Just filed in Fed Court.
There's tactics going on, so there's a limit to what I can say on a public forum. To put it simply, I failed to score funding for a lawyer from any RKBA organizations, so I have no choice but to go pro-per again. Not a great situation, but I've got far better case law, evidence, legal advice and experience over the last time I tried this.
I'm not asking for individual donations at this time. I can handle the early phases myself; how well the upcoming "motion war" goes will determine if I can get more support, a lawyer, and a pile of co-plaintiffs.
--------------------------------------------
James March, attorney Pro Per
Xx xxxxxx xxxx
Pittsburg, CA xxxxx
Email: jmarch@ricochet.net
Fax: 707-221-7152
Website containing documents related to this case: http://www.ninehundred.com/~equalccw
In the Federal District Court of Oakland, California
James March, Plaintiff )
vs )
Sheriff Warren E. Rupf, )
Captain Wayne Willett, )
Contra Costa County Government, ) CIVIL RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS
Pittsburg PD Chief Aaron Baker, ) VIOLATION COMPLAINT
City of Pittsburg, )
Richmond PD Chief Joseph Samuels, )
Former Richmond PD Chief Duncan, )
City of Richmond, )
Does 1 though 50 )
----------------------------------)
Introduction:
Plaintiff James March comes before the court alleging gross, deliberate equal protection violations by all defendants in the issuance of Carry Concealed Weapons (CCW) permits pursuant to California Penal Code 12050-12054, in violation of 42 USC 1983 and California Constitution Article 1 section 7B. The defendants conspired among themselves to perpetuate such civil rights violations against the Plaintiff and against county residents generally.
In addition, Sheriff Rupf violated specific sections of Penal Code 12050-12054 and March's due process rights, in most cases to aid or illegally mask the equal protection violations.
Jurisdiction:
The "core complaint" arises from 42 USC 1983 Federal discrimination law, making Federal District Court the proper venue in this matter.
Description of Parties:
Plaintiff James March is a US citizen, continuously a resident of Contra Costa County since 1997. From October of '97 through 8/1/00 March was a resident of Richmond, California; subsequently he was a resident of Pittsburg, CA, both towns in Contra Costa County.
Defendant Sheriff Warren E. Rupf is an elected constitutional officer holding the title of Sheriff of Contra Costa County since 1992. He is being sued personally and in his official capacity as Sheriff.
Defendant Captain Wayne Willett is a member of the Contra Costa Sheriff's office, assigned the task of "pre-screening" and interviewing CCW applicants by Sheriff Rupf. In this role, Willett made recommendations to Rupf as to the suitability of specific applicants over others. He is being sued personally and in his official capacity.
Defendant Contra Costa County Government is a county government that directly employs Willett and is responsible for his illegal and unconstitutional acts.
Defendant Pittsburg PD Chief Aaron Baker is the municipal Police Chief for Pittsburg.
Defendant City of Pittsburg is the municipal city government within Contra Costa County which employs Baker.
Defendant Richmond PD Chief Joseph Samuels is the municipal Police Chief for Richmond.
Defendant Duncan was the Chief of Police in Richmond prior to Samuels, and was in charge during part of the period in which defendants Rupf and Willett discriminated against plaintiff; Duncan was a direct influence on this discrimination (as was Samuels later).
Defendant City of Richmond is the municipal city government within Contra Costa County which employs Samuels and employed Duncan.
Details of allegations:
1) Defendants Rupf and Willett denied Plaintiff a CCW permit despite his willingness to follow all provisions of Calif Penal Codes 12050-12054, his lack of any disqualifying criminal record and despite his "good cause for issuance" under PC12050 being as good or better than many of Rupf's current permitholders. This is a violation of 42 USC 1983 and Calif. Const. Article 1 section 7B. The formal denial was written by Willett during 1stQ 2000 and confirmed by Rupf when I appealed Willett’s decision in a letter to Rupf (a process used by other applicants who ultimately received permits).
