Current 2A Cases

In the CA case, Scocca et al v. Smith (Sheriff, Santa Clara County), a couple of updates.

Back on 06-22-2012, Judge Edward Chen granted the defendants MTD, with leave to file an amended complaint.

08-06-2012 - First Amended Complaint.

09-16-2012 - Answer to complaint is another MTD.

The docket on the Internet Archive is bollixed, but the entries (document numbers) are there.
 
Second Amendment Arms, et al v. City of Chicago, et al.

Yesterday, the 26th, the district court filed its Memorandum Opinion and Order, as to Chicago's MTD.

Briefly, it was granted in part and denied in part. Second Amendment Arms was given 21 days to file a Third Amended Complaint (which will actually be the 5th complaint)!

The most important claim to survive the MTD, was Count I, the ban on gun stores.

There were a few other things that survived, but most were dismissed. These are the consequences of filing a "Kitchen Sink" complaint.
 
As an addendum to the case referenced above,...

It seems that the attorney, Walter Maksym, is under fire from the 7th Circuit (Judge Dianna Sykes, in particular - The presiding judge in Ezell), for unintelligible writings in his pleading papers. She actually calls it, gibberish.

Judge Sykes nails him, among others things, for a 345 word sentence! :eek: http://abovethelaw.com/2011/09/benc...yle-rambling-incoherent-complaint/#more-98667

See also, http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/ar..._for_unintelligible_writing_full_of_gibberish

At the Gun Rights Policy Conference (GRPC), sponsored by the SAF in Florida this weekend, I understand David Kopel made stern warning of such attorneys (without naming names, of course) and their cases as bad policy in advancing gun rights.
 
If he can't put an intelligible argument, brief, or even sentence together, it's even less likely he understands the folly of the kitchen sink approach to 2A litigation.

What happens to a litigant who is so grossly misrepresented that the attorney is subject to being disbarred? Does he get a do over? Can the case at least be a wash so that no bad precedent results from it?
 
What happens to a litigant who is so grossly misrepresented that the attorney is subject to being disbarred? Does he get a do over? Can the case at least be a wash so that no bad precedent results from it?

Unfortunately, no. For a shining example, see Miller in which the appellate counsel didn't even appear before the Supreme Court. :eek:
 
Dearth v. Holder.

Last Thursday, Sept. 27th, the district court rendered its Memorandum and Opinion on the cross-motions for summary judgment. Here are some selected quotes:

The Supreme Court has held that the right to possess a firearm in one’s home for self-defense is the core right of the Second Amendment. Dist. Of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.570, 628-30 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).

Sound a bit familiar?

In Heller, the Supreme Court made clear that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding . . . laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” 554 U.S. at 626-27. ...

Thus, an initial point of contention is how to construe the challenged laws. Are they restrictions on possession, or are they longstanding conditions and qualifications on commercial sale?

Without really defining the term, an apparent law that is 48 years old (the GCA) is longstanding, while a 32 year old year law (D.C.'s Gun Ban), is not!

The Court concludes they are the latter. Section 922(a)(9) makes it unlawful for any person who does not reside in any State to receive a firearm, unless the receipt is for lawful sporting purposes. Section 922(b)(3) is a restriction on firearms sales that, with the two exceptions described above, prohibits the sale of a firearm to a person who do not reside in the State of the firearms dealer’s business. Both laws thus pertain to the transfer or sale of firearms, rather than the mere possession of firearms. Furthermore, as stated above, Dearth’s challenge is based on his alleged inability to purchase a firearm because no dealer can sell one to him. Therefore, as these laws are applied to Dearth, Sections 922(a)(9) and 922(b)(3) are fairly construed as two “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. Consequently, as stated above, the two laws are “presumptively lawful” if the “conditions and qualifications” they impose can be fairly described as “longstanding.” Id.

So there we have it... Or do we?

Here, Section 922(a)(9) allows Dearth to receive a firearm for lawful sporting purposes, but it prohibits Dearth’s receipt of a firearm solely for self-defense purposes6. Furthermore, Section 922(b)(3)(B) allows a firearms dealer to loan or rent a firearm to Dearth for temporary use for lawful sporting purposes7, but it prohibits such a loan or rental if Dearth’s sole purpose is self-defense.

