For a half century, the Fourth Amendment was largely understood
as a protection of privacy. However, in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012),
and Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), this Court re-established the original
basis of the Fourth Amendment as the protection of property. As Justice Scalia explained:
The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its
close connection to property, since otherwise it
would have referred simply to “the right of the
people to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures”; the phrase “in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects” would
have been superfluous. [Jones at 405.]
Although Cady was decided four decades before
Jones, the Cady Court addressed the property principle. The Cady
Court justified the warrantless search in large part because the police had exercised a
significant degree of custody and control over Cady’s
automobile before it was searched. In evaluating the
search of the car, the Court identified “two factual
considerations [that] deserve emphasis,” the first of
which was:
the police had exercised a form of
custody or control over the 1967 Thunderbird.
Respondent’s vehicle was disabled as a result
of the accident, and constituted a nuisance
along the highway. Respondent, being
intoxicated (and later comatose), could not
make arrangements to have the vehicle towed
and stored. At the direction of the police,
and for elemental reasons of safety, the
automobile was towed to a private garage....
[Cady at 442-43 (emphasis added).]
...
The Cady
Court stressed the distinction which the
court below crushed. “‘[F]or the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment there is a constitutional difference
between houses and cars.’” Cady at 439 (citations
omitted). And the Cady Court relied on that
distinction: