So where are gun owners' opinions on the NICS & mental illness, now after VT?
- Thread starter FirstFreedom
- Start date
The minute a physician declares someone mentally incompetant to have a gun some lawyer like Edwards will sue his ass and you'll be right back where we started: who is going to do the declaration? I saw shumer on TV tonight and he mentioned some legislation that looks like it eliminates physicians from that decision-making process, at least directly. Which means the lawyers (or judges) will make the decision. Who can trust a lawyer (or judge)?
I notice that the votes for "New law requiring reporting to a central DB those "adjudicated mentally defective", add to NICS." are at over 40%.
Were any of you ever dosed with Ritalin as a child in school? TURN IN YOUR FIREARMS!
Have any of you ever been diagnosed as depressed? TURN IN YOUR FIREARMS!
What are your plans for medical privacy rights; and how will you violate them for the greater good?
Were any of you ever dosed with Ritalin as a child in school? TURN IN YOUR FIREARMS!
Have any of you ever been diagnosed as depressed? TURN IN YOUR FIREARMS!
What are your plans for medical privacy rights; and how will you violate them for the greater good?
JuanCarlos
New member
Has this been seriously suggested, here or in the legislature? Or are we simply taking a ride down the slippery slope?
There's generally a difference between "depressed" and "danger to self and others." Though I'll admit that this is actually a reasonable evolution of the system, and something to worry about.
Confidentiality already doesn't apply if you're deemed a threat to self or others, as far as I know. At least that's what the nice counselor lady told me.
One of the things that bothers me is the commited to a mental institution. This falls into the same catagory as not being able to buy a gun if you have been charged with a crime even though you have not been convicted yet. What if you are found to be sane and not a threat. Under this bill you lose your rights to buy or own an gun just by having been evaluated. Nobody wants stark raving mad people to have guns but is it worth risking your own guns to keep someone else from having them. It's not worth the risk to me. The NICS is dangerous to all gun owners.
"Under this bill you lose your rights to buy or own an gun just by having been evaluated."
Where do you see this?
The adjudication and involuntary commitment occurs after the evaluation period, which is typically 2 to 4 days. In Virginia the order that gets you evaluated is called a temporary detention order.
Where do you see this?
The adjudication and involuntary commitment occurs after the evaluation period, which is typically 2 to 4 days. In Virginia the order that gets you evaluated is called a temporary detention order.
No, in this case they relied on NICS to disqualify him
This would have happened if Virginia had the same standards for adjudication of mentally defective as the federal standard.
Cho did lie on his 4473 by Virginia and was qualified under those same Virginia same standards
Would that be the same as adjudication?
There are actually two slippery slopes here
One is the possibility of expanding the definition of mentally defective to include lazy parents dosing their kids to keep them quiet and one to include parents who do not seek physician assistance when needed fearing a lifelong stigma for simple treatment.
I was prescribed Wellbutrin as an insurance dodge to quit smoking once, this really is a concern for me, but right now the key disqualifier is adjudication
Richard Hanson
New member
I understand that what I am about to write will not be in line with most forum members views. Please be assured that I do not intend to be offensive.
As I believe in individual rights, I also adhere to the idea of individual responsibility. I do not think it just to deny people their right to self defense based on their membership in a group.
Perhaps it is true that those with mental illnesses are more likely to commit crimes with guns then those without, I am unaware of any data to demonstrate this, but more predictive might be a family history of violence, or drug use, or race. Most of us understand how racism has historically been used to justify laws criminalizing the possession of guns by blacks.
Our rights to keep and bear arms is derived from our natural or unalienable right to self defense. This right can be somewhat "limited", as can other natural rights, when the state has a "compelling interest" to do so. However, it seams that in the instance of our 2nd Amendment rights the standard for "compelling interest" is extraordinarily low in comparison to other unalienable rights such as free speech or the liberty of conscience or our right to privacy.
How many people who are mentally ill will be denied the right to keep and bear arms, a natural and unalienable right, because we, as a society, fear what they "might" do? How is it that so many fail to recognize that fear is the basic motivating emotion for the vast majority of those who would instantiate comprehensive and oppressive gun control laws? The methodology, the reasoning, is identical, all that is different is the threshold of fear on which to determined who will or who will not be allowed to keep their 2nd Amendment rights.
One significant consequence of protecting any liberty is that some few possessing that freedom will not act responsibly. Thus we have the liberty of conscience to worship god as we each see fit and as a consequence we allow radical and hate-driven religious groups to exist within our society. We have free speech and some few utilize this liberty in the most offensive and hateful manner. If we are truly to have the right to keep and bear arms, if this right is to be respected and the standard for a "compelling interest" is to be reasonable instead of insignificant, then some few individuals that bear arms will used them for evil. If our individual rights to keep and bear ares are to be preserved, then there will be more Cho Seung-Hui's as a consequence.
"The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants." -- Mr. Thomas Jefferson of Virginia.
Liberty is not free, it is both extraordinarily expensive and extraordinarily precious. Some of the blood that has nourished the tree of our liberty belongs to the victims of gun violence including those who died in the Virginia Tech massacre. Such tragedy is the rational and predicable consequence of living in a liberal society. It is not just those who die on the battle fields that have shed their blood so that we might breath free, it is also those who suffer and die when evil men exploit our mutual liberty to do great harm.
I can not, in good conscience, take from the mentally ill any right I hold precious including the right to keep and bear arms. Nor can I countenance a lowering of the standard for "compelling interest" when it comes to our gun rights. The bar is already set far to low and a great many of my countrymen have little, if any, protection for their 2nd Amendment rights.
Respectfully,
Richard
As I believe in individual rights, I also adhere to the idea of individual responsibility. I do not think it just to deny people their right to self defense based on their membership in a group.
Perhaps it is true that those with mental illnesses are more likely to commit crimes with guns then those without, I am unaware of any data to demonstrate this, but more predictive might be a family history of violence, or drug use, or race. Most of us understand how racism has historically been used to justify laws criminalizing the possession of guns by blacks.
Our rights to keep and bear arms is derived from our natural or unalienable right to self defense. This right can be somewhat "limited", as can other natural rights, when the state has a "compelling interest" to do so. However, it seams that in the instance of our 2nd Amendment rights the standard for "compelling interest" is extraordinarily low in comparison to other unalienable rights such as free speech or the liberty of conscience or our right to privacy.
How many people who are mentally ill will be denied the right to keep and bear arms, a natural and unalienable right, because we, as a society, fear what they "might" do? How is it that so many fail to recognize that fear is the basic motivating emotion for the vast majority of those who would instantiate comprehensive and oppressive gun control laws? The methodology, the reasoning, is identical, all that is different is the threshold of fear on which to determined who will or who will not be allowed to keep their 2nd Amendment rights.
One significant consequence of protecting any liberty is that some few possessing that freedom will not act responsibly. Thus we have the liberty of conscience to worship god as we each see fit and as a consequence we allow radical and hate-driven religious groups to exist within our society. We have free speech and some few utilize this liberty in the most offensive and hateful manner. If we are truly to have the right to keep and bear arms, if this right is to be respected and the standard for a "compelling interest" is to be reasonable instead of insignificant, then some few individuals that bear arms will used them for evil. If our individual rights to keep and bear ares are to be preserved, then there will be more Cho Seung-Hui's as a consequence.
"The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants." -- Mr. Thomas Jefferson of Virginia.
Liberty is not free, it is both extraordinarily expensive and extraordinarily precious. Some of the blood that has nourished the tree of our liberty belongs to the victims of gun violence including those who died in the Virginia Tech massacre. Such tragedy is the rational and predicable consequence of living in a liberal society. It is not just those who die on the battle fields that have shed their blood so that we might breath free, it is also those who suffer and die when evil men exploit our mutual liberty to do great harm.
I can not, in good conscience, take from the mentally ill any right I hold precious including the right to keep and bear arms. Nor can I countenance a lowering of the standard for "compelling interest" when it comes to our gun rights. The bar is already set far to low and a great many of my countrymen have little, if any, protection for their 2nd Amendment rights.
Respectfully,
Richard
But a "group" is not being banned. An individual is. The individual is someone who has been deemed a significant danger to themselevs and others due to mental illness. We are not saying "Every person with depression is denied their 2A rights!" We are saying those who have shown they pose a serious risk to others loose their rights. Almost everyone agrees that this should not be done on one persons whim and that it should be challengeable in court.
This is already an accepted practice. There are people today in the USA who are locked away because they are carrying drug resistant strains of TB and refuse to wear a mask in public. They pose a serious reisk to those around them because they do not accept the responsiblities that goes along with their rights. As a result they are locked up in hospitals indefinitely.
Somebody with a mental illness serious enough to threaten themselves and others does not have the same rights because they are utterly incapable of recognizing the responsibilities that go along with them.