____________________
6 The Gun Control Act does not define what a “sporting purpose” is, but “legislative history indicates that ‘sporting purposes’ refers to target shooting and hunting.” Springfield, Inc. v. Buckles, 116 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d, 292 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

7 At oral argument, the Government agreed that this is the proper interpretation of the statute.

In essence, the judge found that the only 2A activity outside the home was ... Sporting Purposes. sigh.

The court clerk entered final judgment immediately after.


Also, that same day, Alan Gura filed his Notice of Appeal. This is now the second trip to the circuit, on this case.
 
Palmer v. D.C.

Monday. Oct. 1st, the SAF files a supplement (doc #38) to its MSJ (doc #5). This was in response to the court asking about the standing of the SAF, in this case. Coincedently, this also comes on the heels of the decision in Dearth.

Refreshing our memory, in Dearth, the Judge opined that the SAF had no standing and was estopped from persuing such by the district courts previous ruling, which it contends the Circuit Court did not disturb, when reading this excerpt from the Circuits decision:

“Nor because the SAF raises no issue not also raised by Dearth, need we decide whether it has standing.” Dearth, 641 F.3d at 503 n.*** (citation omitted).

In Palmer, Gura writes this:

Last week, on remand, a court of this District held that “the Circuit did not disturb the trial court’s ruling that the SAF did not have standing.” Dearth v. Holder, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138697 at *9 n.4 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2012), appeal pending. That is not correct. The D.C. Circuit’s review was de novo. Dearth, 641 F.3d at 501. And the words “affirmed in part” do not appear in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion. The trial court’s order—all of it reviewed de novo—was reversed in its entirety, and the Court merely offered that it did not “need” to decide the issue of SAF’s standing in line with the clearly established rule of avoiding unnecessary standing decisions.

SAF will invite the D.C. Circuit to clarify whether it intended to affirm the denial of SAF’s standing without opinion. In the meantime, the posture of this case is that no decision on standing has been rendered save for the Court’s observation at argument that the individual plaintiffs have standing. Accordingly, in line with the substantial body of precedent, supra, confirming that there is no need to conduct an examination of SAF’s standing, the Court should not address the issue.

Should the Court nevertheless wish to address the issue, SAF clearly has both representational and organizational standing.

Here we see that Gura is not only heading off the Standing issue in Palmer, but also signalling a part of the appeal in Dearth.

The docket is here: http://www.archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.dcd.137887/gov.uscourts.dcd.137887.docket.html

The supplemental filing is here: http://www.archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.dcd.137887/gov.uscourts.dcd.137887.38.0.pdf
 
Al,
Do you have a recap or listing of 2A cases where a cert petition is expected by January on a right to carry case? I am just wondering if we have anything likely to produce a Supreme Court opinion in this term or if we will have to wait for the next term.
 
Sorry Jon. I have no concrete information on this.

Currently, should the 7th rule on Moore/Shepard in a reasonable amount of time (i.e. within the next 60 days), that case could be heard this term. The only other case that may have a chance, is Woollard, and only if the 4th reaches a quick decision after orals. I do not expect this, however.

I have left out the 10th circuits decision in Peterson, as I now suspect that they are waiting to see what the 7th will do (the decision here is long overdue).

The only other case is the cert that Kilmer submitted in Nordyke. It is my impression that this cert is for prevailing party status, and only that. So it may or may not have any meaning to the cases at large, should the cert be granted (slim chance, at best).
 
Thanks, but darn. There is a Gorski opinion under submission in the 9th, but I dont know much about the case. I guess there is also a small chance one of the other 9th Circuit cases is taken under submission in November, and they usually issue an opinion within two months of that. Looks like the supremes wont take up the issue, if at all, until 2014.:(
 
I had forgot to add that we are also awaiting a decision from the CA2 in Kachalsky - that may make it in time, and we have had the decision and refusal for en banc in Hightower. I have no idea if Gura will file for cert in that case.
 
