http://www.udel.edu/global/agenda/2002/readings/wp-ciatrackedbinladen.html
CIA Paid Afghans To Track Bin Laden
Team of 15 Recruits Operated Since 1998
By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, December 23, 2001; Page A01
For four years prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the CIA paid a team of about 15 recruited Afghan agents to regularly track Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, according to well-placed sources.
The team had mixed results, ranging from excellent to total failure. Once every month or so, the team pinpointed bin Laden's presence in a specific building, compound or training camp, and that location was then confirmed by the CIA through communications intelligence or satellite overhead photography. On two occasions, the team reported firing on bin Laden's caravan, though the agency could not independently validate this.
On some rare days, the team provided a specific location, and the CIA was able to obtain three or four verifications from other intelligence sources, confirming bin Laden's whereabouts. For other periods, the team would lose track of him. "There would be a week or two when he [bin Laden] would be out of pocket," said one person with firsthand knowledge of the team's work.
The existence of the tracking team was one of the most tightly held secrets in the CIA over the past several years and suggests that the U.S. search for bin Laden in Afghanistan was more concentrated and aggressive than previously disclosed.
However, the United States never launched an attack on bin Laden based on information provided by the tracking team. Bin Laden remains at large despite the collapse of the Taliban regime that harbored him and the presence of hundreds of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. U.S. officials say they do not know where he is.
The creation of the tracking team was part of a covert CIA operation to capture or kill bin Laden launched first by the Clinton administration and continued under President Bush. In fact, Bush was considering an even more ambitious plan to destroy bin Laden and his al Qaeda network in the summer before the terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, well-placed sources said.
The National Security Council drafted a proposal for a new CIA covert action program that would have cost as much as $200 million a year. It would have had two main components. First, the CIA would have been authorized to destabilize the Taliban leadership of Afghanistan. Second, the CIA would have launched a program to destroy bin Laden's organization worldwide.
The plan was almost ready to be presented to Bush when the terrorists struck on Sept. 11, officials said.
Since the attacks, Bush has authorized a much more sweeping and lethal CIA program against bin Laden. The cost will be more than $1 billion, most of it for covert action in Afghanistan and around the world.
Bin Laden is one of the most elusive figures in modern history, and the frustration felt by hundreds of U.S. soldiers and intelligence operatives scouring the mountains in eastern Afghanistan is familiar to top U.S. policymakers. In the past four years, bin Laden moved about Afghanistan at irregular times, suddenly departing at night and not keeping to a travel pattern or schedule. There was evidence of decoy caravans, and bin Laden may have used disguises and even traveled at times in an ambulance. He stayed mostly in the Kandahar and Jalalabad areas.
The terrorist leader was tracked during much of that time by the special CIA-organized team, which still has a classified code word name. Sources declined to offer many details about the identity of the Afghan operatives, though they indicated some were part of the same family.
One key source said that the team had information about bin Laden's location a majority of the time: "Bottom line: We had eyes on him most of the time."
Some officials in the CIA, White House and Pentagon were skeptical of the team reports because much of the time there was no independent verification and at times other intelligence contradicted the team's reports.
"Though they provided 'eyes on' the target," a senior Bush administration official said, "the weakness was that they were not American 'eyes on' the target so there was never the necessary high level of confidence" about their information without confirmation from other intelligence.
A key problem was translating information provided by the trackers into action. Before Sept. 11, U.S. policy in the Clinton administration and the first eight months of the Bush administration required confirmation that bin Laden would be in a specific location six to 10 hours in the future -- the minimum time required to fire a Tomahawk cruise missile from a Navy ship or submarine nearly 1,000 miles away in the Arabian Sea.
"We never could say where he would be in the future so an attack could be launched," said an intelligence operative. "It was a maddening chase."
Added another person with firsthand knowledge of the dilemma: "Who could say which hut or which tent he might be in in 10 hours? . . . [Bin Laden] might go for a walk or out, or have a meeting away or suddenly pull up at the oddest times for no apparent reason.
"We just could not anticipate his whereabouts and give the decision-makers a level of confidence that if they shot missiles he would be there," this source added.
Said a former senior Clinton administration official about any possible attack on bin Laden, "We did not want to rely on one source."
Indeed, the most public U.S. effort to kill bin Laden apparently did not involve intelligence from the tracking team. In August 1998, President Bill Clinton ordered a Tomahawk missile attack on bin Laden, sending at least 70 missiles into the Khost camp near the Pakistan border where bin Laden was supposed to be attending a conference or meeting of his al Qaeda network. Bin Laden left the camp one or more hours before the missiles landed.
The intelligence for the attack came chiefly from communications showing that bin Laden had ordered a gathering of his operatives on that date at Khost.
Despite the failure to get bin Laden, the tracking team functioned from early 1998 to this Sept. 11 as one of the CIA's most valued intelligence assets. The team reports were "the spine" of the intelligence gathering on bin Laden, a key source said.
"It was the best game in town," another source said. CIA Director George J. Tenet often told senior government officials only that he had "eyes on the ground" reports about bin Laden but did not provide precise details about the source.
The team of about 15, which could break into smaller tracking units, had the capability of providing daily reports to a special CIA unit, called the "bin Laden station," created to monitor bin Laden and his network.
The members were paid less than $1,000 a month, the sources said. Technically, the team members were a category of human intelligence, or HUMINT, but because of the low cost -- several hundred thousand dollars a year, less expenses and equipment -- one source called it "cheap intelligence," or CHEAPINT.
"These guys were often daring, taking all the risk themselves," the source said. "We never knew the full story about motive and reliability, but we loved them."
Opportunities to capture or kill bin Laden became increasingly difficult over the years, especially after the 1998 Tomahawk missile attack. And neither the Clinton nor the early Bush administration would authorize a larger, riskier operation such as sending a Special Forces unit into Afghanistan to attack him.
"He was always surrounded by Taliban as a first layer of defense," a source said, "and then he would have al Qaeda fighters providing security so there was a high risk if we sent a Special Forces team in -- a prohibitively high risk."
Just before or after Sept. 11, the team members lost track of bin Laden but stayed in Afghanistan. "They are now fighters," an official said. "The irony has not been lost. . . . Instead of the 15, there are literally thousands looking for the same guy."