Tocqueville, Democracy in America, chapter 8, "Concerning the Reelection of the President"
Should presidents be eligible for reelection
Were the lawgivers of the United States right or wrong to allow the reelection of the President?
To refuse the head of the executive the chance of reelection seems, at first sight, contrary to reason. One knows what influence the talents or character of a single man exercise over the fate of a whole people, especially in times of difficulty or crisis. Laws forbidding the citizens from reelecting their first magistrate would deprive them of their best means of bringing prosperity to the state or of saving it. In that way one would reach this odd result that a man would be excluded from the government just at the moment when he had succeeded in proving his capacity to rule well.
No doubt those are powerful arguments, but can one not bring up even stronger ones against them?
Intrigue and corruption are natural vices of elective governments; but when the head of state can be reelected, these vices spread beyond bounds and compromise the very existence of the country. When a simple candidate forces himself forward by intrigue, his maneuvers can only take place within a restricted sphere. But when the head of state himself is in the lists, he can borrow all the power of the government for his private use.
In the first case it is a question of a man with feeble resources; in the second, it is the state itself with all its immense resources which intrigues and which corrupts.
The simple citizen guilty of disreputable maneuvers to gain power can harm public prosperity only in some indirect way; but if the representative of the executive power descends to compete, the cares of government become for him a secondary consideration; his main concern is for his election. For him negotiations, like laws, are nothing but electoral combinations; places become the reward for services rendered, not to the nation, but to its head. Even if the government's action is not always contrary to the nation's interest, at least it no longer serves it. But the function of government is solely to serve the country.
It is impossible to observe the normal course of affairs in the United States without noticing that desire for reelection dominates the President's thoughts, that the whole policy of his administration is bent toward that aim, that his slightest actions are subordinate to that aim, and that, particularly as the moment of crises [reelection] draws nearer, his private interest takes the place of the general interest in his mind.
Therefore the principle of reelection makes the corrupting in fluence of elective governments wider spread and more dangerous. It tends to degrade the political morality of the nation and to substitute craft for patriotism.
In America it attacks the very sources of national existence at still closer range.
Each type of government harbors one natural vice which seems inherent in the very nature of its being; the genius of a lawgiver consists in discerning that clearly. A state may stand triumphant over many bad laws, and the harm they do is often exaggerated. But any law having the effect of nourishing this mortal germ cannot fail, in the long run, to prove fatal, even though its ill effects may not be immediately apparent.
In absolute monarchies the ruinous principle is the unlimited and unreasonable extension of the royal power. Any measure, therefore, which takes away the counterweights left by the constitution to balance this power, is radically bad, even though its effects may long seem negligible.
In the same way, in a country where democracy holds sway and a people constantly attracts everything to itself, laws which make its action ever prompter and more irresistible are a direct attack on the existence of the government.
The greatest merit of the lawgivers of America was to have seen this truth clearly and to have had the courage to act accordingly.
They agreed that, besides the people, there must be a certain number of authorities which, though not entirely independent of it, nevertheless enjoyed within their sphere a fairly wide degree of freedom; by this means, though forced to obey the permanent directions of the majority, they could still struggle against its caprices and refuse to be the tools of its dangerous exigencies.
With this object, they concentrated the whole executive power of the nation in the hands of one man; they gave wide prerogatives to the President and armed him with the veto with which to resist the encroachments of the legislature.
But by introducing the principle of reelection they destroyed a part of their work. They gave the President much power, but took away from him the will to use it.
Had he not been reeligible, the President would still not have been independent of the people, or his responsibility toward it never ceased; but the people's favor would not have been so necessary to him that he must in everything bend to its will.
Reeligible (and this is especially true in our day, when political morality is growing lax and men of great character are vanishing from the scene), the President of the United States is only a docile instrument in the hands of the majority. He loves what it loves and hates what it hates; he sails ahead of its desires, anticipating its complaints and bending to its slightest wishes; the lawgivers wished him to guide it, but it is he who follows.
In this way, intending not to deprive the state of one man's talents, they have rendered those talents almost useless, and to preserve a resource against extraordinary eventualities, they have exposed the country to dangers every day.
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Is Tocqueville right, or would solving this "problem" do more harm than good? If an amendment were to prohibit the President from seeking a second term, should he be denied the right to run for any elected office once his single term is complete (Governor, Secretary General of the UN, etc.)? Should Senators and House Members be denied the possibility of re-election? What about House members seeking a Senate Seat, or either seeking the Presidency or Vice-Presidency... should that be prohibited?
Would it be constitutional to deny a former Federal Congressperson or President from running for an elective State office? Vice versa?
Is there too much danger danger of a former elected official getting a lucrative private-sector job, stock, or other favors as repayment for his vote or support as a Congressperson or as President? Can anything be done to prevent that?