2) All defendants collectively conspired to deny equal protection on a "general basis" by "redlining" towns from access to CCW permits. Defendants Baker, Duncan, Samuels and their departments and municipalities asked Sheriff Rupf to discriminate against residents of their towns who apply for CCW with Rupf; Rupf in response instituted policies of discrimination against town residents. At the times of March's denials by Rupf, March was a Richmond resident and was discriminated against by Richmond's part in the conspiracy to violate 42 USC 1983. After 8/1/00, March's access to a Sheriff-issued permit was impeded by Pittsburg PD's inclusion in the illegal and unconstitutional cross-jurisdictional conspiracy to "redline" the lower and middle income (and high minority population) areas of the county. At all times, Rupf and Willett were voluntary partners in the discrimination and knew of the actions of the towns.
In accord with Federal requirements for more details in conspiracy cases:
2A) All defendants connected with the cities collectively asked Sheriff Rupf to discriminate against their own town's residents.
2B) At the same time, the towns committed violations of Penal Code 12050 that led to an absolute practical ban on private citizen CCW.
2C) Rupf knew the towns were doing this, yet he voluntarily "supported" those illegal actions by discriminating against the town residents, in violation of PC12050.
2D) All of the defendants knew that this conspiracy was a violation of due process under Penal Code 12050. In fact, the defendants supported a "right to apply for a permit" once forced to realize denials of the application forms were illegal by plaintiff's first lawsuit in state court, but they used "blanket blocking by town border" to make the application process an exercise in Kafka-esque futility and wasted money, time and dignity.
2E) Finally, all the defendants knew that the discrimination along town border lines created a severe racial imbalance in county-wide permit issuance. Rupf was put in the position of discriminating against high-minority population areas, and the town-related parties worked with him closely to create this gross injustice.
3) Defendant Willett discriminated against Plaintiff willfully and personally; he was aware that Sheriff Rupf had issued permits to specific citizens with no "good cause for issuance" whatsoever yet he insisted on holding March to a standard of either "extraordinary good cause" or "prima facie good cause". He could hardly be unaware of the discrimination; he processed the paperwork for applicants who had "gone over his head" to Rupf and received approval by Rupf despite Willett's own finding of "no good cause". For his role in voluntarily supporting Rupf's discrimination, Willett is being sued personally pursuant to 42 USC 1983, and in his professional capacity as a law enforcement officer sworn to uphold and defend the Fed and state constitutions.
4) Defendant Rupf crafted two different policies to "mask" the equal protection violations:
4A) Circa 1997, Rupf's formal policies state that he would not allow people to apply for a permit via formal paper application unless they were "pre-screened" verbally. This had the effect of eliminating comparisons between denied applicants and approved applicants. This policy was in effect through at least 3/9/99, when it was used against Plaintiff March during his first attempt to apply for a permit. This policy was ended on 3/24/99, apparently in response to March's first suit mentioning application form denial as a cause of action in state court; that complaint was filed 3/15/99.
4B) On 3/24/99, Rupf's new policy manual stated that records of denied applicants were to be destroyed after 90 days. This policy is in effect at present, it is explicitly illegal per Penal Code 12053's record-keeping requirements and serves the purpose of eliminating comparisons between denied applicants and approved via discovery motion or use of California's Public Records Act. The net effect is similar to charge 4A above.
5) Rupf's pattern of discrimination in CCW favors those of wealth, high social status and personal political connections. As a result, permitholders in the county are far more likely to be campaign contributors to Rupf's personal political career. Over 16% of his permitholders are donors to his campaign funds, donating over $21,000. This 16% represents those donors with "good cause" statements varying between mediocre and non-existent in most cases. Rupf's manipulation of a state-mandated public safety program for political financial gain is a gross equal protection violation at the very least.
6) Rupf's current policy manual forces people to get a medical examination at their own expense, in violation of PC12054(d).
