But there is no reason to suppose that a law-abiding person, fully qualified to purchase guns and ammunition for self-defense, becomes an incipient felon, mental incompetent or other danger – beyond the reach of generally-applicable civil and criminal law – merely because the government has declared itself unable to provide police protection.
BEFORE: Ginsburg, Henderson, and Kavanaugh, Circuit Judges
ORDER
It is, on the court's own motion, ORDERED that the parties file supplemental briefs addressing the following questions:
(1) After the Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified at D.C. Code §§ 1-201.01–1-207.71 (2001)), do gun laws passed by the District of Columbia Council have to be “usual and reasonable” within the meaning of the federal Act of June 30, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-401, which is currently codified at D.C. Code § 1-303.43? Cf. McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 749-54 (D.C. 1978); Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Washington, D.C. v. Washington, 483 F.2d 1323, 1327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Maryland & D.C. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Washington, 442 F.2d 123, 125-29 & 125 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Fulton v. District of Columbia, 2 App. D.C. 431, 438-39 (D.C. Cir. 1894).
(2) What does the term “usual” mean in this statute? Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Firemen’s Ins. Co., 483 F.2d at 1327-28; Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556 (D.C. 1969); Filippo v. Real Estate Comm’n of the District of Columbia, 223 A.2d 268 (D.C. 1966); Black’s Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910) (defining usual to mean “ordinary” or “customary”). Is the canon of constitutional avoidance relevant to that question? Cf. Fulton, 2 App. D.C. at 438-39.
(3) Are the challenged D.C. laws “usual” within the meaning of this statute?
(4) Does the D.C. Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the congressionally enacted Act of June 30, 1906, or of similarly worded federal statutes, receive deference from the federal courts? Cf. Bliley v. Kelly, 23 F.3d 507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1994). If so, under what circumstances?
The following briefing format and schedule will apply:
Supplemental Brief for Appellants: 12/01/10
(not to exceed 20 pages)
Supplemental Brief for Appellees: 12/08/10
(not to exceed 20 pages)
Reply Brief for Appellants: 12/13/10
(not to exceed 10 pages)
The United States is invited to file a brief, not to exceed 20 pages, on any or all of these questions by Friday, December 3, 2010.
http://www.calgunlaws.com/http://www.calgunlaws.com/
On November 17, 2010, the Foundation's lawyers at Michel & Associates, P.C. in Long Beach appeared in Fresno court for the Plaintiffs on their hearing for a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and related case management and scheduling conferences. During the hearing, the Court expressed concerns over the amount of “irreparable harm” to plaintiffs if an injunction was not issued at this stage, and whether that harm couldn’t simply be “repaired” with money damages. The Court encouraged the parties to focus on the underlying substantive issue, and to reach agreement on how to expedite a decision on the merits prior to the effective date of February 1st for the major components of AB 962. In doing so, the court noted that although trials are now being set for 2012, the Court would grant the plaintiffs a rare trial setting preference. The Court then assisted the parties in negotiating a briefing schedule for an unusual and extremely expedited joint Motion for Summary Judgment/Trial by brief.
The hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Trial are set for January 18, 2011. The Court, noting that “time was of the essence” for Plaintiffs, ensured a ruling would either be made the date of the hearing or within a few days to ensure this case is resolved in its entirety prior to February 1st. In light of the Court’s willingness to rapidly expedite this litigation and reach a final decision on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs opted to withdraw their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction rather than protracting the litigation by arguing and requesting supplemental briefing on Plaintiffs’ irreparable harm claims. Plaintiffs' need for a preliminary injunction to issue were alleviated in many regards by assurances from both opposing counsel and the Court that this case will in fact be resolved prior to February 1st. The Foundation’s lawyers are now working tirelessly to prepare for Summary Judgment, and if needed, trial.
In light of the fact that defendants have not moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and have instead requested additional time to respond to the Amended Complaint, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Mothers Against Teen Violence, and Texas Chapters of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, through undersigned counsel, move to withdraw their application for leave to file a brief as amici curiae.
The Attorney General’s Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Response Brief to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [filed November 17, 2010; docket #28] is granted. The Attorney General shall respond to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on or before December 10, 2010. Plaintiff may reply within fourteen days of the Attorney General’s response.