What constitutes innocent possession of a controlled substance? As courts in several sister states which have addressed the “innocent possession” defense have noted, it is easy to imagine numerous circumstances in which a person might take possession of a controlled substance without any unlawful intent. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 193 P.3d 92 (Utah 2008); Ramsubhag v. State, 937 So.2d 1192 (Fla.App.2006); People v. E.C., 195 Misc.2d 680, 761 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y.Supr.Ct.2003); People v. Martin, 25 Cal.4th 1180, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081 (2001); Adams v. State, 706 P.2d 1183 (Alaska App.1985). A parent confiscating drugs from his or her child, a teacher finding drugs in his or her classroom, a daughter picking up a prescription for her bedridden parent, a homeowner finding medicine left behind by a guest, all could be, deemed illegal possessors under strictly construed possession statutes. Moreover, if the teacher transferred the drugs to his or her principal, or the homeowner gave the drugs to the guest's spouse who came by to pick them up, the teacher and homeowner could be deemed guilty of trafficking as well. We are confident that the General Assembly did not intend to criminalize the possession or transfer of controlled substances in circumstances such as these, and it is for that reason, among others, that our statutes prohibiting possession and trafficking all require that the possession or trafficking be “knowing and unlawful.” See KRS 218A.1412—KRS 218A.1417. We agree with Adkins, therefore, that these statutes implicitly recognize an innocent possession or innocent trafficking defense, and whenever the evidence reasonably supports such a defense—where there is evidence that the possession was incidental and lasted no longer than reasonably necessary to permit a return to the owner, a surrender to authorities, or other suitable disposal—the instructions should reflect it.