Parkland Shooting Time Line

For those interested, here is the time line of events.

https://media.local10.com/document_...e of events_1520536088541_11763182_ver1.0.pdf

Note that Peterson does not make entry and does not attempt to make entry. He remains outside of Building 12 where the shots are being fired for most of the event. In fact, even after reporting possible shots fired, he does things like ordering traffic control to shut down an intersection and even orders other officers NOT to approach buildings. He gives other direction as well, all of which has nothing to do with stopping the shooter.

Long after the shooter is gone (shooting stops at just over 6 minutes), the order comes from Captain Jordan to set up a perimeter (just over 10 minutes).
 
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Thanks for posting this, DNS. It should answer a lot of questions.

Let's focus our discussion on the events and the LE responses to them, without digressing to accusations of cowardice, how these things are managed in other countries, etc.
Long after the shooter is gone (shooting stops at just over 6 minutes), the order comes from Captain Jordan to set up a perimeter (just over 10 minutes).
Yes, I was struck by that. The transcript gives the impression of a somewhat leisurely response, although I doubt that it felt that way to the responding officers.
 
Let's focus our discussion on the events and the LE responses to them, without digressing to accusations of cowardice, how these things are managed in other countries, etc.

I agree, we have thoroughly addressed cowardice in other threads and really there is no need for further discussion on that.

-My first take-away from reading the transcript is that at no time did BCSO ever intend to send officers inside until SWAT team responded. It does appears that at least 2 Deputies rejected this order and went in with CSPD. I would be furious if they received any discipline for this. This is a serious flaw in BCSO's critical incident response SOP in my opinion. As has been well discussed, set up a perimeter and wait for SWAT is not the standard LEOs are trained to with school shooters currently.

-My second, and really most important, takeaway is pretty much what I already know. No matter how brave the Law Enforcement response, it is a gamble as to whether they will be there in time to actually stop a mass shooting and save lives. CSPD arrived about a minute after the shooting stopped, and just as the suspect was leaving. I personally know, from responding to calls (thankfully not a mass shooting such as this), that it is very rare for Law Enforcement to arrive in time to stop the crime. If we are lucky, and on a good day, we get there in time to catch the suspect(s) fleeing. Most of the time the damage is done at this point. This solidifies my stance on arming teachers.

There are many lessons to be learned from this incident. I hope the FBI learned one as well...
 
In this case, they were very lucky indeed to have caught the suspect. The timeline brings out just how long he stayed around. He was arrested roughly an hour after leaving the school, at a location just over a mile away -- even on foot, he could have traveled much farther from the scene, in which case he might easily still be at large.
 
My first take-away from reading the transcript is that at no time did BCSO ever intend to send officers inside until SWAT team responded.

Interesting. My take is that Peterson went against SRO training and instead of attempting to stop the shooter, assumed (without authority?) control of the scene and decided he was the on scene commander for the response and did things like ordering traffic control and the locking down of the facility...which is basically his order to surround and contain the building. At point, he has been outside of building 12 for 2+ minutes while the shooting is still going on inside. Peterson seems to be the linchpin to how the response was handled and why nobody went inside in a timely manner.

At 6 minutes into the shooting and before the shooting stops, Peterson again is giving traffic control directions to shut off an intersection. His focus and the control he exerts has absolutely nothing to do with stopping the shooter.

What is interesting is that when the suspect is leaving the building that Peterson orders units to stay back 500 feet.

In short, Peterson made all the wrong decisions about stopping the shooter, was occupied with other duties that were not in his purview as SRO, and his decisions likely contributed to the shooter escaping.
 
DNS said:
Interesting. My take is that Peterson went against SRO training and instead of attempting to stop the shooter, assumed (without authority?) control of the scene and decided he was the on scene commander for the response and did things like ordering traffic control and the locking down of the facility...which is basically his order to surround and contain the building. At point, he has been outside of building 12 for 2+ minutes while the shooting is still going on inside. Peterson seems to be the linchpin to how the response was handled and why nobody went inside in a timely manner.
I stopped for a sandwich at a regional chain restaurant today. They had a television on in the dining room. I couldn't hear it, and I don't know what station or network was on, but the captions under scenes of the school said that "The deputy" (which I assume refers to Peterson) warned other responding officers away from the building.

Found an article reporting on this: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/...ol-shooting-scot-peterson-20180309-story.html
 
Interesting. My take is that Peterson went against SRO training and instead of attempting to stop the shooter, assumed (without authority?) control of the scene and decided he was the on scene commander for the response and did things like ordering traffic control and the locking down of the facility...which is basically his order to surround and contain the building. At point, he has been outside of building 12 for 2+ minutes while the shooting is still going on inside. Peterson seems to be the linchpin to how the response was handled and why nobody went inside in a timely manner.

