CHECHNYA - THE BATTLE OF GROZNYY - - - - Russian generals are
re-learning the lessons of their first effort (in 1995) to take Groznyy,
the capital of Chechnya. The following observations provide a better
overview of the situation and the problem than many other reports
available in the public media, most of which contain slants that
decrease credibility. It is uncertain how many times the Russians will
need to re-learn the lessons, but by the same token, some of these
observations have validity for fighting local wars by other than
Russians.
1. The general's found that you need to culturally orient your forces
so you don't end up being your own worst enemy simply out of cultural
ignorance. Many times, Russian soldiers made serious cultural errors in
dealing with the Chechen civilians. Once insulted or mistreated, they
(the Chechens) either became active fighters or began to support the
active fighters. Russians also admit they underestimated the importance
of religion (Islam) on the conflict.
2. Chechens were brutish, especially with prisoners. The battle
degenerated quickly to one of "no quarter asked, none given." Russian
wounded and dead were hung upside down in windows of Chechen positions.
Russians had to shoot at the bodies to engage the Chechens. Russian
prisoners were decapitated and at night their heads were placed on
stakes beside roads leading into the city, over which Russian
replacements and reinforcements had to travel. Both Russian and Chechen
dead were routinely booby-trapped. The Russians were not surprised by
the ferocity and brutality of the Chechens, they expected them to be
"criminals and animal brutes." But they were surprised by the
sophistication of the Chechen use of booby-traps and mines. Chechens
mined and booby-trapped everything, showing excellent insight into the
actions and reactions of the average Russian soldier. The Russians found
that mine and booby-trap- awareness discipline was hard to maintain.
3. You need some way of sorting out combatants from non-combatants. The
days of uniformed and organized units are past - soldiers and civilians
meld together . To find the combatants, Russians had to resort to
searching the pockets of civilians and examining them for shoulder
bruises and flashburns, and to sniffing them for the smell of gunpowder
and gun oil. Trained sniffer dogs were used, but were not always
effective. Nevertheless, dogs probably are the best way to determine if
a person has been using explosives or firing a weapon recently.
4. Both the physical and mental health of the Russian units began to
decline almost immediately upon initiation of high intensity combat. In
less than a month, almost 20% of the Russian soldiers were suffering
from viral hepatitis (very serious, very debilitating, slow recovery).
Most had chronic diarrhea and upper respiratory infections that turned
to pneumonia easily. This was blamed on the breakdown of logistical
support that resulted in units having to drink contaminated water. In
many instances unit sanitary discipline broke down almost completely.
The psychological impact of high intensity urban combat is so intense
that units must maintain a large reserve that will allow them to rotate
units in and out of combat. If you do this, you can preserve a unit for
a fairly long time. If you don't, once it gets used up, it can't be
rebuilt. (NOTE - a lesson from the first world war!)
5. Training and discipline are paramount. You can accomplish nothing
without them. If necessary, you need to do the training in the combat
zone. Discipline must be demanded. Once it begins to slip, the results
are disastrous.
6. The Russians were surprised and embarrassed at the degree to which
the Chechens exploited the use of cell phones, Motorola radios,
improvised TV stations, lightweight video cameras and the internet, to
win the information war. The Russians admitted that they lost control of
the information coming out of Grozny early in the operation and never
regained it.
7. The proliferation of rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers
surprised them, as well as the diversity of uses to which they were
put. RPGs were shot at everything that moved. They were fired at high
angle over low buildings and from around buildings with little or no
attempt made to aim. They were sometimes fired in very disciplined
volleys and were the weapon of choice for the Chechens, along with the
sniper rifle. Not only were the Russians faced with well-trained, well
equipped Chechen military snipers, there were also large numbers of
designated marksmen who were very good shots using standard military
rifles. These were very hard to deal with and usually required massive
firepower to overcome.
8. As expected, the Russians rediscovered the need for large numbers of
well-trained infantrymen. They said that some tasks, such as conducting
logpack operations, could only be conducted by infantrymen, but that
many of the poorly trained draftee soldiers and units, including
logistics troops, were hopelessly inept at basic military skills, such
as perimeter defense, establishing security overwatch, etc. and thereby
fell easy prey to the Chechens.
9. They found that boundaries between units were still tactical weak
points, but that it wasn't just horizontal boundaries they had to worry
about. In Grozny, in some cases, the Chechens held the third floor and
above, while the Russians held the first two floors and sometimes the
roof. If a unit holding the second floor evacuated parts of it without
telling the unit on the ground floor, the Chechens would move troops in
and attack the ground floor unit through the ceiling. Often this
resulted in fratricide as the ground floor unit responded with
uncontrolled fire through all of the ceilings, including the ones below
that section of the building still occupied by Russians. Entire battles
were fought through floors, ceilings, and walls without visual contact.
10. The most common response by the Chechens to the increasingly
powerful Russian indirect and aerial firepower was" hugging" a Russian
unit. If the hugging tactics caused the Russians to cease artillery and
air fires, it became a man-to-man fight and the Chechens were well
equipped to fight it. If they didn't cease the supporting fires, the
Russian units suffered just as much as the Chechen fighters did,
sometimes even more, and the morale effect was much worse on the
Russians.
11. Chechens developed tactics to deal with tanks and BMPs. They
assigned groups of RPG gunners to fire volleys at the lead and trail
vehicles. Once they were destroyed, the others were picked off,
one-by-one. The Russian forces lost 20 of 26 tanks, 102 of 120 BMPs,
and 6 of 6 ZSU-23s in the first three days of fighting in Grozny.
Chechens chose firing positions high enough or low enough stay out of
the fields of fire of the tank and BMP weapons. Russian conscript
infantry simply refused to dismount and often died in their BMP without
ever firing a shot. Russian elite infantry did much better, but didn't
coordinate well with armored vehicles initially.
12. The Russians were satisfied with the combat performance of most of
their infantry weapons. The T-72 tank, however, was dead meat. Too
vulnerable, too awkward, not agile, no visibility, poor weapons
coverage at close ranges. The Russians removed them from the battle and
replaced them with smaller numbers of older tanks and more
self-propelled artillery, more ADA weapons, and more BMPs. Precision
guided weapons and UAVs were very useful. There was some need for
non-lethal weapons, but mostly riot gas and tranquilizer gas, not stuff
like sticky foam. The Russian equivalent of the M202 Flash flame
projector and the Mk 19 grenade launcher were very useful weapons.
Ultimately, a strong combined arms team and flexible command and
control meant more than the individual weapons used by each side.