Palmer v. D.C.

Yesterday, Oct. 3rd, the defendants attempted to refute the SAF's supplemental brief on standing by saying that the SAF lacks organizational standing. http://www.archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.dcd.137887/gov.uscourts.dcd.137887.39.0.pdf

Today, Oct. 4th, Gura responds with:

REPLY BRIEF RE: STANDING

Although Defendants take issue with SAF’s organizational standing, they do not contest that SAF has representational standing. That much appears conceded. Defendants also concede the rule that “where at least one plaintiff has standing, a court need not decide whether any other plaintiffs have standing.” Def. Br., 10/4/12, Dkt. 39, at 1 (citations omitted). Nor do Defendants question that any of the individual plaintiffs have standing.

Accordingly, while the parties may have an abstract dispute about organizational standing, belaboring the topic would be pointless. Even if SAF lacked organizational standing, it would remain a plaintiff in its representative capacity. There is no need to issue an advisory opinion in this disputed area, particularly as SAF seeks no relief in this case different than that sought by the individual plaintiffs, and that which would be available to other SAF members.

Short, concise and to the point. http://www.archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.dcd.137887/gov.uscourts.dcd.137887.40.0.pdf
 
Oral Arguments set in Richards and Peruta for December 6, 2012. Not much chance they will have an opinion by January deadline for Cert to be heard in this term.
 
Expanding further on what Mr. Birdt has reported.

Back on Sept 24th, the court announced the following to 3 cases we are following:

09/24/2012 Filed clerk order (Deputy Clerk: SM): Pursuant to the Motion for Clarification & Coordination of Appeals in Related Cases filed by Appellants in 10-56971, it is hereby ORDERED that arguments in 10-56971, 11-16255, and 12-16258 will be scheduled to be heard by the same panel on the same day. The date and time of the arguments will be determined in due course by subsequent order. [10-56971, 11-16255, 12-16258]

That meant that those 3 cases would be heard by the same panel on the same day. What follows is the actual docket entries for each case:


Adam Richards, et al v. Ed Prieto, et al
Court of Appeals Docket #:
11-16255

10/09/2012 49 Notice of Oral Argument on Thursday, December 6, 2012 - 9:00 AM - Courtroom 1, 3rd Floor - James R. Browning US Courthouse - San Francisco, CA. Please return ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HEARING NOTICE form to: SAN FRANCISCO Office. Please open attached documents to view details about your case. [8352268] (RB)

10/09/2012 50 Filed clerk order (Deputy Clerk: HL): These appeals have been assigned to the same panel because they involve issues regarding the Second Amendment. The cases are not consolidated for oral argument. Counsel may wish to confer in order to enhance oral argument. The Clerk shall serve a copy of the court's service list for each case on all parties. [8353131] [10-56971, 11-16255, 12-16258] (SM)


Edward Peruta, et al v. County of San Diego, et al
Court of Appeals Docket #:
10-56971

10/09/2012 95 Notice of Oral Argument on Thursday, December 6, 2012 - 9:00 AM - Courtroom 1, 3rd Floor - James R. Browning US Courthouse - San Francisco, CA. Please return ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HEARING NOTICE form to: SAN FRANCISCO Office. Please open attached documents to view details about your case. [8352267] (RB)

10/09/2012 96 Filed (ECF) Acknowledgment of hearing notice. Location: San Francisco. Filed by Attorney James Chapin, Esquire for Appellees William D. Gore and County of San Diego. [8352408] (JC)

10/09/2012 97 Filed clerk order (Deputy Clerk: HL): These appeals have been assigned to the same panel because they involve issues regarding the Second Amendment. The cases are not consolidated for oral argument. Counsel may wish to confer in order to enhance oral argument. The Clerk shall serve a copy of the court's service list for each case on all parties. [8353131] [10-56971, 11-16255, 12-16258] (SM)


Christopher Baker v. Louis Kealoha, et al
Court of Appeals Docket #:
12-16258

10/09/2012 29 Notice of Oral Argument on Thursday, December 6, 2012 - 9:00 AM - Courtroom 1, 3rd Floor - James R. Browning US Courthouse - San Francisco, CA. Please return ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HEARING NOTICE form to: SAN FRANCISCO Office. Please open attached documents to view details about your case. [8352270] (RB)