Should presidents be eligible for reelection
Were the lawgivers of the United States right or wrong to allow the reelection of the President?
To refuse the head of the executive the chance of reelection seems, at first sight, contrary to reason. One knows what influence the talents or character of a single man exercise over the fate of a whole people, especially in times of difficulty or crisis. Laws forbidding the citizens from reelecting their first magistrate would deprive them of their best means of bringing prosperity to the state or of saving it. In that way one would reach this odd result that a man would be excluded from the government just at the moment when he had succeeded in proving his capacity to rule well.
No doubt those are powerful arguments, but can one not bring up even stronger ones against them?
Intrigue and corruption are natural vices of elective governments; but when the head of state can be reelected, these vices spread beyond bounds and compromise the very existence of the country. When a simple candidate forces himself forward by intrigue, his maneuvers can only take place within a restricted sphere. But when the head of state himself is in the lists, he can borrow all the power of the government for his private use.
In the first case it is a question of a man with feeble resources; in the second, it is the state itself with all its immense resources which intrigues and which corrupts.
The simple citizen guilty of disreputable maneuvers to gain power can harm public prosperity only in some indirect way; but if the representative of the executive power descends to compete, the cares of government become for him a secondary consideration; his main concern is for his election. For him negotiations, like laws, are nothing but electoral combinations; places become the reward for services rendered, not to the nation, but to its head. Even if the government's action is not always contrary to the nation's interest, at least it no longer serves it. But the function of government is solely to serve the country.
It is impossible to observe the normal course of affairs in the United States without noticing that desire for reelection dominates the President's thoughts, that the whole policy of his administration is bent toward that aim, that his slightest actions are subordinate to that aim, and that, particularly as the moment of crises [reelection] draws nearer, his private interest takes the place of the general interest in his mind.
Therefore the principle of reelection makes the corrupting in fluence of elective governments wider spread and more dangerous. It tends to degrade the political morality of the nation and to substitute craft for patriotism.
In America it attacks the very sources of national existence at still closer range.
Each type of government harbors one natural vice which seems inherent in the very nature of its being; the genius of a lawgiver consists in discerning that clearly. A state may stand triumphant over many bad laws, and the harm they do is often exaggerated. But any law having the effect of nourishing this mortal germ cannot fail, in the long run, to prove fatal, even though its ill effects may not be immediately apparent.
In absolute monarchies the ruinous principle is the unlimited and unreasonable extension of the royal power. Any measure, therefore, which takes away the counterweights left by the constitution to balance this power, is radically bad, even though its effects may long seem negligible.
In the same way, in a country where democracy holds sway and a people constantly attracts everything to itself, laws which make its action ever prompter and more irresistible are a direct attack on the existence of the government.
The greatest merit of the lawgivers of America was to have seen this truth clearly and to have had the courage to act accordingly.
They agreed that, besides the people, there must be a certain number of authorities which, though not entirely independent of it, nevertheless enjoyed within their sphere a fairly wide degree of freedom; by this means, though forced to obey the permanent directions of the majority, they could still struggle against its caprices and refuse to be the tools of its dangerous exigencies.
With this object, they concentrated the whole executive power of the nation in the hands of one man; they gave wide prerogatives to the President and armed him with the veto with which to resist the encroachments of the legislature.
But by introducing the principle of reelection they destroyed a part of their work. They gave the President much power, but took away from him the will to use it.
Had he not been reeligible, the President would still not have been independent of the people, or his responsibility toward it never ceased; but the people's favor would not have been so necessary to him that he must in everything bend to its will.
Reeligible (and this is especially true in our day, when political morality is growing lax and men of great character are vanishing from the scene), the President of the United States is only a docile instrument in the hands of the majority. He loves what it loves and hates what it hates; he sails ahead of its desires, anticipating its complaints and bending to its slightest wishes; the lawgivers wished him to guide it, but it is he who follows.
In this way, intending not to deprive the state of one man's talents, they have rendered those talents almost useless, and to preserve a resource against extraordinary eventualities, they have exposed the country to dangers every day.
------------------------------------------------------------
Is Tocqueville right, or would solving this "problem" do more harm than good? If an amendment were to prohibit the President from seeking a second term, should he be denied the right to run for any elected office once his single term is complete (Governor, Secretary General of the UN, etc.)? Should Senators and House Members be denied the possibility of re-election? What about House members seeking a Senate Seat, or either seeking the Presidency or Vice-Presidency... should that be prohibited?
Would it be constitutional to deny a former Federal Congressperson or President from running for an elective State office? Vice versa?
Is there too much danger danger of a former elected official getting a lucrative private-sector job, stock, or other favors as repayment for his vote or support as a Congressperson or as President? Can anything be done to prevent that?