Federal Appeals Court reverses District court on summary judgment, remands for appeal of strict scrutiny:
"We first consider which of the two relevant standards of
scrutiny (strict or intermediate scrutiny) should apply.10 The
strict-scrutiny standard requires the government to prove its
restriction is “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.” Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82
(1997); see Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310, 340 (2010) (explaining strict scrutiny “requires the
Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). To be narrowly tailored,
the law must employ the least restrictive means to achieve the
compelling government interest. See United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
Conversely, intermediate scrutiny requires the government to
“demonstrate . . . that there is a reasonable fit between the
challenged regulation and a substantial government objective.”
Chester, 628 F.3d at 683. For several reasons, we find that the
Act’s firearms and magazine bans require strict scrutiny.
As we have noted on previous occasions, “any law that would
burden the ‘fundamental,’ core right of self-defense in the home
by a law-abiding citizen would be subject to strict scrutiny.
But, as we move outside the home, firearm rights have always
been more limited.” United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458,
470 (4th Cir. 2011). “[T]his longstanding out-of-the-home/inthe-home
distinction bears directly on the level of scrutiny
applicable,” id., with strict scrutiny applying to laws
restricting the right to self-defense in the home, see Woollard
v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 878 (4th Cir. 2013) (observing that
restrictions on “the right to arm oneself at home” necessitates
the application of strict scrutiny). Strict scrutiny, then, is
the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the ban of semiautomatic
rifles and magazines holding more than 10 rounds. See
Friedman, 784 F.3d at 418 (Manion, J., dissenting); cf. Heller
II, 670 F.3d at 1284 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (reading Heller
as departing from traditional scrutiny standards but stating
that “[e]ven if it were appropriate to apply one of the levels
of scrutiny after Heller, surely it would be strict scrutiny
rather than . . . intermediate scrutiny”).
We recognize that other courts have reached different
outcomes when assessing similar bans, but we ultimately find
those decisions unconvincing."