Now that I've had time to read (and reread) the dissent and digest what it said....
Judge Edith Jones wrote the dissent. The provisions of law being challenged include 18 U.S.C. § 922(c)(1) and the regulations that implement these statutes: 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.99(b)(1), 478.124(a), & 478.96(b).
In her opening statement, Judge Jones speaks of the errors of the panel in general terms:
The Judge is saying that what was acceptable before Heller/McDonald, is now an unacceptable infringement of the Fundamental Right.
Judge Jones doesn't stop there. In directly looking at the panel decision, Jones writes:
Judge Jones concludes her general opinion of the panel decision with:
The rest of the dissent has Jones taking the panel decision apart, piece by piece. It is very well written and tailored (whether written that way or not) to helping write the NRA's petition for cert.
In writing about the age of the militia after the resolution of the BOR, and speaking directly to the Militia Act of 1792, we have footnote 9 (page 12):
This pretty much sets the bar (of the dissent) to the age of majority as it now stands - 18. Jones goes ever further in castigating the panel decision for its faulty examples that 21 was the age of militia service by noting that ... "Massachusetts, for example, required “all youth” from ten to sixteen to be trained in gun use."
All in all, this is a very powerful dissent. Which explains why it took so long to publish the denial of the en banc hearing.
In the en banc poll, 7 judges voted in favor of rehearing (Judges Jolly, Jones, Smith, Clement, Owen, Elrod, and Higginson), and 8 judges voted against rehearing (Chief Judge Stewart and Judges King, Davis, Dennis, Prado, Southwick, Haynes, and Graves).
Judge Edith Jones wrote the dissent. The provisions of law being challenged include 18 U.S.C. § 922(c)(1) and the regulations that implement these statutes: 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.99(b)(1), 478.124(a), & 478.96(b).
In her opening statement, Judge Jones speaks of the errors of the panel in general terms:
There are serious errors in the panel decision’s approach to the fundamental right to keep and bear arms. ... Moreover, the implications of the decision—that a whole class of adult citizens, who are not as a class felons or mentally ill, can have its constitutional rights truncated because Congress considers the class “irresponsible”—are far-reaching.
The Judge is saying that what was acceptable before Heller/McDonald, is now an unacceptable infringement of the Fundamental Right.
Judge Jones doesn't stop there. In directly looking at the panel decision, Jones writes:
The panel states, during that part of the discussion, that “Congress could have sought to prohibit all persons under 21 from possessing handguns—or all guns, for that matter.” Id. at 209. Surely this is hyperbole? Never in the modern era has the Supreme Court held that a fundamental constitutional right could be abridged for a law-abiding adult class of citizens.
Judge Jones concludes her general opinion of the panel decision with:
Three major points of the panel’s opinion, in my view, are incorrect. First, the panel’s treatment of pertinent history does not do justice to Heller’s tailored approach toward historical sources. A methodology that more closely followed Heller would readily lead to the conclusion that 18- to 20-year old individuals share in the core right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. Second, because they are partakers of this core right, the level of scrutiny required to assess the federal purchase/sales restrictions must be higher than that applied by the panel. Finally, even under intermediate scrutiny, the purchase restrictions are unconstitutional. I will address each of these concerns.
The rest of the dissent has Jones taking the panel decision apart, piece by piece. It is very well written and tailored (whether written that way or not) to helping write the NRA's petition for cert.
In writing about the age of the militia after the resolution of the BOR, and speaking directly to the Militia Act of 1792, we have footnote 9 (page 12):
The choice of eighteen as the militia age for the federal law owed, in large part, to George Washington’s stated belief that the best soldiers were those aged eighteen to twenty-one. Further, it is likely, but not provable, that the right to bear arms was thought still to extend even to those sixteen to eighteen (enrollment in the militia was sufficient, but not necessary, to the right to own a gun), but appellants disclaim any intent to reduce the minimum age below 18.
This pretty much sets the bar (of the dissent) to the age of majority as it now stands - 18. Jones goes ever further in castigating the panel decision for its faulty examples that 21 was the age of militia service by noting that ... "Massachusetts, for example, required “all youth” from ten to sixteen to be trained in gun use."
All in all, this is a very powerful dissent. Which explains why it took so long to publish the denial of the en banc hearing.