Could This Be Considered a Straw Purchase?

[zukiphile]

Correct. The point was is that the example I gave (and the one you gave) demonstrates that there are other examples where a straw purchase is illegal even though the buyer is not prohibited from purchasing/possessing. The idea that guns are special--they are the only case where a straw transaction can take place and be illegal even though the actual purchaser is not prohibited from performing the transaction or owning the item in question is demonstrably false as these examples show.

Then it's good that no one asserted that.

A straw purchase can be illegal where the identity of the buyer is a material misrepresentation and the seller is defrauded even if the buyer can legally possess what he bought, but it isn't the transfer that is illegal, it's the fraud. A straw purchaser may breach constitute a breach of a sale agreement, but that's not categorically illegal in a criminal sense.

The issue isn't whether guns are the only subject matter where an agent as a buyer for a criminally prohibited transferee, but whether the current gun rule is a departure from the general rule.

Two observations:

Straw purchases aren't categorically illegal. In the real estate example, concealment of the true purchaser isn't always illegal. The disability can be nothing more than the buyer's true identity.

There are more disabilities than being prohibited from possession by criminal law. It isn't a crime for a person with the disability of a bad reputation to use an agent to purchase real estate, yet it is still correctly described as a straw purchase.

That's correct as a statement of the law on FFL transfers post Abramski, but does not reflect the general concept of a straw purchase.

No, it was the law BEFORE Abramski. Abramski was just the case that made it to SCOTUS.

Abramski is not merely a confirmation of the original bureau position or implementation of the Act. It contradicts earlier bureau positions and enforcement.

It may well be true that in the distant past the bureau position and enforcement was different, but it was not different for many years leading up to Abramski.

Regardless of what position the BATF held in times long past, they had taken the position that a straw purchase was equivalent to lying on the 4473 well before the Abramski case came along.

It's a stretch to call 17 years prior the "distant past" or "times long past", but that's how long it was between the Bureau changing its position and the Abramski decision.

Dogtown Tom's assertion above is incorrect in two ways.

First, the general concept of a straw purchase involves a disability of the principal. That general principle doesn't prevent legislators from departing from that principle, but that's an adaptation rather than the general rule.

Second, the holding in Abramski wasn't clearly the law the prior to Abramski or else the Sup Ct wouldn't have taken it. It only takes reading Abramski to understand that it wasn't the uniform rule prior to the Abramski decision.

 

[JohnKSa]

Then it's good that no one asserted that.

It has been brought up.

I get it, guns are a special case,...

Currently, yes. They are special in so many ways.

Straw purchases aren't categorically illegal.

That is correct.

...in fact in the general case, a straw purchase does not even have to be illegal...

It's a stretch to call 17 years prior the "distant past" or "times long past", but that's how long it was between the Bureau changing its position and the Abramski decision.

How did you arrive at that number? Was 18 U.S.C 922 (a)(6) changed at that point? It looks like that was part of the original 1968 law as far as I can tell.

At any rate, even if we accept that number as accurate, it's still reasonable to say that: "...it was not different for many years leading up to Abramski."

First, the general concept of a straw purchase involves a disability of the principal.

While that is a very common reason for straw purchases, it doesn't have to be the case. A person could have someone do a straw purchase for them to conceal their identity from the seller even though it would be legal for them to do the purchase themselves and the transaction would be expected to proceed without issue. People are often reticent to "go on record" and prefer to keep their identity to themselves even when revealing it wouldn't cause a problem with a transaction. Or, the "disability" could be something as simple as: I don't have the time to drive all the way over there, you go buy it for me.

Second, the holding in Abramski wasn't clearly the law the prior to Abramski or else the Sup Ct wouldn't have taken it.

It would be much easier to argue that it clearly was the law prior to Abramski or he wouldn't have been arrested, prosecuted and convicted and the conviction wouldn't have been upheld at every step through the appeals process--up to and including the Supreme Court.

 

[zukiphile]

It's a stretch to call 17 years prior the "distant past" or "times long past", but that's how long it was between the Bureau changing its position and the Abramski decision.

