Richards v. Prieto appealed to 9th Circuit

The reply is hilarious. Because the majority of the county is wilderness, and the open carry ban doesn't apply there, the Peruta finding of a right to self defense outside the home is met as long as people stay way the heck out of town and never re-enter an incorporated area.
 
Good, but not really that important because it's the same three judges as decided Peruta and with no new reasoning or facts added. Peruta is what matters, esp. whether or not it gets taken up en banc and whether or not it influences the Supremes to take Drake.
 
Jim, this is important, because Judge Thomas, who wrote the dissent in Peruta, reluctantly agrees that the case was decided correctly:

I agree that, if unaltered by an en banc panel or by the Supreme Court, Peruta v. County of San Diego, No. 10-56971,— F.3d—, 2014 WL 555862 (Feb. 13, 2014), requires reversing and remanding in this case. Peruta and this case were argued and submitted on the same date. Absent Peruta, I would hold that the Yolo County’s “good cause” requirement is constitutional because carrying concealed weapons in public is not conduct protected by the Second Amendment. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010). I also would have held, in the alternative, that even if the good cause requirement implicated the Second Amendment, the policy survives intermediate scrutiny.

Therefore, I concur in the judgment.
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The opinion is also unpublished and cannot therefore be cited within the 9th Circuit.
 
Thomas is only saying here "well if Peruta stands, this stands, but I still say Peruta is wrong". So no, there's no new analysis or...well, anything.

I expect the Hawaiian variant of this to be the same.
 
When he says
I would hold that the Yolo County’s “good cause” requirement is constitutional because carrying concealed weapons in public is not conduct protected by the Second Amendment.
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isn't that something of a half-truth analysis of Peruta already? Peruta didn't find that carrying concealed is protected, so much as some form of carry is protected. Like the right to travel is protected, but the "right" to fly, to drive, or travel via some other method specifically, isn't protected?
 
Thomas agued in dissent in Peruta that the majority erred in looking beyond the specific question presented, which was a challenge to the good cause requirement of the concealed carry law. Looking solely at concealed carry, Thomas concluded, based on a long history of cases upholding concealed carry bans, that concealed carry was not within the scope of the Second Amendment--as had the eastern circuits in Kachalsky, Drake and Woolard.

The majority did look at that law more globally, found a right to carry outside the home, and concluded that carry for self defense had to be allowed in one form or another; California having effectively banned urban open carry, concealed carry had to be allowed, and a discretionary system of issuance that had the effect of banning most people from exercising the right was unconstitutional.

In Richards, and contrary to what Al says, Thomas did not concede that the majority was correct, only that under principles of stare decisis the outcome was determined by Peruta. In his concurrence, though, he made the point that he believed that Peruta was wrongly decided, and essentially invited en banc review.
 
Which is why I stated that Judge Thomas "reluctantly agreed." <-- Note the term I used. I did not say he "conceded." You named it: stare decisis.

Not being an attorney affords me the leeway to put legalese into a manner in which the non-legal mind (and the majority of the people), can understand.

You want to take issue with that? Certify my entry into the Bar, and I will go all legalese on everyone. As many of my posts will attest, I'm quite capable of that. :rolleyes:
 
What I was referring to was your language that Thomas agreed "that the case was correctly decided." Which I read as stating that Thomas was saying that Peruta was correctly decided, and of course he was not. He didn't think that Richards was correctly decided either--he "reluctantly agreed" only that the outcome was compelled by Peruta, not that it was "correct".
 
Gotta give Thomas some credit, he's a better judge than 4 on the Supreme Court.

Given Heller, 4 of them still didn't vote for McDonald
 
Looking solely at concealed carry, Thomas concluded, based on a long history of cases upholding concealed carry bans, that concealed carry was not within the scope of the Second Amendment--as had the eastern circuits in Kachalsky, Drake and Woolard.

