Army sergeant arrested for legal possession of a firearm

If a couple cops rolled up on me while I was armed with my Ar-15 or the like and I was on public or private land I would be concerned. Concerned enough to reach for the sky and do as told with a good attitude about it.:D

I would never cause harm to a police officer and I know that but I cant say a police officer would never do me any harm. :eek:

After all I would realize their not approaching to chat about how they like my gun and would like to check it out. I would assume they were called and then it becomes part of their duty to "check me out"

I know I would be nervous if a cop got out of his car with his shotgun in his hand because he pulled me over for speeding........like wise I can see where the cops would be nervous rolling up on a guy walking around with a AR......but it is part of their job. If they dont like it maybe they should find another line of work.
 
As you said in your post, he was legal. Therefore there existed no suspicion of illegality, and therefore there was no reasonable suspicion to detain.
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If the police account is true, he wasn't detained until he refused to be disarmed during the course of investigating a complaint by another citizen. If correct, then his refusal resulted in him being detained. The videos provided by Grisham do not contradict the police claims nor does to video support his claims that the police tried to disarm him by force with no verbal request. The video shows none of this because it happened BEFORE the camera was used.
 
If the police account is true, he wasn't detained until he refused to be disarmed during the course of investigating a complaint by another citizen. If correct, then his refusal resulted in him being detained.
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I would point you to Florida v. Royer - 460 U.S. 491 (1983) As referenced in ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW 528 U.S. 119 (2000)

Specifically this section:
Such a holding is consistent with the decision in Florida v. Royer, supra, at 498, that an individual, when approached, has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.
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As well as
...Terry recognized that officers can detain individuals to resolve ambiguities in their conduct, 392 U.S., at 30, and thus accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. If they do not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, an individual must be allowed to go on his way.
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Jim let us put the rest of that back in there:

Held: The officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This case, involving a brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer on a public street, is governed by Terry, under which an officer who has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot may conduct a brief, investigatory stop. While “reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause, there must be at least a minimal level of objective justification for the stop. An individual’s presence in a “high crime area,” standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion of criminal activity, but a location’s characteristics are relevant in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147—148. In this case, moreover, it was also Wardlow’s unprovoked flight that aroused the officers’ suspicion. Nervous, evasive behavior is another pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, and headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion. In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences from suspicious behavior, and this Court cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty when none exists. Thus, the reasonable suspicion determination must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418. Officer Nolan was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating further. Such a holding is consistent with the decision in Florida v. Royer, supra, at 498, that an individual, when approached, has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Unprovoked flight is the exact opposite of “going about one’s business.” While flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity, Terry recognized that officers can detain individuals to resolve ambiguities in their conduct, 392 U.S., at 30, and thus accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. If they do not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, an individual must be allowed to go on his way. But in this case the officers found that Wardlow possessed a handgun and arrested him for violating a state law. The propriety of that arrest is not before the Court. Pp. 3—6.
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It sure sounds a lot different when you read all of it does it not?
 
Well JimDandy, as you noted...

We don't have enough information about what happened to make any judgement calls either way.
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So by your own clearly made statement, you don't know if your citations apply or not because you don't have enough information to make a call either way.

Though I haven't seen anything where the LEO asked the guy to set it down and he didn't- Just that they walked up with guns drawn and took it from him.
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Then you didn't listen to Grisham's claims in the links provided. He never claimed that they walked up to him with guns drawn. That information was provided several pages ago, LOL.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gy3Sw8APRQo

He specifically stated that the guns were NOT drawn when he was approached. He claims he would have surrendered his guns if they would have asked. The police's side of the story is that they responded to a complaint and that Grisham failed to comply with their demands and that they legally have the right to disarm him for their safety.
 
Alabama Shooter:

Held: The officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This case, involving a brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer on a public street, is governed by Terry, under which an officer who has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot may conduct a brief, investigatory stop. While “reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause, there must be at least a minimal level of objective justification for the stop. An individual’s presence in a “high crime area,” standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion of criminal activity, but a location’s characteristics are relevant in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147—148. In this case, moreover, it was also Wardlow’s unprovoked flight that aroused the officers’ suspicion. Nervous, evasive behavior is another pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, and headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion. In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences from suspicious behavior, and this Court cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty when none exists. Thus, the reasonable suspicion determination must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418. Officer Nolan was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating further. Such a holding is consistent with the decision in Florida v. Royer, supra, at 498, that an individual, when approached, has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Unprovoked flight is the exact opposite of “going about one’s business.” While flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity, Terry recognized that officers can detain individuals to resolve ambiguities in their conduct, 392 U.S., at 30, and thus accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. If they do not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, an individual must be allowed to go on his way. But in this case the officers found that Wardlow possessed a handgun and arrested him for violating a state law. The propriety of that arrest is not before the Court. Pp. 3—6.
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You might also have said, it sounds very different depending on which phrases you boldface...
 
Alabama Shooter, you accusing me of cherry-picking verges on hilarious. Re-read the entire bit you quoted.

The convicted guy was loitering in an area known for criminal activity, and he fled when the police made contact. The court took the totality of that event, with some emphasis on the fleeing part, as a situation that created reasonable articulable suspicion for the officers.

If anybody cherry-picked, it was you.
 
I don't think you understand what "cherry picking" and "in context" mean.

Dancing around the page and taking bits and pieces of a sentence that appeal to you or you think support your argument (exactly like you did) is cherry picking.

All I did was show the surrounding paragraph for context of the partial quote. This called "putting it into context". If you don't understand that I have nothing for you.

I assume you are trying to troll me in some way again. This is becoming a really sad habit of yours. It won't work.
 
Edited to remove the bickering tone that was unintended-

The facts of any given case- once it's decided at the SCOTUS level (or so I'm given to understand from the resident lawyers, and Gura briefs) is more about the principle than the specific facts of the specific case being reviewed. As you can see I linked the first case- which cited the second- and explained the meaning of that case- by an assumedly knowledgeable source in a Justice of the Supreme Court- that without reasonable suspicion one cannot be stopped, and may continue about your business. As a practical matter, one does have to stop, and prove there is no reason for suspicion because it's hard to enjoy the money your estate would win if you were right.

On the comparable facts-

The Sgt did not attempt to flee. There was no mention of this being a high crime neighborhood. Or a neighborhood at all. Drugs were never mentioned, so certainly no correlation/causality could be introduced that drugs = guns or the inverse. Exercise of a right is not grounds for reasonable suspicion- ergo that officer has the herculean task of proving even reasonable suspicion before making that Sergeant a moderately rich man. It has long been established that the mere presence of a firearm does not mean criminal activity is likely.

Can you explain how one would come up with a reasonable suspicion the Sgt was about to commit a crime in the middle of nowhere with his rifle that was on a sling, and not being actively handled?
 
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As an update, according to some local news I ran into by accident, it appears his jury was seated on Tuesday. CBS Trial blurb.

Any of you have access to motions/rulings on some of the issues raised already? Like the questioning of the minor child, etc?
 
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