10/09/2012 30 Filed clerk order (Deputy Clerk: HL): These appeals have been assigned to the same panel because they involve issues regarding the Second Amendment. The cases are not consolidated for oral argument. Counsel may wish to confer in order to enhance oral argument. The Clerk shall serve a copy of the court's service list for each case on all parties. [8353131] [10-56971, 11-16255, 12-16258] (SM)

According to the documents, each side will get 20 minutes. That's pretty generous (15 minutes is the standard) and indicates that the circuit panel is taking this seriously.
 
As reported in their individual threads...

  • Donald Kilmer and Don Kates have petitioned the SCOTUS for cert on the questions of prevailing party in Nordyke (CA9).
    • In Nordyke, after a stipulation en banc by the defendant, the Nordykes get the remedial action they wanted but were denied prevailing party status, thus rendering 14 years of litigation and lost profits by the Nordykes, moot.
    • If left to stand, the impact on civil rights litigation is at jeopardy.
  • John Monroe has petitioned the SCOTUS for cert in GeorgiaCarry.Org v. Georgia (CA11), 1A case (2A is a sub heading in that case).
    • In GeorgiaCarry.Org, a test of religious scruples, designed from the whole cloth by the 11th Circuit, justified a law that regulates religious activity, by the State of Georgia. This splits the 11th from its sister circuits (3rd, 6th, 7th, 9th and 10th) and SCOTUS precedent.
    • If left to stand, States may be able to further regulate religious activities and how a religious order may deal with internal policies.

A grant of cert (and a win) in either(both) case(s) will have little immediate effect on the 2A cases, other than some remedial value. Both cases may pique the curiosity of the Court, more for their technical aspects than for anything directly 2A related.
 
Instead of updating three threads with the same information, I'm putting this here as general information.

Of the 3 cases up for orals in the 9th Circuit, all 3 will be heard on Dec. 6th by the same panel, even though the cases are not consolidated. What follows is the latest from the CA9 dockets:

In Richards v. Prieto:

10/29/2012 53 Filed (ECF) Appellees County of Yolo and Ed Prieto citation of supplemental authorities. Date of service: 10/29/2012. [8379327] (JAW)

Appellees authority is:
Hightower v. City of Boston
Piszczatoski v. Filko
Moore v. Madigan
Peterson v. McCabe
People v. Mitchell
(a criminal case we were not following)​

In Peruta v. San Diego:

10/17/2012 100 Filed Appellees County of San Diego and William D. Gore additional citations. Served on 10/15/2012. (panel) [8365457] (RL)

Appellees site People v. Mitchell as a supplemental authority.

So far, no 28(J) letters have been filed in Baker v. Kealoha.
 

Attachments

It's been awhile, but I was notified by Michel & Associates (I'm signed up for their press releases) that the NRA has finally been paid. The costs:

November 2, 2012

NRA Recovers 1.3 Million Dollars in Attorneys’ Fees For Work on Supreme Court McDonald Case and Related Cases

On August 14, 2012, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois awarded over 1.3 million dollars to the National Rifle Association (NRA) to reimburse it for attorneys’ fees for the legal work NRA’s lawyers did in the cases of National Rifle Association v. City of Chicago and National Rifle Association v. Village of Oak Park, and for its role and significant work as a party in the Supreme Court case McDonald v. City of Chicago. The checks are in! A copy of the $663,294.10 check from the Village of Oak Park can be viewed here. A copy of the $663,294.10 check from the City of Chicago can be view here.

The filings in these three cases can be viewed by clicking on the respective case name. These three cases were all filed shortly after the 2008 District of Columbia v. Heller Supreme Court decision was issued. That decision struck down a Washington D.C. law banning handgun possession, and recognized an individual right to self-defense and to keep and bear arms. These cases were designed to get the Supreme Court to resolve the issue of whether the Second Amendment, in addition to prohibiting federal government infringement, also prohibited state and local governments from infringing on the right to keep and bear arms. In the McDonald decision, the Supreme Court extended the Second Amendment’s protections to the state and local government level, just as self-defense civil rights advocates had hoped it would.

