SCOTUS Cert filed: Schrader, et al v. Holder, et al

If a soldier is convicted in a civilian court of a crime which prevents him from possessing a firearm, The army will discharge him.

You would think that. The number of felony waivers that the Army processed to allow people in was in the thousands 2005-2008. Some people convicted of arson, B&E, assault and various other things. We wonder now why we have former soldiers wandering around MT. Rainer with a rifle? I don't wonder why; we do this to ourselves every war.

The Army took these people in without any attempt to restore their rights and then stuck a rifle in their hands. Now the same government is saying that they can't be trusted to own a gun. In some cases they are right.
 
Really no need to argue this point but, I have just reviewed the current Army recuriting and retention policies. The practices which may have occurred in 2008 when the army was winking at the law, no longer apply.
 
05/14/2012 Open Document CONSENT UNOPPOSED MOTION filed [1373498] by Jefferson Wayne Schrader and Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. to extend time to file brief to 06/19/2012. [Service Date: 05/14/2012 ] Pages: 1-10. [11-5352] (Gura, Alan)

05/14/2012 Open Document CLERK'S ORDER filed [1373646] granting appellant's consent motion to extend time to file the briefs [1373498-2], The following revised briefing schedule will now apply: APPELLEE Brief due on 06/05/2012. APPELLANT Reply Brief due 06/19/2012 [11-5352]

Appellee's (Defendant Holder) response brief was due today, however... On May 14th, the Appellant (Plaintiff Schrader) filed a consent motion to extend time to file, by 2 weeks.

Considering everything that is on Gura's plate, this should not surprise anyone.
 
Appellee (Defendant US Atty General's Office) Response Brief was filed in Schrader.

What the government is saying is that because at common law, any misdemeanor offense could have been punished by a term of imprisonment exceeding two years, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) applies.

According to the government, it makes no difference if you could prove that no simple assault & battery (fistfight) ever received such a sentence, it could have.

The government is also arguing that once convicted of a crime, however slight, you are a criminal for life... Even after 40 years of an otherwise exemplary life.
 

Attachments

I wonder how many of our Honorable Senators and Congresspersons are not eligible to own a gun due to this law?

A photo of our President as a young man smoking pot is evidence of a misdemeanor, isn't it? Should he be disallowed from owning a gun? Would that ban him from being Commander and Chief of the largest collection of weapons in the world?

I'm not ranting, just pointing out the extended logic of the law.
 
Oral Args are set for Oct.10th, 2012.

08/06/2012 Open Document CLERK'S ORDER filed [1387705] scheduling oral argument before Judges TATEL, WILLIAMS, RANDOLPH Wednesday, 10/10/2012 AM [11-5352]

David S. Tatel - 1994, Clinton
Stephan F. Williams - 1986, Reagan (Senior Status)
A. Raymond Randolf - 1990, G.H.W. Bush (Senior Status)
 
esqappellate said:
Oral argument was held today in the D.C. Circuit. Argument time vastly exceeded 15 minutes per side. Gura was up for a good 30 minutes and gov. counsel was up well past her time. While the court did not appear to buy Gura's argument that 922(g) should be narrowly construed to exclude common law offenses categorically, at least two members of the panel appeared to be very uncomfortable with a holding that 922(g) could be constitutionally applied to Mr. Schrader specifically in his unique circumstances. They were looking at ways to avoid the constitutional holding, perhaps with a remand to the district court with instructions to apply 18 usc 925(c). However, that would require a judicial rewrite of 925(c), as it permits the district court to review a denial of a decision of the AG, not to conduct de novo proceedings in the absence of such an AG denial, and 925(c) has been defunded by Congress so the AG has no money to apply it. As Judge Tatel said to gov. counsel "assume that we have a major constitutional problem with applying 922(g) to Schrader personally so give us a way to avoid the constitutional issue" Gov. counsel declined the invitation (and honestly there does not appear any easy way to avoid the constitutional issue if the court does not rewrite the statute to avoid application to common law crimes). Bottom line prediction (don't hold me to it): 2-1 (Judges Tatel and Williams) for Schrader in *some* manner, if only a remand for a factual hearing. As Judge Tatel suggested: The Court may be forced to make a constitutional ruling that application of 922(g) "as applied" to Schrader is unconstitutional under the 2A.

