This as part of the majority decision seems to be causing a lot of concern and I think rightfully so, time will tell but Bruen is alive and mostly well with some guidance that some will continue try to abuse such as saying a ban on Bowie knives way back when justifies modern firearm bans. Todd Vandermyde (YT Freedoms Steel) believes that the "were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber" will be heard in a lot in lower courts to justify their very questionable decisions to restrict the Second Amendment.
However on a positive note the language requiring "due process' could end up deep sixing red flag laws that bypass due process.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
From pages 6,7,8.
In Heller, our inquiry into the scope of the right began
with “constitutional text and history.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at
22. In Bruen, we directed courts to examine our “historical
tradition of firearm regulation” to help delineate the contours of the right. Id., at 17. We explained that if a challenged regulation fits within that tradition, it is lawful under the Second Amendment. We also clarified that when
the Government regulates arms-bearing conduct, as when
the Government regulates other constitutional rights, it bears the burden to “justify its regulation.” Id., at 24.
Nevertheless, some courts have misunderstood the methodology of our recent Second Amendment cases.
These
precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber. As we explained in Heller, for example, the reach of
the Second Amendment is not limited only to those arms
that were in existence at the founding. 554 U. S., at 582.
Rather, it “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in existence.” Ibid. By that same logic, the Second Amendment
permits more than just those regulations identical to ones
that could be found in 1791. Holding otherwise would be as
mistaken as applying the protections of the right only to
muskets and sabers.
As we explained in Bruen, the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is
consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory
tradition. 597 U. S., at 26–31. A court must ascertain
whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to laws that our
tradition is understood to permit, “apply[ing] faithfully the
balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.” Id., at 29, and n. 7. Discerning and developing the law in this way is “a commonplace task for any lawyer or judge.” Id., at 28.
Why and how the regulation burdens the right are cen-
tral to this inquiry. Id., at 29. For example, if laws at the
founding regulated firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws
imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within
a permissible category of regulations.
Even when a law regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, though, it
may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding. And when a
challenged regulation does not precisely match its historical precursors, “it still may be analogous enough to pass
constitutional muster.” Id., at 30. The law must comport with the principles underlying the Second Amendment, but
it need not be a “dead ringer” or a “historical twin.”