Yes I agree as well after re-reading. Peterson first keys up about shots fired a full 3 minutes up before anyone from CSPD comes on the net about the shooting. CSPD had not even been dispatched, it was just a CSPD officer who heard about it from fire or rescue and requested a confirmation.

Despite being 3 minutes behind BCSO (an eternity in an incident such as this), CSPD is the first to announce a suspect description (1 minute before BCSO gets around to it). You are correct in that Peterson is too busy trying to play incident commander, and BCSO's response may have fed off of him some. Which to be fair, it would not be uncommon for an agency to allow a School SRO command over an incident at that school until an administrative commander arrived on scene.
 
In this case, they were very lucky indeed to have caught the suspect. The timeline brings out just how long he stayed around. He was arrested roughly an hour after leaving the school, at a location just over a mile away -- even on foot, he could have traveled much farther from the scene, in which case he might easily still be at large.

That has got to be the one thing which puzzles me to no end. Sources have said that the shooter carried up to 600 rounds in his backpack, and only expended around 200 or so rounds, before ditching the gun and ammo and trying to blend in with the other students being escorted from the building by LEOs. By this moment, I assume everyone would have seen that HE was the shooter. Why was he even allowed to travel for so long and remain out of custody for so long? Didn't anyone scream out to the officers: "That's HIM...HE is the one...GET HIM!!!". He would have been tackled to the ground and cuffed as soon as he emerged into the sunlight.

An active shooter exiting a tremendously target rich environment does not strike me as the worst thing in the world.

Yes, and to add to my above statement, the POS had already ditched his rifle and packs by the time first responders have arrived. I am truly surprised that a group of students did not just jump him then and there and beat him to a pulp before handing him to the officers outside. [...]
 
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5whiskey said:
You are correct in that Peterson is too busy trying to play incident commander, and BCSO's response may have fed off of him some.
Additionally, Peterson and others initially seem to focus entirely on preventing people from approaching or entering the school ("Get the school locked down gentlemen... make sure there’s no pedestrian traffic anywhere on Holmberg Rd... Make sure I have a unit over in the front of the school, make sure no one comes inside the school..."). Note that none of the BSO officers seem to react to the call that "... I got more students running west towards the football field..." [14:26:34]; they seemingly aren't concerned that people are fleeing.

Almost 10 minutes elapses after Peterson's first call before someone at the BSO seems to realize that it just might be important to prevent people—such as the suspect!—from leaving the school [Capt. Jordan at 14:33:04, "all the kids are getting out, but we need to shut down around this school"].
Evan Thomas said:
In this case, they were very lucky indeed to have caught the suspect. The timeline brings out just how long he stayed around. He was arrested roughly an hour after leaving the school, at a location just over a mile away -- even on foot, he could have traveled much farther from the scene, in which case he might easily still be at large.
Lucky is right.

It seems to me that the shooter didn't really have a coherent plan for what to do after he escaped, and that his failure to promptly get the heck outta Dodge, combined with some dumb luck by police, led to his apprehension. I could draw a parallel to Lee Oswald after the JFK assassination, assuming he was in fact the assassin, but let's not go there. :)
Rachen said:
By this moment, I assume everyone would have seen that HE was the shooter.... I am truly surprised that a group of students did not just jump him then and there and beat him to a pulp before handing him to the officers outside.
While I haven't seen a rundown of events inside the school, it's likely that he used an escape route that didn't pass back through the shooting areas. It's very hard in a high school the size of Parkland to know what's going on beyond your immediate vicinity—especially when people around you are panicking. It's probable that none of the students fleeing with him had seen him shoot anyone, and the fact that he was a recent former student may have also played an ironic role, as he may have been a familiar face.
 
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An active shooter exiting a tremendously target rich environment does not strike me as the worst thing in the world.

Only he wasn't an active shooter anymore, was he? Read the transcript. Not that the cops would have known one way or the other, but first they failed to stop him then failed Peterson's perimeter and the guy just walked away.

   
 
I think that if there hadn’t had so many previous complaints about the shooter, he may have very well gotten away for some time.

But, that’s speculation on my part and we have no way of knowing. Actually is not relevant to this discussion anyway... just want to throw that thought out.

On the topic at hand, no matter who did what, where and when as far as law enforcement goes, I’m deeply disappointed about this. I think someone at least attempting to engage the shooter would have made some difference.