How did you arrive at that number? Was 18 U.S.C 922 (a)(6) changed at that point? It looks like that was part of the original 1968 law as far as I can tell.

You are correct; it was part of the original US Code section. What changed was the Bureau's position on what the code means. Polk is a 1997 case in which the government articulated the rule accepted in Abramski in 2014.

I'll observe that the Bureau articulating a position and losing doesn't make it law.

Second, the holding in Abramski wasn't clearly the law the prior to Abramski or else the Sup Ct wouldn't have taken it.

It would be much easier to argue that it clearly was the law prior to Abramski or he wouldn't have been arrested, prosecuted and convicted and the conviction wouldn't have been upheld at every step through the appeals process--up to and including the Supreme Court.

It might be easier, but it would also be incorrect. Abramski was taken because of a circuit split, meaning that the rule in Abramski was contradicted in one or more other circuits.

In Polk, the government lost its argument.

Although Section(s) 922(a)(6) on its face does not prohibit "straw purchases," we have nonetheless held that such transactions violate Section(s) 922(a)(6). See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz-Loya, 777 F.2d 973, 979 (5th Cir. 1985). It is clear to us — indeed, the plain language of the statute compels the conclusion — that Section(s) 922(a)(6) criminalizes false statements that are intended to deceive federal firearms dealers with respect to facts material to the "lawfulness of the sale" of firearms. (Emphasis added.) Thus, if the true purchaser can lawfully purchase a firearm directly, Section(s) 922(a)(6) liability (under a "straw purchase" theory) does not attach.

Where you have circuits rejecting the Bureau's newest interpretation of US code, it is incorrect to assert that

No, it was the law BEFORE Abramski. Abramski was just the case that made it to SCOTUS.

The Sup Ct took the case because the law was in dispute. I can't say whether the current court or a future court would apply the rule of lenity if they take the issue again.

 

[JohnKSa]

I'll observe that the Bureau articulating a position and losing doesn't make it law.

Will you also observe that it is not evidence that the position came into being at that point?

For whatever it's worth, Polk's charges were filed in 1995.

More to the point, in the appeal it was noted that the 1994 4473 was markedly different from the 1991 4473.
https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-5th-circuit/1188031.html

We note a marked difference in the “straw purchase” warning on the reverse side of the August 1994 version of ATF Form 4473 and the April 1991 version of that same form.   The April 1991 warning states that a “straw purchase” may violate federal firearms laws if the licensee knows and has reasonable cause to believe that the true purchaser of the firearm(s) is “ineligible” to make that purchase directly.   By contrast, the August 1994 version of Form 4473 significantly broadens the definition of “straw purchase” transactions:  “A ‘straw purchase’ occurs when the actual buyer uses another person (the straw purchaser) to execute ATF Form 4473 purporting to show that the straw purchaser is the actual buyer.”​

That suggests that the BATF decided to push the enforcement of a straw purchase as merely being a misrepresentation of the actual buyer sometime between 1991 and 1994 when the new form came out. Somewhere between 20 and 23 years before Abramski.

It might be easier, but it would also be incorrect. Abramski was taken because of a circuit split, meaning that the rule in Abramski was contradicted in one or more other circuits.

It's not uncommon for circuit courts to disagree--that's hardly evidence that the law Abramski was convicted of was something new. In fact it's good evidence that it had been used in prosecutions before Abramski.

If he had been found not guilty in any of the appeals, it would never have made it to the Supreme Court. You don't appeal not guilty verdicts and you can't be tried again if you are found not guilty. So, it would not only be easier, as you agree, the statement I made is also perfectly correct. The fact that another circuit court, in a different case made a different ruling doesn't call the accuracy of my assertion into question.

Where you have circuits rejecting the Bureau's newest interpretation of US code, it is incorrect to assert that...

That's quite a stretch. Circuits get overturned all the time. In fact, over the past couple of decades or so when SCOTUS takes a case, that's the outcome more often than not.