When the McDonald case, financed in large part by the Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), was accepted by the Supreme Court, the NRA was deemed a party to the McDonald case under Supreme Court Rule 12.6 by virtue of its role as a party in the two consolidated Chicago and Oak Park cases. As a full-fledged party in the McDonald case, the NRA filed its own legal briefs to persuade the Supreme Court Justices of the NRA’s position. Multiple other non-party groups also weighed in on the case through amicus briefs, including the CRPA Foundation. Lawyer Alan Gura argued for Mr. McDonald. Former Solicitor General Paul Clement argued on behalf of the NRA before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court’s McDonald decision held that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and thus, fully applicable to the States. In the wake of the ruling, the Supreme Court remanded the McDonald case, as well as the two NRA cases, back to the Court of Appeal to address the City of Chicago’s and the Village of Oak Park’s unconstitutional handgun bans. But before an injunction could be issued by the lower courts, both Chicago and Oak Park repealed their handguns bans. The City of Chicago replaced its repealed ban with another ordinance which allows Chicago residents to lawfully possess handguns in their homes if they obtain a valid Chicago Firearms Permit and register each handgun. This new law is currently being challenged in a new lawsuit.

Because the challenged ordinances were repealed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not need to address the injunction issue. Instead, it vacated the original rulings of the U.S. District Court (which had granted the City of Chicago’s motions for judgment on the pleadings against McDonald and the NRA), and then sent all three cases back to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the cases as moot (because the ordinances were repealed).

But the Seventh Circuit Court also instructed that "f plaintiffs [both McDonald and NRA] believe that the repeals [of the ordinances] entitled them to attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1988, they may file appropriate motions in the district court."

All plaintiffs filed those attorney fee recovery motions in the District Court. In opposing the attorney fee motions, Chicago and Oak Park argued that because the ordinances were repealed before an injunction or judgment could be entered, the plaintiffs in all three cases were not "prevailing parties" and therefore were not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees. On that basis, the District Court denied all plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees.

The parties again appealed and went back up to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which overturned the District Court’s ruling on plaintiffs' entitlement to recover fees. The Court of Appeals recognized that the NRA was indeed a prevailing party in each of the three cases, including the McDonald case in the Supreme Court, and that the NRA was entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees for all the work its lawyers did, including work in the U.S. Supreme Court.

Finally, in June 2011 the cases were once again all sent back to the U.S. District Court to calculate the amount of the fee awards.

In September 2011, the SAF lawyers resolved their attorneys’ fees claims for work on the McDonald case for slightly less than $400,000.00.

NRA, on the other hand, continued to litigate the fees issue. Referencing the value of NRA’s contribution to the McDonald case when it reevaluated NRA’s fee request, the U.S. District Court recognized in June 2012 that the McDonald / SAF attorneys and NRA’s attorneys "took different approaches to their respective cases: McDonald said that the Second Amendment applies to the states by virtue of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while NRA said it applied by virtue of the doctrine of substantive due process." The Supreme Court’s McDonald decision adopted the substantive Due Process approach. McDonald’s lawyers argued the Due Process approach as a back-up to their Privileges or Immunities clause argument. However, the Privileges or Immunities argument was ridiculed by Justice Scalia and the majority of other Supreme Court Justices during oral argument.

NRA has now recovered fees in excess of 1.3 million dollars. So for losing the cases, Chicago and the other cities involved paid a total of over 1.7 million dollars to firearms civil rights groups.

In September 2012, the NRA filed another Motion for Supplemental Attorneys’ Fees. By that motion, the NRA is now seeking attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in litigating its original motion for attorneys’ fees. Because these fees and expenses were not included in the amount of the August fee award, Chicago and Oak Park will most likely be writing more checks to the NRA!
 
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Please note that Chuck gives Gura and the SAF credit where credit is due, contrary to the national org itself. sigh.
 
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