We traded our privacy and a lot of our rights so these things could be caught beforehand or stopped as they happen.
To me, the shooter clearly wasn’t interested in dying that day, neither was the officer. Probably could have been stopped
 
Only he wasn't an active shooter anymore, was he? Read the transcript. Not that the cops would have known one way or the other, but first they failed to stop him then failed Peterson's perimeter and the guy just walked away.

We can't criticize the officers for not treating him as an active shooter with one hand while criticizing them for not treating him as an active shooter with the other.

I'm not a tactical expert for police response which is probably a good thing but rushing in when there is not active and ongoing shooting seems reasonable to a degree especially when an team from another force is clearing the area.
 
We can't criticize the officers for not treating him as an active shooter with one hand while criticizing them for not treating him as an active shooter with the other.
I'm assuming that one of these "nots" is superfluous, and that you didn't mean to say the same thing twice. ;)

That said, of course we can. He was initially an active shooter, and the officers first on the scene, including Peterson, failed to follow current "best practice" in dealing with him as such. He discarded his weapon before leaving the building roughly six and a half minutes after the first reports of the incident, and at that point he stopped being an active shooter. The officers also failed to set up any kind of perimeter around the school during those six minutes. It's reasonable to suggest that if they had done so, they might have caught him long before they did.

Their inaction both failed to stop him when he was an active shooter and gave him every chance of getting clean away once he stopped being one.
 
Yeh - there may be a lot of nots in that sentence resulting in some odd ball triple negative.

I'm more than willing to criticize the SRO in this circumstance. Part of the job, in my non-qualified mind, of an SRO is going towards gun fire even if doing so seems to be somewhat suicidal. Your armed, your in a school of "innocent" children, and your job is to do whatever you can to stop the shooter immediately. I suppose this is the duty I prescribe to the first responding officer and, by nature of being there, the SRO qualifies.

The rest of the responding officers... while I get the criticism you are trained to follow orders. This is a case of bad orders and bad training in my opinion and the failure does not fall onto the officers.

I have not talked to any local officer who has said anything but "I'm going in" given the hypothetical situation. Around here though these are smaller forces due to the population and there is no such thing as "waiting for the SWAT" team because that team is a long ways away. I've talked to a handful of emergency medical responders and they have stated they are going in - around here it is not uncommon of them to be armed and have a CCW license.

I'm not thrilled with the reaction of the responding officers but if they were given orders it is at least defensible.
 
Way back when I made my (based on personal training and experience) "I give the guy a pass"

we had very little knowledge of the actual situation ---as HE knew it--- and I am still leaning to a pass..as the more we know to more murky it is with protocol, training,

certainly IN MY MIND ---cuz it is the way I am wired....I would have EVENTUALLY rushed in despite the protocol or training..BUT it still would have required a lot of better intel gathering... by my training

For what it is worth... twice in my civilian life... after being a go in first Army guy---I was in what seemed to me an escalating situation.... I gathered up kids and wife and evacuated the areas ASAP

Later that night to see on the news that it did indeed turn into a parking lot/resturant shooting

OK ---not a good analogy, as I certainly was not, and am not a LEO.... but sometimes I wonder if I was the ONE guy there armed that could/should have taken action against the BG...before LEO arrived

Answer is YES/Maybe..... but in that few moments my concerns were for me and MINE

Each and every event is unique.... I agree the local leadership (LEO) need to be much better trained, armed, and damned near as capable as out best of the best Seal/Delta/Beret guys....and at least have a culture of selfless service
 
A few different descriptions of the shooter are contained in that timeline. First he is wearing a hoodie, then its the ROTC burgandy shirt.

And there is plenty of witness interviews in the aftermanth that claim he wore body armor, and a helmet. But none of that is in the timeline, so, perhaps those eyewitness accounts were people who saw one thing but their brain processed it as something entirely different. Not uncommon.
 
That response time is disappointing. That's not what I'd expect to see here if an officer was involved in an active shooting.

As already discussed, the response when they did show up was also lacking.
 
That response time is disappointing. That's not what I'd expect to see here if an officer was involved in an active shooting.

Keep in mind that the shooting was going on 1:23 before the first phone call and well into 2 minutes before Peterson identified a possible shooting situation. That is about how long it took him to get to building 12. After that, the first units were on scene within the next 2 minutes or so after Peterson's report. That is an awfully fast response when you think about it. For responses to be that fast, officers really have to be in the immediate area in order to respond that quickly. Short of teleportation, I would not expect them to be there sooner.
 
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