SCOTUS decision in Raich is out.
- Thread starter shaggy
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From Justice Thomas' Dissent:
This Court has never held that Congress can regulate noneconomic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Morrison, 529 U.S., at 613 (“[T]hus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature” (emphasis added)); Lopez, supra, at 560. To evade even that modest restriction on federal power, the majority defines economic activity in the broadest possible terms as the “ ‘the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’ ”7 Ante, at 23 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 720 (1966) (hereinafter Webster’s 3d). This carves out a vast swath of activities that are subject to federal regulation. See ante, at 8—9 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). If the majority is to be taken seriously, the Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States. This makes a mockery of Madison’s assurance to the people of New York that the “powers delegated” to the Federal Government are “few and defined,” while those of the States are “numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison).
Moreover, even a Court interested more in the modern than the original understanding of the Constitution ought to resolve cases based on the meaning of words that are actually in the document. Congress is authorized to regulate “Commerce,” and respondents’ conduct does not qualify under any definition of that term.8 The majority’s opinion only illustrates the steady drift away from the text of the Commerce Clause. There is an inexorable expansion from “ ‘commerce,’ ” ante, at 1, to “commercial” and “economic” activity, ante, at 20, and finally to all “production, distribution, and consumption” of goods or services for which there is an “established … interstate market,” ante, at 23. Federal power expands, but never contracts, with each new locution. The majority is not interpreting the Commerce Clause, but rewriting it.
This Court has never held that Congress can regulate noneconomic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Morrison, 529 U.S., at 613 (“[T]hus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature” (emphasis added)); Lopez, supra, at 560. To evade even that modest restriction on federal power, the majority defines economic activity in the broadest possible terms as the “ ‘the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’ ”7 Ante, at 23 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 720 (1966) (hereinafter Webster’s 3d). This carves out a vast swath of activities that are subject to federal regulation. See ante, at 8—9 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). If the majority is to be taken seriously, the Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States. This makes a mockery of Madison’s assurance to the people of New York that the “powers delegated” to the Federal Government are “few and defined,” while those of the States are “numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison).
Moreover, even a Court interested more in the modern than the original understanding of the Constitution ought to resolve cases based on the meaning of words that are actually in the document. Congress is authorized to regulate “Commerce,” and respondents’ conduct does not qualify under any definition of that term.8 The majority’s opinion only illustrates the steady drift away from the text of the Commerce Clause. There is an inexorable expansion from “ ‘commerce,’ ” ante, at 1, to “commercial” and “economic” activity, ante, at 20, and finally to all “production, distribution, and consumption” of goods or services for which there is an “established … interstate market,” ante, at 23. Federal power expands, but never contracts, with each new locution. The majority is not interpreting the Commerce Clause, but rewriting it.
For too many legislators and judiciaries, politics is no longer about principle. Rather, it's become a naked competition for clout among interests seeking to use the power of government to their advantage.
For example, in Wisconsin, Assembly Bill 222 (coined the All Sums Bill) was to address the matter of cleaning up of the Fox River. It could cost as much as $500 million. This clean-up is needed due to the paper industry's use of the river over years and years.
So the paper companies have turned to their political buddies in Madison to shift the shaft. They want to force insurance companies to pay even though their insurance policies may not have covered such conduct. The solution -- and I'm not making this up -- is to simply have the Legislature rewrite the contracts years after the fact. Under the bill, the paper industry could pick one unlucky insurer and require that company to pay the entire cost of the cleanup, thus the term "all sums." In practice, it is a legislative looting.
For example, in Wisconsin, Assembly Bill 222 (coined the All Sums Bill) was to address the matter of cleaning up of the Fox River. It could cost as much as $500 million. This clean-up is needed due to the paper industry's use of the river over years and years.
So the paper companies have turned to their political buddies in Madison to shift the shaft. They want to force insurance companies to pay even though their insurance policies may not have covered such conduct. The solution -- and I'm not making this up -- is to simply have the Legislature rewrite the contracts years after the fact. Under the bill, the paper industry could pick one unlucky insurer and require that company to pay the entire cost of the cleanup, thus the term "all sums." In practice, it is a legislative looting.
Publius42, you could go on quoting Thomas from his dissent. Nobody else seems to care about this anymore. But I love to read this particular opinion. He constantly nails the rest of the Court to that barn door they keep leaving open!
Shhhh! Let's keep it quiet, OK? They'll start looking to see what they might have missed...
Shhhh! Let's keep it quiet, OK? They'll start looking to see what they might have missed...
And I might. I keep hoping some of our drug warriors will show up to tell me why Thomas is wrong, and how Scalia's ruling in Raich can be reconciled with Madison in Federalist 45. I figure if you ask a question often enough, it may just get answered, if there is an answer...
But then you go on with your furby example, which could as well be applied to guns. So, mere possession of anything that came from another state (or had components from another state?) could be regulated, and that would include concealed carry. But under Raich, even if it came from your state, even if you grew it yourself, the fact that it could find its way to another state gives Congress power over it. That was applied to guns under Stewart (or soon will be, I guess I should say, since I haven't heard that the 9th did anything with it as yet.)
Of course, laws about bearing arms would seem to present a 2nd amendment problem, but the Court does not want to hear about the 2nd amendment, and would probably just spew forth some gibberish about concealed handguns having nothing to do with militias if they did hear it.
It's sounding to me like anything that might have anything to do with anything that ever touched on interstate commerce is now among the "few and defined" powers of the federal govt.
It sounds that way to Justice Thomas as well:
I think that if you took a copy of the Raich decision back in time to the Constitutional Convention and showed it to the Founders, the Convention would end in a riot. They never intended these sweeping powers. Otherwise, why would Madison say this in Federalist 45:
Doh.
Right. I shouldn't have separated them.
Is there a Supreme Court decision saying as much? It would have to be over an item that was bought by the defendent in an intra-state transaction, but was manufactured in another state.
Is there a Supreme Court decision saying as much? It would have to be over an item that was bought by the defendent in an intra-state transaction, but was manufactured in another state.
I think if the Constitutional Convention had been made aware of Raich, they would have modified the constitution to make it clear that such BS is not allowed. I don't think there would have been any debate on the changes, on either the federalist or antifederalist side. Not even the federalists wanted something like Raich.
For the record...
There was some discussion back on page 1 re US v Stewart. That issue has been settled.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-617.htm
There was some discussion back on page 1 re US v Stewart. That issue has been settled.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-617.htm
Hugh Damright
New member
Look what I found in the Congressional Record today: