Wildalaska
Moderator
I'm not afraid to put out MY position (along with specifics), so why are you?
I dont debate silliness, let me know when you have something with a measure of historical truth to say
WildstillfightingthenewdealAlaska
I'm not afraid to put out MY position (along with specifics), so why are you?
... personally believe very strongly. I am particularly proud of my contributions in recent cases in which the government has argued in the Superme Court that racial and ethnic quotas should not be allowed...
IMO...
Better than what Clinton 1 or 2 would appoint!!
Lets say then that a "Clinton" would not be appointing a "suppossed"2A supporter then..Irrelevant since neither Clinton 1 or 2 is running for SCOTUS but
Hooray for Wickerd v. Filburn and emminent domain of people's homes so we can build yacht clubs.
Was United States v. Lopez, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), a constitutional freak? Or did it signify that the Commerce Clause still imposes some meaningful limits on congressional power?
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In other words, the majority argues in effect that the private, purely intrastate possession of machine guns has a substantial effect on the interstate machine gun market. This theory, if accepted, would go far toward converting Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce into "a plenary police power." Lopez, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1633. If there is any sort of interstate market for a commodity--and I think that it is safe to assume that there is some sort of interstate market for practically everything--then the purely intrastate possession of that item will have an effect on that market, and outlawing private possession of the item will presumably have a substantial effect. Consequently, the majority's theory leads to the conclusion that Congress may ban the purely intrastate possession of just about anything.
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The activity that the Lopez Court found was not "economic" or "connected with a commercial transaction" was a type of intrastate firearm possession, i.e., the possession of a firearm (including a machine gun) within a school zone. At issue here is another type of purely intrastate firearm possession, i.e., the purely intrastate possession of a machine gun. If the former must be regarded as non-economic and non-commercial, why isn't the same true of the latter? Is possession of a machine gun inherently more "economic" or more "commercial" than possession of other firearms? [Footnote 4] Is the possession of a firearm within a school zone somehow less "economic" and "commercial" than possession elsewhere--say, on one's own property? Is possession of a machine gun inherently more "economic" or more "commercial" than possession of other firearms? [Footnote 4] Is the possession of a firearm within a school zone somehow less "economic" and "commercial" than possession elsewhere--say, on one's own property? [Footnote 5] If there are distinctions of constitutional dimension here, they are too subtle for me to grasp.
and often writes opinions which go against well established SCOTUS decisions and which are often overturned by SCOTUS at a later time BECAUSE they go against established precedent.
I officially announce my opposition to the Brady Center
Here is another point: don't assume that Alito is pro-Second Amendment based on the Rybar case
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the dissent is based on Alito's opinion that for Congress to outlaw the possession of a machine gun (based on its power to regulate interstate commerce), there must be some evidence on the record concerning the effect that the intrastate possession of a machine gun has on interstate commerce.