Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff's Department

To be honest I take issue with the ban on felons as well. Someone who did their time for a non violent offense and has been working a good job for 10 years and owns a house should have their rights restored. We're supposed to be bringing them back into society, not shutting them out of it.



Same with the whole mental institution thing. Something that happened 20 years ago once and has long since been deemed not dangerous shouldn't be an end to someones constitutional rights.


I agree.
 
Let's start here:
speedrrracer said:
...he just won the case...
No he hasn't. He won the first round. Now his case can go on.

  1. Tyler filed a lawsuit.

  2. The trial court threw the lawsuit out on the grounds that Tyler's had no legal claim. That ended the case.

  3. So Tyler appealed. The appellate court said that Tyler did have a legal claim. That reinstated the case and allows it to now go forward.

  4. So now Tyler and the government are back in the trial court to continue the litigation that was started but cut short by the trial courts initial ruling.

speedrrracer said:
...Why would Tyler be required to dispute the basis of an unconstitutional law,...
Maybe that's the conceptual sticking point. The appellate court didn't toss out (nullify) the law as unconstitutional.

They effectively ruled it would be unconstitutional to apply to Tyler without Tyler having a chance to challenge the application of the law to him, i. e., without giving Tyler an opportunity to demonstrate that notwithstanding the law there is no reason for the government to prohibit him from possessing a gun.
 
Frank Ettin said:
They effectively ruled it would be unconstitutional to apply to Tyler without Tyler having a chance to challenge the application of the law to him, i. e., without giving Tyler an opportunity to demonstrate that notwithstanding the law there is no reason for the government to prohibit him from possessing a gun.

Is it not a key aspect of the ruling that Congress provided mechanisms for prohibited persons to have their rights restored, but that in Tyler's particular circumstances (the federal program being unfunded and his state's election to not create a parallel state program) no actual mechanism exists?
 
gc70 said:
Is it not a key aspect of the ruling that Congress provided mechanisms for prohibited persons to have their rights restored, but that in Tyler's particular circumstances (the federal program being unfunded and his state's election to not create a parallel state program) no actual mechanism exists?
I don't know what you mean by "key." It was a factor that there was no available administrative procedure whereby Tyler could seek relief from his 18 USC 922(g)(4) disability, and therefore he had to seek relief through litigation.

If there had been an administrative alternative, Tyler would need to have pursued that rather than suing. He would not have been able to sue unless, following having sought an available administrative remedy he then had legal grounds to challenge that.

And the appellate court also concluded that the fact that Congress had included provision for such a program, and the federal government also provided a form of encouragement for States to implement their own programs, as demonstrating a recognition that it would be possible for someone to demonstrate that his gun rights should be restored.
 
Frank Ettin said:
Maybe that's the conceptual sticking point. The appellate court didn't toss out (nullify) the law as unconstitutional.

They effectively ruled it would be unconstitutional to apply to Tyler without Tyler having a chance to challenge the application of the law to him, i. e., without giving Tyler an opportunity to demonstrate that notwithstanding the law there is no reason for the government to prohibit him from possessing a gun.

Yup, sticking point found. Thanks. I think a bit chunk of the sticking point is here:

6th said:
f [the govt] declines to do so, the district court should enter a declaration of unconstitutionality as to § 922(g)(4)’s application toTyler.

I saw "should enter a declaration of unconstitutionality..." and my eyes got all misty. ;)

So it's completely incorrect to say that as far as this court is concerned, the law is unconstitutional. As far as this court is concerned, it's only unconstitutional in this unique application / these unique circumstances, and so the court said go back and go through some process.

Now the process part I'm not sure I get. So now the govt must, as you said, "...[give] Tyler an opportunity to demonstrate that notwithstanding the law there is no reason for the government to prohibit him from possessing a gun"

So Tyler must demonstrate there is no reason for him to be prohibited. Doesn't that sound a lot like requiring someone to prove their innocence? And how he does that...that's the part nobody is clear on? Because these are uncharted waters or just because it's some local statute in Podunk, Michigan and none of us are from there?

Jim March said:
What probably happens next is a settlement. There's not a lot of wiggle room left in the appellate decision.