At the enforcement level the determination was that Abramski was deserving of arrest and prosecution. At every trial and appeal he was found guilty. SCOTUS agreed with his conviction. That's not very good evidence for the idea that the law he was prosecuted under was questionable.

Finally, regardless of all of that, the bottom line at this point is that lying on the 4473 form about the actual buyer constitutes a straw purchase. The BATF, whatever their previous position, has taken that position since sometime before 1994, for at least the last 30 years. And, in case there's any question about the strength of their position, Abramski confirms that the courts will convict, and appeals courts will uphold convictions, based on it.

 

[zukiphile]

Will you also observe that it is not evidence that the position came into being at that point?

Certainly. So the Bureau changed form language between 1991 and 1994, tried to enforce it a year later, and lost? If you really think that the difference between 17 and 20 years makes you more comfortable with "distant past" or "times long past", have at it.

More to the point, in the appeal it was noted that the 1994 4473 was markedly different from the 1991 4473.
https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us...t/1188031.html
We note a marked difference in the “straw purchase” warning on the reverse side of the August 1994 version of ATF Form 4473 and the April 1991 version of that same form.   The April 1991 warning states that a “straw purchase” may violate federal firearms laws if the licensee knows and has reasonable cause to believe that the true purchaser of the firearm(s) is “ineligible” to make that purchase directly.   By contrast, the August 1994 version of Form 4473 significantly broadens the definition of “straw purchase” transactions:  “A ‘straw purchase’ occurs when the actual buyer uses another person (the straw purchaser) to execute ATF Form 4473 purporting to show that the straw purchaser is the actual buyer.”
That suggests that the BATF decided to push the enforcement of a straw purchase as merely being a misrepresentation of the actual buyer sometime between 1991 and 1994 when the new form came out. Somewhere between 20 and 23 years before Abramski.

And lost it, so Abramski wasn't "just the case that made it to SCOTUS", correct?

Instead, the Bureau undertook a novel reading of the Act and materiality that contradicted its earlier position, lost in the fifth circuit and worked with that loss on that point of law for another 17 years.

It's not uncommon for circuit courts to disagree--that's hardly evidence that the law Abramski was convicted of was something new.

Do you believe anyone here has asserted that?

Where there is a circuit split on an issue, there isn't a singular "the law" on that issue. That Abramski was taken because of and resolved the split is the assertion.

If he had been found not guilty in any of the appeals, it would never have made it to the Supreme Court. You don't appeal not guilty verdicts and you can't be tried again if you are found not guilty. So, it would not only be easier, as you agree, the statement I made is also perfectly correct. The fact that another circuit court, in a different case made a different ruling doesn't call the accuracy of my assertion into question.

No, John. Your statement isn't "perfectly correct"; that's why I corrected it.
Your rendition above omits the information you already know that contradicts it. Since you now know of a 1997 holding in another circuit that stood for 17 years prior to Abramski, you are aware that the rule in Abramski was disputed and not "clearly the law".

That's quite a stretch. Circuits get overturned all the time.

Which is why it is special pleading to assert that the circuit court decision in Abramski is dispositive of the rule prior to Abramski.

At the enforcement level the determination was that Abramski was deserving of arrest and prosecution. At every trial and appeal he was found guilty. SCOTUS agreed with his conviction. That's not very good evidence for the idea that the law he was prosecuted under was questionable.

Had anyone argued that arrest, prosecution, trial, appeal and upholding the appeal were the evidence that the law was questionable, that would have been incisive. On review, you'll notice that isn't the information that confirms Tom's assertion as error.

No, it was the law BEFORE Abramski. Abramski was just the case that made it to SCOTUS.

Abramski is not merely a confirmation of the original bureau position or implementation of the Act. It contradicts earlier bureau positions and enforcement.

The Bureau's shift in policy is undisputed. For decades the Bureau's position on materiality was at least as permissive and consistent with ordinary agency principles as the court in Polk and the four vote minority in Abramski. It isn't correct to cast the Abramski decision is a mere continuation of the status quo ante on the issue.