The majority did look at that law more globally, found a right to carry outside the home, and concluded that carry for self defense had to be allowed in one form or another; California having effectively banned urban open carry, concealed carry had to be allowed, and a discretionary system of issuance that had the effect of banning most people from exercising the right was unconstitutional.
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Wait, did I miss something? I thought the question included reference to the virtual ban on open carry? Wasn't the issue -and give me some round-about latitude to get there- A challenge to the good cause requirement because Open Carry was virtually banned?

From following the discussion, I was under the impression there was some multi-tiered issue raised that included an assertion that open carry wasn't allowed in enough of the county to count as exercising the right. If that was one of the legs Pertua was figuratively trying to stand on, doesn't that mean the court had to examine that leg as part of their job?
 
At the time Peruta was decided in the trial court, California still allowed open unloaded carry--as long as you were not in a GFSZ or were in an unincorporated area. The trial court held that this allowance was sufficient to protect the right, notwithstanding Plaintiff's argument that open unloaded is utterly useless in case of a sudden emergency, and granted the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment. The law changed while the case was on appeal.
 
I guess I am thick. Because one Cali law barred open carry, Gore's exercise of his discretion to determine "good cause" under another Cali law for the issuance of concealed carry permits was held unconstitutional. The law barring open carry didn't exist at the complained of times and was enacted later. How then could Gore's complained of conduct injured Peruta?

Did he resubmit an application or request reconsideration after the law prohibiting open carry was in effect?
 
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Dreaming, I think you might have mixed up the two cases.

Regardless, In both Richards v. Prieto and in Peruta v. San Diego, the main complaint was that neither Sheriff (Prieto and Gore, respectively) would accept "self defense" as good cause for the issuance of a concealed carry license.

At the time these cases were filed, you could lawfully carry an unloaded handgun, openly (UOC - Unloaded Open Carry). Both Richards and Peruta argued that carrying an unloaded firearm was not the same as being fully prepared for confrontation. That is, an loaded firearm was essentially useless if you were attacked and needed the firearm, now.

That was the original nature of the complaint. The only method of carrying a loaded and ready handgun was concealed carry, under CA law, and that the authorities administering the law did not accept self defense as good cause. The injury was that both were denied the effective means of self defense under CA law.

The Richards case was the first case filed. Yet the Peruta case was the first one that was decided.

The Judge in Peruta decided that UOC was all that was necessary to fulfill the requirements of the second amendment. The Judge in Richards essentially said the same thing.

During the time both cases were on appeals to the 9th circuit, the CA legislature changed the law and banned any form of open carry within the limits of a city/town. That changed an essential nature of the lawsuits.

Reading Judge O'Scannlain's opinion, although it would not have changed the nature of his decision. It did make his decision easier. Under the operating parameters of the second amendment, as laid out by the Supreme Court in Heller, the State must allow at least one form of armed carry. The State of CA had chosen concealed carry as that means. That the State did, in the form of licensed concealed carry. Where the injury was in the Sheriffs interpretation of the State "Good Cause" clause, the Sheriffs must include "self defense" as good cause.

No State law was struck down. Only a policy of individual interpretation of the law was ruled unconstitutional.

Does that help with your confusion?
 
Under the operating parameters of the second amendment, as laid out by the Supreme Court in Heller, the State must allow at least one form of armed carry.
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Now I'm confused again. First, was Heller before or after these two cases were filed?

Second, I thought one of the big "holes" people were debating about with Heller was that it didn't directly deal with carry outside the home, and like that comma in the second amendment, people were arguing about what the inclusion of "in the home" meant. I thought the only thing Heller directly dealt with for this was that requiring unloaded was too much of a burden.
 
Second, I thought one of the big "holes" people were debating about with Heller was that it didn't directly deal with carry outside the home
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Scalia found the right to self-defense to be "most acute" in the home, but in no way did he limit it there.

Possession of a loaded handgun in the home was the central question in Heller.
 
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