Because I agree with the 2nd sentence I don't understand how the first sentence can happen. It seems like a yes or no thing...either Tyler is prohibited or he is not...on what middle ground could they possibly settle? Or does "settle" mean one side just capitulates?
 
speedrrracer said:
So it's completely incorrect to say that as far as this court is concerned, the law is unconstitutional. As far as this court is concerned, it's only unconstitutional in this unique application / these unique circumstances, and so the court said go back and go through some process.
Frank and or Spats may correct me, but I don't believe it's even correct to say that this [appeals] court has said that the law is unconstitutional even in this unique application. If I understand Frank's explanations correctly, the ONLY thing the appeals court has said is that Tyler has a legitimate claim, so the district court has to hear the case, they were wrong in dismissing it.

The directive to enter a finding that the law is unconstitutional applies ONLY IF the government elects not to dispute Tyler's assertion that he is not dangerous. If the government contests this assertion, although the district court could still find the law unconstitutional, they would not be required to do so once the government disputes Tyler's contention.

...Tyler’s complaint validly states a claim for a violation of the Second Amendment. The government’s interest in keeping firearms out of the hands of the mentally ill is not sufficiently related to depriving the mentally healthy, who had a distant episode of commitment, of their constitutional rights.43 The government at oral argument stated that it currently has no reason to dispute that Tyler is a non-dangerous individual. On remand, the government may, if it chooses, file an answer to Tyler’s complaint to contest his factual allegations. If it [the government (ed.)] declines to do so, the district court should enter a declaration of unconstitutionality as to § 922(g)(4)’s application to Tyler. 44 We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

There is simply no mention of what the trial court should or must do if the government decides to contest Tyler's allegations. That leaves it completely to the judgment and discretion of the trial court.
 
speedrrracer said:
...Yup, sticking point found. Thanks. I think a bit chunk of the sticking point is here:

6th said:
if [the govt] declines to do so, the district court should enter a declaration of unconstitutionality as to § 922(g)(4)’s application toTyler.

I saw "should enter a declaration of unconstitutionality..." and my eyes got all misty. ;)...
Understood. It's a matter of understanding what that actually means in context.

speedrrracer said:
...So it's completely incorrect to say that as far as this court is concerned, the law is unconstitutional. As far as this court is concerned, it's only unconstitutional in this unique application / these unique circumstances, and so the court said go back and go through some process....
That's basically correct.

A law could be found to be unconstitutional on its face. That means it's void and unenforceable under any and all circumstances. The court in Tyler didn't rule that way.

A law could also be found to be unconstitutional if applied under certain circumstances or used for certain purpose, but the law might be valid and enforceable in different circumstances or for certain purpose. Perhaps the easiest way to understand "unconstitutional as applied" is to look at Fourth Amendment cases.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizure. So a search or seizure found to be unreasonable violates one's constitutional rights protected by the Fourth Amendment, i. e., the government action would b unconstitutional as applied. But if the search and seizure is reasonable, it would not violate one's rights protected by the Fourth Amendment; and the government action would not offend the Constitution. The standards and bases for deciding whether a particular search or seizure is or is not reasonable have been hashed out in a large body of Fourth Amendment case law.

speedrrracer said:
...Doesn't that sound a lot like requiring someone to prove their innocence?...
Among other things, the presumption of innocence applies only in a criminal case. This is a civil case.

speedrrracer said:
...And how he does that...that's the part nobody is clear on?...
Beats me. That will also need to be worked out. Furthermore, I couldn't really say how he might make his case, because I have no idea exactly what facts he has to work with.

Aguila Blanca said:
Frank and or Spats may correct me, but I don't believe it's even correct to say that this [appeals] court has said that the law is unconstitutional even in this unique application. If I understand Frank's explanations correctly, the ONLY thing the appeals court has said is that Tyler has a legitimate claim, so the district court has to hear the case, they were wrong in dismissing it.

The directive to enter a finding that the law is unconstitutional applies ONLY IF the government elects not to dispute Tyler's assertion that he is not dangerous...
Yup. And see my discussion, above, of the concept of "unconstitutional as applied."
 