Now you raise the issue of whether the Abramski decision is questionable. That it is questionable should be apparent. First, that the bureau itself interpreted the very same code differently until the 1990s indicates ample ambiguity as viewed by the Bureau itself. Second, ordinary application of lenity would not permit the government to convict based on that ambiguity. Third, 5-4 decisions are uniquely susceptible to later overturning or limiting, which is one reason that as great as Heller was, it was comforting to see the 6-3 vote in NYSPRA. Fourth, the majority rationale in Abramski is policy driven, much like the majority reasoning in Raich; upholding a result on policy ground despite conventional legal concepts and the text of the law being applied can get votes, but is analytically weak.

 

[Aguila Blanca]

IMHO (as a layperson, not as an attorney), any time there is a circuit split that's (to me) prima facie evidence that the law in question is OBVIOUSLY not clear.

 

[JohnKSa]

...any time there is a circuit split that's (to me) prima facie evidence that the law in question is OBVIOUSLY not clear.

There's far more to circuit splits than lack of clarity--it might even be accurate to say that clarity is rarely the issue in circuit splits.

That aside, it's one thing to say a law is not clear. It's quite another to claim it didn't exist until SCOTUS confirmed it.

Since you now know of a 1997 holding in another circuit that stood for 17 years prior to Abramski, you are aware that the rule in Abramski was disputed and not "clearly the law".

1. You know that circuit rulings only affect the courts under them. It would be possible to argue that under that circuit's jurisdiction it wasn't "clearly the law" after that ruling, but that argument wouldn't apply anywhere else.

2. Since you read my post, you know what I said was:

"It would be much easier to argue that it clearly was the law prior to Abramski or he wouldn't have been arrested, prosecuted and convicted and the conviction wouldn't have been upheld at every step through the appeals process--up to and including the Supreme Court. "

There is absolutely nothing in that statement that is incorrect. He was arrested, prosecuted and convicted and then lost every appeal. Based on an existing law.

On review, you'll notice that isn't the information that confirms Tom's assertion as error.

Of course it isn't. Because it's not an error.

It's simply nonsense to claim that the SCOTUS decision established a law. SCOTUS can overturn laws or confirm laws, but they can't create them. The law clearly existed before Abramski, that's why he was prosecuted and convicted in the first place. The validity of that law was confirmed by the appeals and finally by SCOTUS.

Second, ordinary application of lenity would not permit the government to convict based on that ambiguity.

Every court that dealt with Abramski's case, including SCOTUS disagrees with you.

Now you raise the issue of whether the Abramski decision is questionable.

What I did was point out that even if the BATF's interpretation ever was questionable, that is clearly no longer the case. You can have a personal opinion that disagrees with SCOTUS and the BATF on this law, but it doesn't change reality.

 

[zukiphile]

...any time there is a circuit split that's (to me) prima facie evidence that the law in question is OBVIOUSLY not clear.

There's far more to circuit splits than lack of clarity--it might even be accurate to say that clarity is rarely the issue in circuit splits.

That doesn't bear on whether a circuit split indicated a lack of clarity in the law on an issue. A circuit split on an issue indicates a diversity on that point, not an unequivocal state.

That aside, it's one thing to say a law is not clear. It's quite another to claim it didn't exist until SCOTUS confirmed it.

Here, you argue again against a claim no one made. Why?

Since you now know of a 1997 holding in another circuit that stood for 17 years prior to Abramski, you are aware that the rule in Abramski decision was disputed and not "clearly the law".

1. You know that circuit rulings only affect the courts under them. It would be possible to argue that under that circuit's jurisdiction it wasn't "clearly the law" after that ruling, but that argument wouldn't apply anywhere else.

You probably meant that circuit court precedent only binds the courts in that circuit, which would be right.

I would encourage you to review the thread. The matter under discussion with Spats was not about authority within a circuit.

