Frank Ettin
Administrator
There is some federal authority to suggest that a prohibited person may lawfully have legal title to guns he can't physically possess.
In U.S. v. Casterline, 103 F.3d 76 (C.A.9 (Or.), 1996), the 9th Circuit set aside a conviction for being a felon in possession of a gun, because the conviction was based solely on evidence of ownership, but under circumstances in which the defendant could not possibly have had access to or possession of the guns. Casterline was in prison at the time, and the guns were in the sheriff's department evidence locker. As the Ninth Circuit wrote in Casterline, at 79 (emphasis added):
But there is also some federal authority to suggest that upon becoming a prohibited person one's rights to control disposition of the firearms he must dispose of might be subject to some constraints. See Henderson v. United States (Supreme Court, No. 13–1487, 2015) in which Henderson became a prohibited person and sought to direct the transfer of his guns. In finding in favor of Henderson, the Court said (Henderson, slip op at 7 -- 8, emphasis added):
That's federal law, and Hawaiian law might be more restrictive. If Hawaiian law is less restrictive, federal law will control.
In U.S. v. Casterline, 103 F.3d 76 (C.A.9 (Or.), 1996), the 9th Circuit set aside a conviction for being a felon in possession of a gun, because the conviction was based solely on evidence of ownership, but under circumstances in which the defendant could not possibly have had access to or possession of the guns. Casterline was in prison at the time, and the guns were in the sheriff's department evidence locker. As the Ninth Circuit wrote in Casterline, at 79 (emphasis added):
...The felon-in-possession statute is prophylactic, intended "to keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that 'they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.' " Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572, 97 S.Ct. 1963 1968, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977). Ownership without physical access to, or dominion and control over, the firearm does not constitute possession. If the felon owns a firearm, but does not actually possess or have dominion and control over it, then he does not possess the firearm for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ....
But there is also some federal authority to suggest that upon becoming a prohibited person one's rights to control disposition of the firearms he must dispose of might be subject to some constraints. See Henderson v. United States (Supreme Court, No. 13–1487, 2015) in which Henderson became a prohibited person and sought to direct the transfer of his guns. In finding in favor of Henderson, the Court said (Henderson, slip op at 7 -- 8, emphasis added):
...a court facing a motion like Henderson’s may approve the transfer of guns consistently with §922(g) if, but only if, that disposition prevents the felon from later exercising control over those weapons, so that he could either use them or tell someone else how to do so. One way to ensure that result, as the Government notes, is to order that the guns be turned over to a firearms dealer, himself independent of the felon’s control, for subsequent sale on the open market. See, e.g., United States v. Zaleski, 686 F. 3d 90, 92–94 (CA2 2012). Indeed, we can see no reason, absent exceptional circumstances, to disapprove a felon’s motion for such a sale, whether or not he has picked the vendor. That option, however, is not the only one available under §922(g). A court may also grant a felon’s request to transfer his guns to a person who expects to maintain custody of them, so long as the recipient will not allow the felon to exert any influence over their use. In considering such a motion, the court may properly seek certain assurances: for example, it may ask the proposed transferee to promise to keep the guns away from the felon, and to acknowledge that allowing him to use them would aid and abet a §922(g) violation. See id., at 94; United States v. Miller, 588 F. 3d 418, 420 (CA7 2009). Even such a pledge, of course, might fail to provide an adequate safeguard, and a court should then disapprove the transfer. See, e.g., State v. Fadness, 363 Mont. 322, 341–342, 268 P. 3d 17, 30 (2012) (upholding a trial court’s finding that the assurances given by a felon’s parents were not credible). But when a court is satisfied that a felon will not retain control over his guns, §922(g) does not apply, and the court has equitable power to accommodate the felon’s request….
That's federal law, and Hawaiian law might be more restrictive. If Hawaiian law is less restrictive, federal law will control.