Richard Hanson
New member
Musketeer,
If a person is determined to "pose a serious risk to others loose their rights" then such a person should be "locked away" in which case they will be denied both their freedom and 2nd Amendment rights simultaneously. If the danger they represent to society is so significant as to deny them their 2nd Amendment rights, then they should not be at at large within our society.
I recognize that such people exist but the standard for the government to demonstrate a "compelling interest" to limit our 2nd Amendment rights should not be grossly dissimilar to the standard for limiting any other natural right.
Frankly, any person who posses such a sufficient risk to society as to justify the removal of their 2nd Amendment rights also posses an equally significant risk to society in the absence of their 2nd Amendment rights. Such a person can use a car as a weapon, or poison, or explosives, or a knife, a bat, a screwdriver, an ax, or even a gun in violation of the restrictions placed on them by such a law.
Best Regards,
Richard
If a person is determined to "pose a serious risk to others loose their rights" then such a person should be "locked away" in which case they will be denied both their freedom and 2nd Amendment rights simultaneously. If the danger they represent to society is so significant as to deny them their 2nd Amendment rights, then they should not be at at large within our society.
I recognize that such people exist but the standard for the government to demonstrate a "compelling interest" to limit our 2nd Amendment rights should not be grossly dissimilar to the standard for limiting any other natural right.
Frankly, any person who posses such a sufficient risk to society as to justify the removal of their 2nd Amendment rights also posses an equally significant risk to society in the absence of their 2nd Amendment rights. Such a person can use a car as a weapon, or poison, or explosives, or a knife, a bat, a screwdriver, an ax, or even a gun in violation of the restrictions placed on them by such a law.
Best Regards,
Richard
Let it Bleed
New member
18 USC § 922(d)(4) (2005).
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person -
has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution;
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person -
has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution;
Let it Bleed
New member
No. 84-1904
Argued March 26, 1986
Decided June 27, 1986
477 U.S. 556
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Syllabus
Appellee, who had been involuntarily committed to a mental hospital for a period of several days in 1971, was unable to purchase a firearm from a store in 1982 because of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) prohibiting sales of firearms to such persons. Section 922(d) and other federal statutes prohibiting persons who have been committed to mental institutions from possessing, receiving, or transporting firearms also apply to felons. However, under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), certain felons could apply to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for administrative relief from the disabilities imposed by federal firearms laws, but no such relief was permitted for former mental patients. After unsuccessfully seeking a special exemption from the Bureau, appellee brought suit in Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the firearms legislation. The court held that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional as violating equal protection principles because there was no rational basis for singling out mental patients for permanent disabled status, particularly as compared to convicts. The court also concluded that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally created an "irrebuttable presumption" that one who has been committed, no matter what the circumstances, is forever mentally ill and dangerous.
Held: The equal protection and "irrebuttable presumption" issues are now moot because, after this Court noted probable jurisdiction over this appeal and heard arguments, Congress amended § 925(c) to afford the administrative remedy contained therein to former mental patients ineligible to purchase firearms. Since appellee's complaint appears to raise other issues best addressed in the first instance by the District Court, the case is remanded for further proceedings. Pp. 559-560.
602 F.Supp. 682, vacated and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. [477 U.S. 557]
BURGER, J., lead opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We noted probable jurisdiction to decide whether Congress may, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, forbid all involuntarily committed former mental patients to purchase firearms while permitting some felons to do so.
In 1982, appellee attempted to purchase a firearm at Ray's Sport Shop in North Plainfield, New Jersey. The Sport Shop gave appellee a standard questionnaire, which asked, inter alia: "Have you ever been adjudicated mentally defective or have you ever been committed to a mental institution?" Appellee had been involuntarily committed to a mental hospital for a period of several days in 1971, and accordingly answered "yes" to this question. The store then refused to sell him a gun by reason of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4), which makes it unlawful for a licensed dealer in firearms to sell . . . any firearm . . . to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person . . . has been adjudicated as a mental defective or had been committed to any mental institution. Federal firearms laws also forbid any person . . . who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution . . . to ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), or to "receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate [477 U.S. 558] or foreign commerce," § 922(h). Partially overlapping provisions of 18 U.S.C.App. §§ 1202(a)(1) and (3) prohibit any person who has "been adjudged by a court . . . of being mentally incompetent" from receiving, possessing, or transporting firearms.
After unsuccessfully seeking a special exemption from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, appellee brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, challenging the constitutionality of the firearms legislation. The District Court concluded that those portions of the federal firearms statutes that deprived appellee of his ability to purchase a firearm were constitutionally infirm. 602 F.Supp. 682, 683 (1985). Both felons and persons who have been committed to mental institutions, inter alia, are subject to the firearms disabilities contained in 18 U.S.C. § 922(d). Under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), however, felons who have committed crimes not involving firearms may apply to the Bureau for administrative relief from these disabilities. No such relief is permitted for former mental patients.