2. Since you read my post, you know what I said was:

"It would be much easier to argue that it clearly was the law prior to Abramski or he wouldn't have been arrested, prosecuted and convicted and the conviction wouldn't have been upheld at every step through the appeals process--up to and including the Supreme Court. "

There is absolutely nothing in that statement that is incorrect. He was arrested, prosecuted and convicted and then lost every appeal. Based on an existing law.

Yet that isn't your whole assertion, is it? Your assertion includes "it clearly was the law prior to Abramski". Now that you are aware of the circuit split prior to the Abramski decision, it doesn't make sense to assert that the Abramski rule was the law, i.e. the clear single settled rule, prior to resolution of the circuit split. That's the incorrect part.

On review, you'll notice that isn't the information that confirms Tom's assertion as error.

Of course it isn't. Because it's not an error.

John, it's easy to glean from reading Abramski that the Bureau itself had earlier held a position in line with general agency principles rather than departing from them, and that it was the Abramski decision that established the Bureau's departure from that as the law on that issue.

One cannot simultaneously recognize that and fail to see the error in tom's assertion. The idea that the rule in Abramski was uneqivocally the law on this issue, and Abramski's case just made it to the Sup Ct so they could let everyone know this point wasn't previously disputed in the law should set off your nonsense meter.

It's simply nonsense to claim that the SCOTUS decision established a law. SCOTUS can overturn laws or confirm laws, but they can't create them.

No one has argued that the Sup Ct created the Act, a law. Courts do establish the law, just as they did in Abramski. Every case that is resolved establishes the law of that case. Heller, McDonald and NYSRPA all established important points of law. Courts can establish the law on a point as in Roe, and amend or even reverse the law in that point as in Dobbs. The Sup Ct isn't limited to affirming or striking US Code. It can and does resolve party positions about how laws are interpreted and applied as it did in Sackett v. EPA.

I am providing an explanation on this to resolve the equivocation introduced on whether the Court establishes a law or the law.

Now you raise the issue of whether the Abramski decision is questionable.

What I did was point out that even if it ever was questionable, that is clearly no longer the case.

Every case that isn't appealed has the issues in that case decided. That doesn't make the resolution of those issues unquestionable as noted above.

 

[JohnKSa]

That doesn't bear on whether a circuit split indicated a lack of clarity in the law on an issue. A circuit split on an issue indicates a diversity on that point, not an unequivocal state.

A diversity on the point doesn't indicate that a position is not valid law either.

Here, you argue again against a claim no one made. Why?

The assertion that the position was law before Abramski is not incorrect. That is a claim you have made several times now.

I would encourage you to review the thread. The matter under discussion with Spats was not about authority within a circuit.

Good advice on the review. I didn't respond to something you said about a comment by Spats, I responded to something you said about one of my comments.

Now that you are aware of the circuit split prior to the Abramski decision, it doesn't make sense to assert that the Abramski rule was the law, i.e. the clear single settled rule, prior to resolution of the circuit split. That's the incorrect part.

Ah, I see. You are adding the word "settled" to my assertion and then claiming it's incorrect based on that strawman. Laws do not come into being at the time they are settled. SCOTUS rulings either overturn or confirm EXISTING laws, they do not create them.

The BATF position was clearly law prior to Abramski or he could not have been convicted of it.

The idea that the rule in Abramski was uneqivocally the law on this issue...

Hmmm... Interesting how when you add words to what I said it changes the meaning.

If you want to address my comments, it would be more productive to do so. Putting words in my mouth and then addressing the resulting strawman is pointless.

Courts do establish the law, just as they did in Abramski.

Courts can confirm or overturn existing laws. If there is no existing law to work with there's no case and there's nothing for them to rule on.

That doesn't make the resolution of those issues unquestionable as noted above.

Pretty sure that SCOTUS (and therefore every court in the land) would disagree with you that this issue remains questionable.

 

[dogtown tom]

Originally Posted by zukiphile

Originally Posted by dogtown tom
No, it was the law BEFORE Abramski. Abramski was just the case that made it to SCOTUS.

Dogtown Tom's assertion above is incorrect in two ways.