7) Rupf instituted a fee structure in his latest 3/24/99 policy manual that is in excess of limits specified under AB2022 effective 1/1/99. This issue is unfortunately complicated by the state's failure to include part of AB2022 into the Penal Codes, particularly a piece titled "Sec. 7" at the very end. Plaintiff has brought this bit and it's implications to the attention of defendant Rupf's counsel circa December of '99.
8) Defendant Rupf has instituted policies limiting permitholders to two higher-end weapons of medium or large caliber only. By stressing big-dollar guns, he imposes yet another financial barrier to permit issuance in violation of Penal Code 12054(d). There is no "rational basis" for the limits in general, and they are illegal due to Rupf's lack of legislative authority.
9) In general, the actions of all defendants were "racially reckless", leading to an obvious pattern of race-based discrimination in CCW issuance due to "racial redlining". Their actions should therefore be subject to "strict scrutiny"; however, by examining the known drawbacks of "elitist issuance" (elite permitholders acting like they're "above the law") and the known lack of problems in widespread issuance from the "shall-issue" CCW states, it's clear the defendants collective policies cannot withstand even a "rational basis" test.
10) The defendants are abusing a state statute that was written in 1923, as a deliberate violation of equal protection. The law itself was based on earlier southern statutes with known links to lobbying by the KKK and other directly racist individuals and groups. In their earliest structure prior to the Civil War, the need for a discretionary-issuance CCW permit was limited specifically to free blacks (Virginia, 1840) and after the passage of the 14th Amendment were given the appearance of broad applicability to escape Federal court scrutiny.
11) As a final insult, defendant Chief Baker of Pittsburg PD has discussed the CCW issue with the plaintiff in a personal meeting over a month ago. At that time, Baker explained that no permit application forms are available from Pittsburg, that there are no current Pittsburg PD permitholders, and that his department had not created a local CCW policy manual in accord with Penal Code 12050.2. His blanket-ban on issuance violates PC12050, and his part in the conspiracy with Rupf incurs on him a "tremendous liability", as Richmond assistant city attorney Wayne Nishioka phrased it when denying the existence of such conspiracies on 3/26/99 in a meeting with plaintiff March.
THEREFORE:
Plaintiff prays the court recognize the illegality and unconstitutionality of the defendants collective and individual policies, and order all such wrongful practices halted.
Plaintiff prays the court recognize the gross "ill will" suggested by the nature of the offenses, the sheer quantity of problems and the illegal attempts to cover them up, and assign punitive damages for each civil rights violation.
Plaintiff prays the court recognize the obvious abuse of the "good cause" requirement in PC12050 by the defendants, and recognize that the defendants are actually using it as intended back in 1923 as a deliberate equal protection violation, and strip the defendants of all authority to judge "good cause" when reviewing a CCW application.
Plaintiff hereby attests to the accuracy of these claims and is willing and able to support each and every allegation.
Dated: __/__/__
_____________________________________
James March, Attorney Pro Per
---------------------------------------------
End of pleading.
The letter below to the AG's office is required by Fed court rules when alleging a state law is a Federal Constitutional violation.
The AG's office got the pleading above, and the letter below.
---------------------------------------------
State of California
Office of the Attorney General
Department of Justice
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
NOTIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO STATE LAW
AS REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LOCAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEEDURE.
Members of the AG's staff,
Please find enclosed a pleading filed in Federal District Court, Oakland, Northern California district. It is primarily aimed at county and city law enforcement officers and officials regarding their administration of Penal Codes 12050-12054 - California's "Carry Concealed Weapons" (CCW) permit system..
One issue is that PC12050's requirement for subjective, "discretionary" review of "good cause" and "good character" was designed in 1923 as an equal protection violation, on the basis of race, wealth and social standing. It was based on earlier Southern statutes that can be proven to be racist in origin.