Section 925(c) provides in relevant part:
A person who has been convicted for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year (other than a crime involving the use of a firearm or other weapon or a violation of this chapter or of the National Firearms Act) may make application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms and incurred by reason of such conviction, and the Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the conviction, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest. [477 U.S. 559]
The District Court held that this scheme violated equal protection principles because, in its view, "[t]here is no rational basis for thus singling out mental patients for permanent disabled status, particularly as compared to convicts." 602 F.Supp. at 689. The court also concluded that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional because it in effect creates an irrebuttable presumption that one who has been committed, no matter the circumstances, is forever mentally ill and dangerous.
Id. at 690. We noted probable jurisdiction over the Government's appeal, 474 U.S. 943 (1985), and the case was argued on March 26, 1986.
Meanwhile, Congress came to the conclusion, as a matter of legislative policy, that the firearms statutes should be redrafted. On May 19, 1986, while this case was under consideration here, the President signed into law Pub.L. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449. Section 105 of the statute amends the provision providing for administrative relief from firearms disabilities, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), by striking out the language limiting the provision to certain felons and changing the statute to read that any person who "is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition" may apply to the Secretary of the Treasury for relief. Section 110 of the statute provides that the amendment made by § 105 "shall be applicable to any action, petition, or appellate proceeding pending on the date of the enactment of this Act. "
This enactment significantly alters the posture of this case. The new statutory scheme permits the Secretary to grant relief in some circumstances to former involuntarily committed mental patients such as appellee. The new approach affords an administrative remedy to former mental patients like that Congress provided for others prima facie ineligible to purchase firearms. Thus, it can no longer be contended that such persons have been "singled out." Also, no "irrebuttable presumption" now exists, since a hearing is afforded to anyone subject to firearms disabilities. Accordingly, the equal protection and "irrebuttable presumption" issues discussed [477 U.S. 560] by the District Court are now moot. See United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 213 (1984).
In such circumstances, "it is the duty of the appellate court to set aside the decree below. . . ." Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S. 259, 267 (1936); see also United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950). We therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court. However, since appellee's complaint appears to raise other issues best addressed in the first instance by the District Court, we also remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Argued March 26, 1986
Decided June 27, 1986
477 U.S. 556
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Syllabus
Appellee, who had been involuntarily committed to a mental hospital for a period of several days in 1971, was unable to purchase a firearm from a store in 1982 because of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) prohibiting sales of firearms to such persons. Section 922(d) and other federal statutes prohibiting persons who have been committed to mental institutions from possessing, receiving, or transporting firearms also apply to felons. However, under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), certain felons could apply to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for administrative relief from the disabilities imposed by federal firearms laws, but no such relief was permitted for former mental patients. After unsuccessfully seeking a special exemption from the Bureau, appellee brought suit in Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the firearms legislation. The court held that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional as violating equal protection principles because there was no rational basis for singling out mental patients for permanent disabled status, particularly as compared to convicts. The court also concluded that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally created an "irrebuttable presumption" that one who has been committed, no matter what the circumstances, is forever mentally ill and dangerous.
Held: The equal protection and "irrebuttable presumption" issues are now moot because, after this Court noted probable jurisdiction over this appeal and heard arguments, Congress amended § 925(c) to afford the administrative remedy contained therein to former mental patients ineligible to purchase firearms. Since appellee's complaint appears to raise other issues best addressed in the first instance by the District Court, the case is remanded for further proceedings. Pp. 559-560.
602 F.Supp. 682, vacated and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. [477 U.S. 557]
BURGER, J., lead opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We noted probable jurisdiction to decide whether Congress may, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, forbid all involuntarily committed former mental patients to purchase firearms while permitting some felons to do so.
In 1982, appellee attempted to purchase a firearm at Ray's Sport Shop in North Plainfield, New Jersey. The Sport Shop gave appellee a standard questionnaire, which asked, inter alia: "Have you ever been adjudicated mentally defective or have you ever been committed to a mental institution?" Appellee had been involuntarily committed to a mental hospital for a period of several days in 1971, and accordingly answered "yes" to this question. The store then refused to sell him a gun by reason of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4), which makes it unlawful for a licensed dealer in firearms to sell . . . any firearm . . . to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person . . . has been adjudicated as a mental defective or had been committed to any mental institution. Federal firearms laws also forbid any person . . . who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution . . . to ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), or to "receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate [477 U.S. 558] or foreign commerce," § 922(h). Partially overlapping provisions of 18 U.S.C.App. §§ 1202(a)(1) and (3) prohibit any person who has "been adjudged by a court . . . of being mentally incompetent" from receiving, possessing, or transporting firearms.
