under subsection (g).
(C) Approval of petition.— The Attorney General shall approve a petition submitted in accordance with this paragraph, if the Attorney General determines that waiving the requirements of subsection (g)(5)(B) with respect to the petitioner—
(i) would be in the interests of justice; and
(ii) would not jeopardize the public safety.
- Let's also look at the interstate commerce issue. It's really a red herring. There have certainly been plenty of prosecutions for being a felon, an unlawful drug user, or other prohibited person in possession of a firearm. And to understand what constitutes possession with a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce for the purposes of a violation of 18 USC 922(g) it doesn't matter what the disqualifying condition is.
So let's look at some cases:
- In U.S. v. Barron-Rivera, 922 F.2d 549 (C.A.9 (Wash.), 1991) affirmed Barron-Rivera's conviction for being an alien in possession of a firearm. Barron-Rivera's claimed reversible error in that the government failed to prove the necessary intent.
The court of appeal noted, at 551:...Barron-Rivera argued that the gun was in his wife's residence at the time he re-entered the United States and moved back into that residence. Accepting that contention, the district court, nonetheless, found that Barron-Rivera's possession of the firearm was voluntary because he permitted the firearm to remain in the house after he acquired knowledge of its presence....
In affirming the conviction, the court of appeal found, at 551 -- 552:...In other words, by continuing to reside in the apartment in which the gun was located, he voluntarily and knowingly possessed the gun...
- In U.S. v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564 (C.A.6 (Tenn.), 1996), the Sixth Circuit affirmed, against a Commerce Clause challenge Chesney's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
In rejecting Chesney's assertion that the 18 USC 922(g) is unconstitutional, the court of appeal noted, at 568 -- 569:...another panel of this court has held § 922(g)(1) to be constitutional. In United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887 (6th Cir.1996), a unanimous panel held that " § 922(g)(1) represents a valid exercise of legislative power under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 889. As this court wrote in Turner, "Every court of appeals that has been faced with this question since Lopez has held that the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) provides the requisite nexus with interstate commerce ....
In rejecting Chesney's assertion that the statute can not be applied in his case, the court of appeal noted, at 570 -- 571:...Chesney, unlike the defendant in Turner, also challenges § 922(g)(1) as applied to him by arguing that his conviction is unconstitutional because the government failed to prove any "substantial nexus between the crime charged and interstate commerce." Chesney stipulated that the gun had moved in interstate commerce, and such a stipulation is sufficient evidence to support Chesney's conviction pursuant to § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Lee, 72 F.3d 55, 58 (7th Cir.1995) (stipulation that gun was in or affecting commerce sufficient evidence to support a conviction under § 922(g)(1)). ...
The Supreme Court has held that proof that a firearm moved in interstate commerce at any time is sufficient to meet the government's burden of proving the "in commerce or affecting commerce" element of § 1202(a), the predecessor to § 922(g)(1). Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 566-67, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 1964-65, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977). Although Scarborough was decided as a matter of statutory construction, the Court noted that Congress knew how to assert " 'its full Commerce Clause power so as to cover all activity substantially affecting interstate commerce,' " and that Congress intended to exercise the full extent of its Commerce Clause power when enacting § 1202(a). Id. at 571-72, 97 S.Ct. at 1967-68 ...
All of the courts of appeals to consider the issue since Lopez have concluded that § 922(g)(1), as construed to require only the minimum nexus to commerce approved in Scarborough, is constitutional. See, e.g., McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390; Sorrentino, 72 F.3d at 296; Shelton, 66 F.3d at 992; Hanna, 55 F.3d at 1462 n. 2.,...
- In U.S. v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3rd Cir., 2001), the Third Circuit affirmed a conviction for being a felon in possession against an attack on the constitutionality of 922(g), at 197:...Singletary contends that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional because the conduct it proscribes -- the intrastate possession of a firearm -- does not have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce, and thus does not constitute a valid exercise of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. Specifically,...
In rejected Singletary's assertion, the court of appeal noted, at 200:...the Court in Scarborough v. United States had the opportunity to address squarely "whether proof that the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required nexus between the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and commerce." 431 U.S. 563, 564 (1977). The Court accepted the Government's contention that it only need prove that "the firearm possessed by the convicted felon traveled at some time in interstate commerce." Id. at 568. Thus, the Scarborough Court established the proposition that the transport of a weapon in interstate commerce, however remote in the distant past, gives its present intrastate possession a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to fall within the ambit of the statute. Because S 1202(a) is the predecessor to the current felon-in-possession statute, this statutory construction applies equally to S 922(g)(1)....
- In United States v. Hoyle, 697 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir., 2012), the Tenth Circuit affirmed Hoyle's conviction for being a felon in possession. In doing so the court of appeal noted, at 1165:... “Section 922(g) requires that the firearm be possessed ‘in or affecting commerce.’” United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)). The Supreme Court has affirmed the Fourth Circuit's holding that: “[T]he interstate commerce nexus requirement of the possession offense was satisfied by proof that the firearm [defendant] possessed had previously traveled in interstate commerce.” Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 566, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977)...
- In U.S. v. Barron-Rivera, 922 F.2d 549 (C.A.9 (Wash.), 1991) affirmed Barron-Rivera's conviction for being an alien in possession of a firearm. Barron-Rivera's claimed reversible error in that the government failed to prove the necessary intent.
It appears to me that unless a non-immigrant alien has a hunting license (or qualified for one of the other exceptions) he is a prohibited person.
I wouldn't be too sure. Transfer is about physical possession. That's one of the problems with I-594 in Washington State.Tom Servo said:...If they're renting a firearm at the range, it's still in possession of the range owner, so it's not an issue. Same goes for me letting them use my personal gun if I'm present....
A "transfer" is a change of physical possession -- not ownership.
- Possession means:1 a : the act of having or taking into control...
If you have something in your hands, you have it, control it, and therefore have possession of it.
- Some definitions of "transfer" (emphasis added):
- http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/transfer:...Transfer encompasses the sale and every other method, direct or indirect, of (1) disposing of property or an interest therein or possession thereof;...
- http://www.thefreedictionary.com/transferred:2. Law To make over the possession or legal title of; convey.
- http://law.yourdictionary.com/transfer:Any and every method of removing something from one person or place to another; specifically, the handing over of possession or control of assets or title. ...
- So if you hand (or ship) something to someone, you have relinquished possession of that thing and given (transferred) possession of that thing to someone else.
- http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/transfer:
- And consider the case of United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588 (3rd Cir., 2012). The Third Circuit (Pennsylvania) let stand an indictment for aiding and abetting the unlawful possession of a gun by a prohibited persons in a situation in which a gun owner had a cohabitant who was a prohibited person. In that case the gun the prohibited person was charged with possessing was not secured against the prohibited person's access, supporting both the prohibited person's conviction for unlawful possession of a gun and the indictment of his cohabitant. From the opinion (at pg. 593, emphasis added):...on June 6, 2008, a valid search warrant (the “search warrant”) was executed on the couple‟s Clarion County home. Agents seized an SKS, Interordnance M59/66 rifle (“SKS rifle”) from an upstairs bedroom.
Although Huet is legally permitted to possess a firearm, Hall was convicted in 1999 of possessing an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and is therefore prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm. After being informed of the raid, Huet allegedly told investigators that the guns in the house belonged to her and that it was not illegal for her to purchase weapons. Despite Huet‟s assertions that she alone possessed the SKS rifle, the Government sought and obtained an indictment charging Hall with illegal possession of the weapon, and Huet with aiding and abetting Hall‟s possession....
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