One example is Florida's old discretionary system, reformed in 1986 to "shall issue" with the discretionary elements severely reduced. In 1941, a case in which a Caucasian was charged with illegal carry sans permit made it to the FL Supreme Court, where Justice Buford wrote in the majority opinion releasing the defendant:
"I know something of the history of this legislation. The original Act of 1893 was passed when there was a great influx of negro laborers in this State drawn here for the purpose of working in turpentine and lumber camps. The same condition existed when the Act was amended in 1901 and the Act was passed for the purpose of disarming the negro laborers and to thereby reduce the unlawful homicides that were prevalent in turpentine and saw-mill camps and to give the white citizens in sparsely settled areas a better feeling of security. The statute was never intended to be applied to the white population and in practice has never been so applied." - Watson v. Stone, 4 So.2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941)
In 1927, Michigan copied this same basic system. Not as a public safety measure: it was a direct response to a landmark acquittal of members of an African-American family who shot at a charging lynch mob, and the statute was lobbied for by the Klu Klux Klan. See also:
http://www.detroitnews.com/EDITPAGE/9903/04/sweet/sweet.htm
You should also find historian Clayton Cramer's landmark thesis paper interesting: "The Racist Roots Of Gun Control" was first published in the Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy, 4:2 [Winter, 1995]:
http://www.ggnra.org/cramer//racism.htm
Now, if indeed the California version of the statute has such directly racist origins, the Fed Supreme Court had some pertinent commentary on applying "strict scrutiny" to a different "Jim Crow relic" state law in Hunter vs. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
It is my contention that PC12050's "good cause" requirement in particular is impossible to apply in a manner fully consistent with constitutional equal protection principles, especially if the "good cause" is being used in a highly restrictive manner. And equal protection is most definitely a factor in CCW issuance: see also Guillory vs. Gates 731 F.2d 1379 (9th Circuit supporting equal protection in CCW) and CBS vs. Block 230 Cal.Rptr. 362 (check the reasons the CA Supremes ordered CCW records made public). You might also review Salute vs. Pitchess 61 Cal. App. 3d 557 - it established a standard of "individual investigation and determination into the merits of every applicant's case" that the defendants have collectively refused to honor.
The fact that PC12050 was designed as an inducement to bigotry doesn't indemnify the defendants in my case - they eagerly used PC12050 as a tool of civil rights abuse and personal political and financial gain. They acted in ways deliberately designed to create a "racial and social bias" in permit issuance by conspiring to blanket-block lower-income and high-minority-demographics areas by incorporated city. They knew their policies would result in a "racial bias", they took specific measures to cover up the abuses with illegal policies, and much more.
I anticipate a "flurry of motions" breaking out approximately 30 to 60 days into the process. I am reasonably confident that after approximately 60 to 90 days tops, I'll have revealed my "full hand", all of my current documentation and other evidence on the problems. As that occurs, I will forward all related motions, points and authorities and exhibits to your department.
Alternatively, if your Civil Rights Enforcement Section wants to investigate the charges I've made in the pleading, please send me notice to that effect along with a written guarantee that any such evidence and notes will NOT be passed along to the named defendants in this case, or their agents, counsel or associates, and will be kept in strict confidence used purely to further the investigation until these facts and bits of evidence come to light during the course of the action. Upon receiving such a guarantee of confidentiality, I'll show you what I've got. Failing that, when everything is already exposed to the opposition, I'll file a formal complaint with your civil rights section against the defendants, complete with evidence and full details.
In short, the defendant's collective actions are so obviously repugnant that your only chance to "save" PC12050 in it's current form will be to attack their handling of PC12050 and argue that it's possible to administer the law fairly. I await any such arguments on your part with anticipation and an open mind.
On the other hand, if your goal becomes one of trying to help completely exonerate the defendants…well, good luck. The sheer number of different screwups argues strongly for deliberate ill will.
Thank you for your kind attention in this matter,
_______________________________ ___/___/___
James March,
Pittsburg, CA
There's tactics going on, so there's a limit to what I can say on a public forum. To put it simply, I failed to score funding for a lawyer from any RKBA organizations, so I have no choice but to go pro-per again. Not a great situation, but I've got far better case law, evidence, legal advice and experience over the last time I tried this.