Many thanks, Frank. Your efforts have brought a tiny glimmer of comprehension into the vast, dark chasm of legal ignorance in my brain. :p
 
speedrrracer said:
Now the process part I'm not sure I get. So now the govt must, as you said, "...[give] Tyler an opportunity to demonstrate that notwithstanding the law there is no reason for the government to prohibit him from possessing a gun"

So Tyler must demonstrate there is no reason for him to be prohibited. Doesn't that sound a lot like requiring someone to prove their innocence? And how he does that...that's the part nobody is clear on? Because these are uncharted waters or just because it's some local statute in Podunk, Michigan and none of us are from there?

Michigan has no law for the restoration of rights, but 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) provides a general description for federal restoration of rights, which is paralleled in Public Law 110-180 § 105(a)(2) for state programs. The federal process is defined in more detail in 27 CFR 478.144 and state program requirements are provided in the form for states to certify their programs to the DOJ.

The court would not have to follow the (unfunded) federal process or the (nonexistent in Michigan) state process, but it seems reasonable to expect the government to at least seek to hold Tyler to those standards in demonstrating his rehabilitation.
 
I've been out of pocket for a few days, so forgive me for not reading this thread as in-depth as perhaps I should have. That said, part of the confusion may be due to the fact that this is a procedural matter, not (really) a substantive matter

The district court dismissed Tyler’s suit for failure to state a claim. Because Tyler’s complaint validly states a violation of the Second Amendment, we reverse and remand.
That means that the gov't filed a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted." IOW, a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A very quick and cursory review of 6th Circuit caselaw shows me the following:
6th Circuit said:
Dismissals of complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted are subject to de novo review. . . . . All factual allegations are considered to be true. . . . . If an allegation is capable of several inferences, the allegation must be construed in a light most favorable for the plaintiff. . . . .

Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993)(internal citations omitted)
In other words, on a 12(b)(6) motion, the defendants are basically saying, "Judge, even if you take everything in the Complaint as true, we win. Please throw this case out." For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the defendants do not challenge the factual assertions, but only for purposes of the motion to dismiss. The defendants are free to challenge the factual assertions in the event that the motion to dismiss is denied.

The bottom line of the 6th's decision is: Tyler has alleged sufficient facts that, if true, "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." It doesn't mean he's right; it doesn't mean he automatically wins. It only means that he survives a motion to dismiss.

Now we'll move on to an Answer, the discovery process, probably a motion for summary judgment, etc.
 
Originally Posted by KyJim
Even if the government does not specifically find anything disputing the claim made in the complaint, it will probably state it does not have any knowledge about the allegations and therefore denies them. The plaintiff can then submit affidavits or declarations and/or documents and to support a motion for summary judgment.
I think a lot of important stuff was crammed into too few words here, and as a result I'm missing a lot, and it surely also exposes my lack of understanding of the issue as a whole.

So if the govt doesn't understand the laws of physics, it can deny them? If you don't have knowledge of something, how can you say yes or no to it?
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff and, unless I know an allegation in the complaint is true, I can still require the plaintiff to present some evidence of the truthfulness of the allegation. Suppose the allegation is that the plaintiff, after a short commitment 30 years ago, has neither threatened harm to himself or others or posed any risk of violence to the community. That may or may not be true. The defendant doesn't know at the initial state of litigation so the lawyer answers something like, "The defendant does not have sufficient information or knowledge or belief as to to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 5 and therefore denies them." Then, during discovery, the defendant would be entitled to look at medical records, interview or depose neighbors and family, and participate in other discovery.
 
Lyle Denniston at SCOTUSblog presents an interesting analysis of the case, including:
If the government appeals the decision, either to the en banc Sixth Circuit or to the Supreme Court, and if the ruling were to be upheld, it could have an impact on gun control laws well beyond the specific limit at issue in this case. It appeared to cast into constitutional doubt at least some of a host of laws, federal and state, that impose categorical bans on groups of individuals — that is, bans that preclude anyone in an excluded group from being able to prove individually that they should have access to guns.

The District Court decision dismissed Tyler's claim, in part, because:
... the Court finds that the government has satisfied its burden of establishing that the Second Amendment, as historically understood, does not extend to Plaintiff.

The Sixth Circuit decision concluded differently:
The problem, as noted, is that the class of individuals constituting those ever previously mentally institutionalized is not identical to the class of individuals presently mentally ill. Ultimately, the government cannot establish that § 922(g)(4) regulates conduct falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment as it was understood in 1791. We cannot conclude, then, that the regulated activity is “categorically unprotected.”
 
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