"I am loath to even go there, but to resort to statistics is essentially impertinent. This is a court of law, not a court of social science."
2012-02-03 38 ORDER granting 24 Motion to Dismiss; denying 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 13 Motion for Permanent Injunction; ORDER. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/3/2012. (CT, ilcd) (CT, ilcd). (Entered: 02/03/2012)
2012-02-03 39 JUDGMENT in favor of Hiram Grau, Lisa Madigan against Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Illinois Carry, Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., Charles Hooks, Jon Maier, Michael Moore, Peggy Fechter (CT, ilcd) (Entered: 02/03/2012)
2012-02-03 40 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 38 Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion for Permanent Injunction, Terminate Deadlines and Hearings, by Peggy Fechter, Charles Hooks, Illinois Carry, Jon Maier, Michael Moore, Second Amendment Foundation, Inc.. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 0753-1306898. (Jensen, David) (Entered: 02/03/2012)
02/06/2012 42 NOTICE of Docketing Record on Appeal from USCA re 40[RECAP] Notice of Appeal, filed by Jon Maier, Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., Charles Hooks, Michael Moore, Illinois Carry, Peggy Fechter. USCA Case Number 12-1269 (VM, ilcd) (Entered: 02/06/2012)
02/06/2012 1 Private civil case docketed. Fee paid. Transcript information sheet due by 02/21/2012. Docketing Statement due for Appellants Peggy Fechter, Charles Hooks, Jon Maier, Michael Moore, Second Amendment Foundation, Incorporated by 02/10/2012. Appellant's brief due on or before 03/19/2012 for Peggy Fechter, Charles Hooks, Jon Maier, Michael Moore and Second Amendment Foundation, Incorporated. [1] [6372098] [12-1269] (AD)
Now come Plaintiffs who respond to Defendants' Motion to Cite Supplemental Authority (Doc. No. 55) as follows:
1. As Defendants note, in Moore v. Madigan, No. 11-cv-03134 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2012), the Central District of Illinois granted the State's motion to dismiss a Second Amendment challenge to the same Illinois statutes banning public carriage of firearms at issue in this case. Moore does not, however, add anything of substance to Defendants' case.
2. The principal basis for the Moore Court's decision is its sweeping conclusion that "individuals do not have a Second Amendment right to bear arms outside of the home." Moore, Slip. Op. at 47. This conclusion finds no support in the text of the Second Amendment or in history. See Doc. No.40 at 6-13.
3. In reaching its erroneous conclusion that the Second Amendment is limited to the home, Moore asserts that the Supreme Court has not "explicitly recognized a general right to carry firearms in public." Slip. Op. at 28. Supreme Court precedent does, however, speak directly to the meaning of the right to "bear arms" in public subject to regulation, such as involving sensitive places. See Doc. No. 40 at 13-15. At any rate, the fact that the Supreme Court has left an issue not wholly decided does not relieve a lower court of the duty to face that issue squarely when properly presented in a case before it. See id. at 15-16.
4. As an alternative ground for its holding, Moore asserts that Illinois's public carriage ban satisfies intermediate scrutiny. See Slip. Op. at 39-43, 47. As an initial matter, Illinois's ban must be evaluated either pursuant to the textual and historical approach employed by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), or strict scrutiny (both of which it fails), not intermediate scrutiny. See Doc. No. 40 at 17-18. Furthermore, Moore is incorrect in concluding that the ban can survive even intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 18-20.
5. In sum, Plaintiffs have already amply demonstrated in prior briefing to this Court why the conclusions reached by Moore are in error.
3. The District Court’s Decision
The District Court began its analysis of the merits by opining that “neither the United States Supreme Court nor any United States Court of Appeals has recognized” a right to carry handguns in public for self-defense. SA 14. It then opined that District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) is limited to its facts of having a gun at home. SA 16.
Curiously, the District Court then cited this Court’s holding that “the Second Amendment creates individual rights, one of which is keeping operable handguns at home for self-defense. What other entitlements the Second Amendment creates . . . were left open.” SA 17 (quoting United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)) (emphasis added). The District Court asserted that McDonald applied against state actors “the right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense.” SA 17.
The District Court then offered that this Court’s opinion in Ezell “did not make a finding regarding the scope of the Second Amendment outside of the home.” SA 19. And Ezell’s citation to Skoien’s observation that “one of” the Second Amendment’s rights is the right to having arms at home was said by the lower court to “support[] the conclusion that the Second Amendment right, as recognized by the Supreme Court, does not extend outside of the home.” Id. The District Court confirmed its conclusion with citation to a number of opinions that similarly limited the Second Amendment. SA 19-22.
The District Court found that assuming that the Second Amendment secures rights outside the home, such rights would warrant no more than intermediate scrutiny. SA 38. The District Court then balanced any public Second Amendment right out of existence by finding that completely prohibiting the carrying of guns for self-defense is substantially related to the government’s asserted public safety interest. SA 42. Denial of Plaintiffs’ motion, and the granting of Defendants’ motion, followed directly from this determination of the constitutional merits.