I'm not asking for individual donations at this time. I can handle the early phases myself; how well the upcoming "motion war" goes will determine if I can get more support, a lawyer, and a pile of co-plaintiffs.
--------------------------------------------
James March, attorney Pro Per
Xx xxxxxx xxxx
Pittsburg, CA xxxxx
Email: jmarch@ricochet.net
Fax: 707-221-7152
Website containing documents related to this case: http://www.ninehundred.com/~equalccw
In the Federal District Court of Oakland, California
James March, Plaintiff )
vs )
Sheriff Warren E. Rupf, )
Captain Wayne Willett, )
Contra Costa County Government, ) CIVIL RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS
Pittsburg PD Chief Aaron Baker, ) VIOLATION COMPLAINT
City of Pittsburg, )
Richmond PD Chief Joseph Samuels, )
Former Richmond PD Chief Duncan, )
City of Richmond, )
Does 1 though 50 )
----------------------------------)
Introduction:
Plaintiff James March comes before the court alleging gross, deliberate equal protection violations by all defendants in the issuance of Carry Concealed Weapons (CCW) permits pursuant to California Penal Code 12050-12054, in violation of 42 USC 1983 and California Constitution Article 1 section 7B. The defendants conspired among themselves to perpetuate such civil rights violations against the Plaintiff and against county residents generally.
In addition, Sheriff Rupf violated specific sections of Penal Code 12050-12054 and March's due process rights, in most cases to aid or illegally mask the equal protection violations.
Jurisdiction:
The "core complaint" arises from 42 USC 1983 Federal discrimination law, making Federal District Court the proper venue in this matter.
Description of Parties:
Plaintiff James March is a US citizen, continuously a resident of Contra Costa County since 1997. From October of '97 through 8/1/00 March was a resident of Richmond, California; subsequently he was a resident of Pittsburg, CA, both towns in Contra Costa County.
Defendant Sheriff Warren E. Rupf is an elected constitutional officer holding the title of Sheriff of Contra Costa County since 1992. He is being sued personally and in his official capacity as Sheriff.
Defendant Captain Wayne Willett is a member of the Contra Costa Sheriff's office, assigned the task of "pre-screening" and interviewing CCW applicants by Sheriff Rupf. In this role, Willett made recommendations to Rupf as to the suitability of specific applicants over others. He is being sued personally and in his official capacity.
Defendant Contra Costa County Government is a county government that directly employs Willett and is responsible for his illegal and unconstitutional acts.
Defendant Pittsburg PD Chief Aaron Baker is the municipal Police Chief for Pittsburg.
Defendant City of Pittsburg is the municipal city government within Contra Costa County which employs Baker.
Defendant Richmond PD Chief Joseph Samuels is the municipal Police Chief for Richmond.
Defendant Duncan was the Chief of Police in Richmond prior to Samuels, and was in charge during part of the period in which defendants Rupf and Willett discriminated against plaintiff; Duncan was a direct influence on this discrimination (as was Samuels later).
Defendant City of Richmond is the municipal city government within Contra Costa County which employs Samuels and employed Duncan.
Details of allegations:
1) Defendants Rupf and Willett denied Plaintiff a CCW permit despite his willingness to follow all provisions of Calif Penal Codes 12050-12054, his lack of any disqualifying criminal record and despite his "good cause for issuance" under PC12050 being as good or better than many of Rupf's current permitholders. This is a violation of 42 USC 1983 and Calif. Const. Article 1 section 7B. The formal denial was written by Willett during 1stQ 2000 and confirmed by Rupf when I appealed Willett’s decision in a letter to Rupf (a process used by other applicants who ultimately received permits).
