"Why? Two reasons: 1- Because that military action was ordered by Bill Clinton, who in the minds of the "dissenters" and other Demosocialists can do no wrong. And, 2- these so-called Americans view soldiers as an expendable commodity, just like Bill clinton did and does.
http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/dec14/analysis14.asp
http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/dec14/garrison.asp
"As U.N. efforts to grab Aidid met with one failure after the next, frustration mounted. The plan to attack the Abdi House reflected that. The Turkish commander of U.N. troops, Gen. Cevik Bir, and his second, U.S. Army Gen. Thomas Montgomery, wanted to attack without warning in an effort to chop off the head of Aidid's organization.
When Howe proposed issuing a warning, or just storming the building, he was told that such approaches would subject the attackers to unacceptable risks. The Quick Reaction Force, Gen. Montgomery's 10th Mountain Division that was in Mogadishu as a reserve to aid U.N. forces in trouble, lacked the capability to perform the kind of snatch-and-grab tactics used by Delta Forces. Approval for the assault was obtained from the Pentagon and White House.
It was the deaths of four Western journalists who raced to the scene of the June 5 attack that dominated news the next day. But the outraged Somalian mob that killed them was just a reflection of the anger in Mogadishu. The vicious helicopter attack greatly bolstered Aidid's status, and bloodied the image of the United Nations in Somalia and around the world.
From the Habr Gidr's perspective, the United Nations and, in particular, the United States, had declared war.
Howe kept pushing for Delta, and he had allies. Madeleine K. Albright, the ambassador to the United Nations, had just visited Somalia weeks before, and she favored the move. So did Secretary of State Warren Christopher and U.S. envoy Robert Gosende. The Central Intelligence Agency believed the plan would work. Lake, the national security adviser, and his deputy, Samuel R. Berger, now supported it as well.
In August, when remote-controlled land mines first killed four American soldiers and then, two weeks later, injured seven more, even Powell approved. Vacationing on Martha's Vineyard, President Clinton assented. Delta would go. Aidid became America's white whale.
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Firimbi was a big man for a Somali, tall with long arms and big hands. He had a pot belly, and squinted through thick, black-framed glasses. He was warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid's ``propaganda minister.'' Once Aidid's men had purchased Durant back from the bandits who had kidnapped him, Firimbi was put in charge of his safekeeping.
He was told, ``If any harm comes to the pilot, the same shall be done to you.''
The White House was in trouble. The day after the Oct. 3, 1993, Battle of Mogadishu, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Secretary of State Warren Christopher had been grilled by angry members of Congress. How had this happened? Why were American soldiers dying in far-off Somalia?
These were the same questions that Clinton was asking his aides.
Until this raid, Clinton had been briefed on missions in advance. This one had been mounted so quickly he had not been informed. He complained bitterly to Lake. He felt he had been blindsided, and he was angry. He wanted answers to a broad range of questions from policy to military tactics.
FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR to Somalia Robert Oakley was at a party at the Syrian Embassy in Washington on Oct. 5 when he got a phone call from the White House. It was Anthony Lake, national security adviser to President Clinton.
``I need to talk to you first thing in the morning,'' Lake said.
``Why, Tony?'' Oakley said. ``I've been home for six months.''
Oakley, a gaunt, plainspoken intellectual with a distinguished career in diplomacy, had been President George Bush's top civilian in Mogadishu during the humanitarian mission that had begun the previous December and eventually ended the famine. He had left in March along with 20,000 Marines.
Since his return, Oakley had watched with dismay the course of events in Mogadishu. Despite his long experience there, no one from the White House or State Department had consulted him.
``Can you come to breakfast tomorrow at 7:30?'' Lake asked.
The White House was in trouble. The day after the Oct. 3, 1993, Battle of Mogadishu, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Secretary of State Warren Christopher had been grilled by angry members of Congress. How had this happened? Why were American soldiers dying in far-off Somalia?
Oakley was dispatched to Mogadishu to deliver this message and to try to secure the release of Durant.
There would be no negotiating with Aidid.
Oakley was instructed to deliver a stern message: The President of the United States wanted the pilot released. Now.
Oakley was careful to say, ``This is not a threat,'' but then he laid out a chilling scenario. He offered it as friendly advice.
``I have no plan for this, and I'll do everything I can to prevent it, but what will happen if a few weeks go by and Mr. Durant is not released? Not only will you lose any credit you may get now, but we will decide that we have to rescue him. I guarantee you we are not going to pay or trade for him in any way, shape or form. . . .
``
So what we'll decide is we have to rescue him, and whether we have the right place or the wrong place, there's going to be a fight with your people. The minute the guns start again, all restraint on the U.S. side goes. Just look at the stuff coming in here now. An aircraft carrier, tanks, gunships . . . the works. Once the fighting starts, all this pent-up anger is going to be released. This whole part of the city will be destroyed, men, women, children, camels, cats, dogs, goats, donkeys, everything. . . . That would really be tragic for all of us, but that's what will happen.''
The Somalis delivered his message and ``friendly advice'' to Aidid, in hiding, who offered to hand the pilot right over. Oakley asked them to delay for a few hours to give him time to leave the country. He told them to turn Durant over to Howe, and he flew back to Washington.
Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
Colin L. Powell, who had approved sending Task Force Ranger to Mogadishu, said in an interview this year: ``Bad things happen in war. Nobody did anything wrong militarily in Mogadishu. They had a bad afternoon. No one expected a large number of soldiers to get killed. Is 18 a large number? People didn't start noticing in Vietnam until it was 500 a week.''