First, the general concept of a straw purchase involves a disability of the principal. That general principle doesn't prevent legislators from departing from that principle, but that's an adaptation rather than the general rule.

Second, the holding in Abramski wasn't clearly the law the prior to Abramski or else the Sup Ct wouldn't have taken it. It only takes reading Abramski to understand that it wasn't the uniform rule prior to the Abramski decision.

No, its not incorrect.
"General principle" is irrelevant. Again, this isn't a loaf of bread you buy for your neighbor.
And again, a "straw sale" is not illegal. You can buy guns any day of the week on behalf of others. No federal law concerns itself with "straw sales" between nonlicensees.

The crime that occurs is when you complete and sign the Form 4473, attesting that you are the actual buyer/transferee. The instructions on the Form 4473 make it very clear that the only exemption is when the buyer/transferee intends to make a bona fide gift of that firearm. Unlike the example above, this would occur only at a licensed dealers premises.

If the potential buyer/transferee disagrees with the instructions and requirements on that Form 4473, lying isn't the way to address that.

Whether ATF took a different view in the '70's or '80's is irrelevant. The Brady Law (passed in 1993) that required a background check prior to a dealer transferring a firearm, made it clear that the actual buyer needed to undergo that check, not someone else.

Whether the law was clear or unclear didn't really matter to Bruce Abramski. He lied first when he presented expired LE credentials to get a Blue Label discount on that Glock, then again when he lied on the 4473.

 

[zukiphile]

John, I've bolded some words below, and those emphases are mine.

I would encourage you to review the thread. The matter under discussion with Spats was not about authority within a circuit.

Good advice on the review. I didn't respond to something you said about a comment by Spats, I responded to something you said about one of my comments.

Your review should show have shown you that the issue under discussion with Spats is the comment to which you began this exchange. "The matter under discussion with" doesn't mean that you were responding to his text.

That doesn't bear on whether a circuit split indicated a lack of clarity in the law on an issue. A circuit split on an issue indicates a diversity on that point, not an unequivocal state.
A diversity on the point doesn't indicate that a position is not valid law either.

Here, you argue again against a claim no one made. Why?

The assertion that the position was law before Abramski is not incorrect. That is a claim you have made several times now.

That is incorrect. It may be sloppiness with idiom that is confusing you. Typically, when you read "a law" that indicates a code section. As you've noted, that's a legislative product, not a judicial one, and the contrary hadn't been asserted or suggested. "Law" by itself may indicate an area rather than anything more specific as in Law on implied malice in torts arising from drunk driving will vary. The law on an issue is singular. People don't generally write the "singular" law because the concept is singular, and we try to avoid redundancy. The singular law on the issue of federal regulation of abortion is currently Dobbs. Prior to Roe, there wasn't "the law" on the issue, though there was law on the topic of abortion in many states.

One could be idiomatically correct in noting that there was diversity within the law prior to Abramski (the Sup Ct decision rather than the man), but that construction would support Aguila Blanca's observation of lack of clarity.

With the table set,

That doesn't bear on whether a circuit split indicated a lack of clarity in the law on an issue. A circuit split on an issue indicates a diversity on that point, not an unequivocal state.

A diversity on the point doesn't indicate that a position is not valid law either.

Here, you argue again against a claim no one made. Why?

The assertion that the position was law before Abramski is not incorrect. That is a claim you have made several times now.

No, John. You are misreading the text.

The law was equivocal prior to the decision in Abramski. That doesn't mean that the [singular] law in circuits with contrary caselaw (a form of law) aren't law, they just aren't the law. I have not claimed that the decisions of courts that had decided consistent with Abramski weren't law.

Now that you are aware of the circuit split prior to the Abramski decision, it doesn't make sense to assert that the Abramski rule was the law, i.e. the clear single settled rule, prior to resolution of the circuit split. That's the incorrect part.

Ah, I see. You are adding the word "settled" to my assertion and then claiming it's incorrect based on that strawman. Laws do not come into being at the time they are settled. SCOTUS rulings either overturn or confirm EXISTING laws, they do not create them.