2) All defendants collectively conspired to deny equal protection on a "general basis" by "redlining" towns from access to CCW permits. Defendants Baker, Duncan, Samuels and their departments and municipalities asked Sheriff Rupf to discriminate against residents of their towns who apply for CCW with Rupf; Rupf in response instituted policies of discrimination against town residents. At the times of March's denials by Rupf, March was a Richmond resident and was discriminated against by Richmond's part in the conspiracy to violate 42 USC 1983. After 8/1/00, March's access to a Sheriff-issued permit was impeded by Pittsburg PD's inclusion in the illegal and unconstitutional cross-jurisdictional conspiracy to "redline" the lower and middle income (and high minority population) areas of the county. At all times, Rupf and Willett were voluntary partners in the discrimination and knew of the actions of the towns.
In accord with Federal requirements for more details in conspiracy cases:
2A) All defendants connected with the cities collectively asked Sheriff Rupf to discriminate against their own town's residents.
2B) At the same time, the towns committed violations of Penal Code 12050 that led to an absolute practical ban on private citizen CCW.
2C) Rupf knew the towns were doing this, yet he voluntarily "supported" those illegal actions by discriminating against the town residents, in violation of PC12050.
2D) All of the defendants knew that this conspiracy was a violation of due process under Penal Code 12050. In fact, the defendants supported a "right to apply for a permit" once forced to realize denials of the application forms were illegal by plaintiff's first lawsuit in state court, but they used "blanket blocking by town border" to make the application process an exercise in Kafka-esque futility and wasted money, time and dignity.
2E) Finally, all the defendants knew that the discrimination along town border lines created a severe racial imbalance in county-wide permit issuance. Rupf was put in the position of discriminating against high-minority population areas, and the town-related parties worked with him closely to create this gross injustice.
3) Defendant Willett discriminated against Plaintiff willfully and personally; he was aware that Sheriff Rupf had issued permits to specific citizens with no "good cause for issuance" whatsoever yet he insisted on holding March to a standard of either "extraordinary good cause" or "prima facie good cause". He could hardly be unaware of the discrimination; he processed the paperwork for applicants who had "gone over his head" to Rupf and received approval by Rupf despite Willett's own finding of "no good cause". For his role in voluntarily supporting Rupf's discrimination, Willett is being sued personally pursuant to 42 USC 1983, and in his professional capacity as a law enforcement officer sworn to uphold and defend the Fed and state constitutions.
4) Defendant Rupf crafted two different policies to "mask" the equal protection violations:
4A) Circa 1997, Rupf's formal policies state that he would not allow people to apply for a permit via formal paper application unless they were "pre-screened" verbally. This had the effect of eliminating comparisons between denied applicants and approved applicants. This policy was in effect through at least 3/9/99, when it was used against Plaintiff March during his first attempt to apply for a permit. This policy was ended on 3/24/99, apparently in response to March's first suit mentioning application form denial as a cause of action in state court; that complaint was filed 3/15/99.
4B) On 3/24/99, Rupf's new policy manual stated that records of denied applicants were to be destroyed after 90 days. This policy is in effect at present, it is explicitly illegal per Penal Code 12053's record-keeping requirements and serves the purpose of eliminating comparisons between denied applicants and approved via discovery motion or use of California's Public Records Act. The net effect is similar to charge 4A above.
5) Rupf's pattern of discrimination in CCW favors those of wealth, high social status and personal political connections. As a result, permitholders in the county are far more likely to be campaign contributors to Rupf's personal political career. Over 16% of his permitholders are donors to his campaign funds, donating over $21,000. This 16% represents those donors with "good cause" statements varying between mediocre and non-existent in most cases. Rupf's manipulation of a state-mandated public safety program for political financial gain is a gross equal protection violation at the very least.
6) Rupf's current policy manual forces people to get a medical examination at their own expense, in violation of PC12054(d).
7) Rupf instituted a fee structure in his latest 3/24/99 policy manual that is in excess of limits specified under AB2022 effective 1/1/99. This issue is unfortunately complicated by the state's failure to include part of AB2022 into the Penal Codes, particularly a piece titled "Sec. 7" at the very end. Plaintiff has brought this bit and it's implications to the attention of defendant Rupf's counsel circa December of '99.