After unsuccessfully seeking a special exemption from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, appellee brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, challenging the constitutionality of the firearms legislation. The District Court concluded that those portions of the federal firearms statutes that deprived appellee of his ability to purchase a firearm were constitutionally infirm. 602 F.Supp. 682, 683 (1985). Both felons and persons who have been committed to mental institutions, inter alia, are subject to the firearms disabilities contained in 18 U.S.C. § 922(d). Under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), however, felons who have committed crimes not involving firearms may apply to the Bureau for administrative relief from these disabilities. No such relief is permitted for former mental patients.
Section 925(c) provides in relevant part:
A person who has been convicted for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year (other than a crime involving the use of a firearm or other weapon or a violation of this chapter or of the National Firearms Act) may make application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms and incurred by reason of such conviction, and the Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the conviction, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest. [477 U.S. 559]
The District Court held that this scheme violated equal protection principles because, in its view, "[t]here is no rational basis for thus singling out mental patients for permanent disabled status, particularly as compared to convicts." 602 F.Supp. at 689. The court also concluded that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional because it in effect creates an irrebuttable presumption that one who has been committed, no matter the circumstances, is forever mentally ill and dangerous.
Id. at 690. We noted probable jurisdiction over the Government's appeal, 474 U.S. 943 (1985), and the case was argued on March 26, 1986.
Meanwhile, Congress came to the conclusion, as a matter of legislative policy, that the firearms statutes should be redrafted. On May 19, 1986, while this case was under consideration here, the President signed into law Pub.L. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449. Section 105 of the statute amends the provision providing for administrative relief from firearms disabilities, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), by striking out the language limiting the provision to certain felons and changing the statute to read that any person who "is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition" may apply to the Secretary of the Treasury for relief. Section 110 of the statute provides that the amendment made by § 105 "shall be applicable to any action, petition, or appellate proceeding pending on the date of the enactment of this Act. "
This enactment significantly alters the posture of this case. The new statutory scheme permits the Secretary to grant relief in some circumstances to former involuntarily committed mental patients such as appellee. The new approach affords an administrative remedy to former mental patients like that Congress provided for others prima facie ineligible to purchase firearms. Thus, it can no longer be contended that such persons have been "singled out." Also, no "irrebuttable presumption" now exists, since a hearing is afforded to anyone subject to firearms disabilities. Accordingly, the equal protection and "irrebuttable presumption" issues discussed [477 U.S. 560] by the District Court are now moot. See United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 213 (1984).
In such circumstances, "it is the duty of the appellate court to set aside the decree below. . . ." Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S. 259, 267 (1936); see also United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950). We therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court. However, since appellee's complaint appears to raise other issues best addressed in the first instance by the District Court, we also remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fine with me!
Then there are those who are released becaue their medication keeps them "regulated." Many things can affect medication levels, not just forgetting to take them. These people may be fine but are subject to real problems if their levels go off. Do we lock them away forever?
Felons are let out but have their rights restricted, why should this be different?
FirstFreedom, man I vote in almost all the polls. I gotta leave this one alone. There are too many open ended questions. What and who classifies someone as being mentally incapable of owning a firearm? Have you ever seen a question sheet from a ha-ha doctor. If that, is going to decide whether or not you are sane enough to own a gun, 75% of the members of this forum can kiss their guns goodbye.
Except that the provision for seeking relief was defunded in 1992 at the behest of anti-firearms groups and there is no other way for having rights restored.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=537&invol=71
Let it Bleed
New member
I agree. It is absurd that legislation, inserted into a statute to remedy a constitutional infirmity, can be rendered meaningless by simply refusing to fund the process. Especially when it was the lack of due process that rendered the law unconstitutional. 
Not necessarily. You'd get some of that to be sure but I suspect it would be a small amount. Most people that would be 'declared' would be pretty extreme cases. There'd be no reason you couldn't but a temporary "can't purchase firearms restraining order" type of thing on them until you get it sorted out. You are talking about someone who hopefully does not already have a gun, has a problem, gets declared, then can't buy one until he/she is either cleared or put under treatment and not cleared until well.
There are things you can do with this. And there are abuses you can do with it.