If you don't concede that Abramski produced the singular law on this point, meaning that it settled the circuit split, then we have more work to do. If you do already know that, then your protest about a strawman doesn't work for you.

In our system, courts make laws frequently; that's the body of case law. The Sup Ct makes laws frequently. We now have caselaw that a federal moratorium on state evictions as recently arose is not within federal authority. The caselaw on that point arises from the Sup Ct's decision.

The idea that the rule in Abramski was uneqivocally the law on this issue...

Hmmm... Interesting how when you add words to what I said it changes the meaning.

If you want to address my comments, it would be more productive to do so. Putting words in my mouth and then addressing the resulting strawman is pointless.

Since no one put words in your mouth, it's not a strawman, and I doubt that tom is made of straw.

Addressing this isn't pointless since it resolves an equivocation for the purpose of explaining the issue. Where you understand that law on this specific point was diverse and there was a split prior to Abramski, you agree that it produced the singular law on the point that there is now.

That doesn't make the resolution of those issues unquestionable as noted above.

Pretty sure that SCOTUS (and therefore every court in the land) would disagree with you that this issue remains questionable.

An illustration of your confidence in an assertion that is not correct or relevant to the explanation is as good a time as any to wind this up. Feel free to chase your tail if it continues to please you.

 

[JohnKSa]

If you don't concede that Abramski produced the singular law on this point, meaning that it settled the circuit split, then we have more work to do. If you do already know that, then your protest about a strawman doesn't work for you.

Abramski was not a legislative process so it didn't produce any law.

Abramski did settle a circuit split by confirming an existing law.

Since no one put words in your mouth, it's not a strawma...

By adding the word "unequivocally" to my statement (putting words into my mouth) you changed the focus and therefore the meaning of my statement. That's called a strawman, as you know. As you knew when you altered my statement to create it.

In our system, courts make laws frequently; that's the body of case law.

They don't do this except by confirming or overturning existing laws. For a court to rule, there had to be a law, already in existence, that generated the prosecution and brought the court into the picture.

"a law" ... "Law" by itself may indicate an area...as in Law ...The law .... the "singular" law ... The singular law ...there wasn't "the law" ... there was law. ...there was diversity within the law

Ok. Right.

You're getting more and more creative and more and more deliberately (and needlessly) esoteric in your responses. I understand why you feel that's necessary, but it's not really a very complicated topic and the principles are actually pretty simple.

To save a lot of typing, let's take a step back and consider some simple questions with simple answers.

1. Is it your contention that the law in question came into being when SCOTUS ruled on it?

2. Is it your contention that there was no legal basis for arresting/prosecuting convicting Abramski? If there was, what was it?

3. Is it your contention that even though SCOTUS has ruled on the law that it still remains questionable? If so, why is it still questionable?

4. On what basis would one challenge a "questionable" law that has been confirmed by SCOTUS? If there is no basis, how is the law questionable?

5. Is it your contention that a circuit ruling invalidates a law everywhere in the country and that state of affairs remains in place, countrywide unless/until SCOTUS takes a second case and rules in favor of the law? If so, what is the basis for prosecution in the second case?

6. Do you believe that there is any way for a law to cease to be questionable if its interpretation has ever changed in the past?

7. Do you believe that there is any way for a law to cease to be questionable if there have ever been differing rulings in the courts?

 

[steve4102]

Thanks for all the Replies and great info, but I’m still not sure, is using another persons CC to purchase a firearm online for myself a straw purchase.

 

[zukiphile]

... is using another persons CC to purchase a firearm online for myself a straw purchase.

No, but...

As a practical matter, the "but" will be the more important part of the answer for a transferee.

...your FFL may like to operate according to some brightline rules that don't make him or his staff wonder why you aren't paying with your own CC. Vendors aren't typically looking for trouble or the chance to make a point with their licensing authorities. A purchase in which you point to the firearm you want, fill out the 4473 and pay with your own card or money is the straight over the plate pattern that doesn't have him wondering if you are really purchasing on your own behalf.