The above is a direct quote from MDShooters member esqappellate, who attended the Orals for Schrader. The thread is: Schader Oral argument 10/10/2012 and the actual post is: http://mdshooters.com/showpost.php?p=1884714&postcount=22

Esqappellate is a retired appellate attorney and has been a great help in understanding both the district court proceedings and the appeals courts... When asked for his permission to quote him, he made the following statement, in order to qualify what the circuit court cannot do (the bolded part, above).

esqappellate said:
Note that the SCT has already held that under 18 usc 925, the district court is limited to reviewing an administrative denial of a request for relief of the possession disability. See United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 123 S.Ct. 584 (2002) (holding that actual denial of relief from firearms disabilities was prerequisite to judicial review). Since 925(c) proceedings have been defunded there is no possibility of administrative proceedings and hence no right of action in district court under 925(c). The D.C. Circuit knows that. So, the possibility of an actual ruling on the 2A is quite real.

This is what I remembered about the Bean case. For those that are unaware, but interested in this decision, the Berkeley Press has a 2003 article available for download (75pg PDF @ 2.4MB): http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/87/

The actual opinion (written by Justice Thomas) is available from Cornell: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/01-704.ZS.html This 9-0 opinion overturned the district court and the 5th circuit court (both the panel and en banc) decisions.
 
In their decision today, the CADC affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case.

—and given that plaintiffs raised no as-applied challenge with respect to Schrader in their district court briefs, we view this more specific claim as simply derivative of the broader claim that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to common-law misdemeanants as a class. And although plaintiffs referred to the specific circumstances of Schrader’s offense, they did so in the context of arguing that common-law misdemeanants as a class can be expected to share Schrader’s sympathetic characteristics.

In other words, the court rejected the arguments but said that because an as-applied argument was not made at district, it could not now be made and rejected Gura's implied arguments.
 

Attachments

How would your proposed amendment in any way make it right, ethical or moral for this man to be deprived (actually, "stripped") of his RKBA?

Knowledge aforethought. He plead guilty to a crime that he knew, or should have known would have this affect.



It wouldn't do anything for the poor man who's case is currently in court. That will be handled under current law. And yes, I do feel that if he is found guilty that it would be a serious violation of both moral and ethical law.

My proposal to modify the USC would be with the intent to avoid a case like this one ever being brought again, no matter how rabidly zealous the prosecution.

Can you imagine if IL decided that speeding XY miles over the speed limit constituted a Criminal negligence so they tacked on a sentence to prevent gun ownership and skirt their recent SCOTUS defeat?
 
Wikipedia definition of ex post facto:

... is a law that retroactively changes the legal consequences (or status) of actions that were committed, or relationships that existed, before the enactment of the law. In criminal law, it may criminalize actions that were legal when committed; it may aggravate a crime by bringing it into a more severe category than it was in when it was committed; it may change the punishment prescribed for a crime, as by adding new penalties or extending sentences; or it may alter the rules of evidence in order to make conviction for a crime likelier than it would have been when the deed was committed.

How does this not change the legal consequences, and/or aggravate the crime?

If losing his 2A rights is a legal consequence, and how can it not be...?
 
I kept looking and found Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 4 Wall. 277 277 (1867)

That defines Ex Post Facto in a SCOTUS decision-

An ex post facto law is one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed, or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed, or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required.

Doesn't the combination of laws here constitute ex post facto? He plead guilty to the crime at Point A before two laws that combined have imposed an additional punishment to "that then prescribed" - and as mentioned earlier in the same case point 2 of the syllabus "Deprivation or suspension of any civil rights for past conduct is punishment for such conduct."
 
To be honest, JimDany, I don't have a good answer for that question. I'll have to look into it. At first blush, your argument (where I think you're headed, anyway) has some appeal.
 
Back
Top