8) Defendant Rupf has instituted policies limiting permitholders to two higher-end weapons of medium or large caliber only. By stressing big-dollar guns, he imposes yet another financial barrier to permit issuance in violation of Penal Code 12054(d). There is no "rational basis" for the limits in general, and they are illegal due to Rupf's lack of legislative authority.
9) In general, the actions of all defendants were "racially reckless", leading to an obvious pattern of race-based discrimination in CCW issuance due to "racial redlining". Their actions should therefore be subject to "strict scrutiny"; however, by examining the known drawbacks of "elitist issuance" (elite permitholders acting like they're "above the law") and the known lack of problems in widespread issuance from the "shall-issue" CCW states, it's clear the defendants collective policies cannot withstand even a "rational basis" test.
10) The defendants are abusing a state statute that was written in 1923, as a deliberate violation of equal protection. The law itself was based on earlier southern statutes with known links to lobbying by the KKK and other directly racist individuals and groups. In their earliest structure prior to the Civil War, the need for a discretionary-issuance CCW permit was limited specifically to free blacks (Virginia, 1840) and after the passage of the 14th Amendment were given the appearance of broad applicability to escape Federal court scrutiny.
11) As a final insult, defendant Chief Baker of Pittsburg PD has discussed the CCW issue with the plaintiff in a personal meeting over a month ago. At that time, Baker explained that no permit application forms are available from Pittsburg, that there are no current Pittsburg PD permitholders, and that his department had not created a local CCW policy manual in accord with Penal Code 12050.2. His blanket-ban on issuance violates PC12050, and his part in the conspiracy with Rupf incurs on him a "tremendous liability", as Richmond assistant city attorney Wayne Nishioka phrased it when denying the existence of such conspiracies on 3/26/99 in a meeting with plaintiff March.
THEREFORE:
Plaintiff prays the court recognize the illegality and unconstitutionality of the defendants collective and individual policies, and order all such wrongful practices halted.
Plaintiff prays the court recognize the gross "ill will" suggested by the nature of the offenses, the sheer quantity of problems and the illegal attempts to cover them up, and assign punitive damages for each civil rights violation.
Plaintiff prays the court recognize the obvious abuse of the "good cause" requirement in PC12050 by the defendants, and recognize that the defendants are actually using it as intended back in 1923 as a deliberate equal protection violation, and strip the defendants of all authority to judge "good cause" when reviewing a CCW application.
Plaintiff hereby attests to the accuracy of these claims and is willing and able to support each and every allegation.
Dated: __/__/__
_____________________________________
James March, Attorney Pro Per
---------------------------------------------
End of pleading.
The letter below to the AG's office is required by Fed court rules when alleging a state law is a Federal Constitutional violation.
The AG's office got the pleading above, and the letter below.
---------------------------------------------
State of California
Office of the Attorney General
Department of Justice
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
NOTIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO STATE LAW
AS REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LOCAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEEDURE.
Members of the AG's staff,
Please find enclosed a pleading filed in Federal District Court, Oakland, Northern California district. It is primarily aimed at county and city law enforcement officers and officials regarding their administration of Penal Codes 12050-12054 - California's "Carry Concealed Weapons" (CCW) permit system..
One issue is that PC12050's requirement for subjective, "discretionary" review of "good cause" and "good character" was designed in 1923 as an equal protection violation, on the basis of race, wealth and social standing. It was based on earlier Southern statutes that can be proven to be racist in origin.
One example is Florida's old discretionary system, reformed in 1986 to "shall issue" with the discretionary elements severely reduced. In 1941, a case in which a Caucasian was charged with illegal carry sans permit made it to the FL Supreme Court, where Justice Buford wrote in the majority opinion releasing the defendant:
"I know something of the history of this legislation. The original Act of 1893 was passed when there was a great influx of negro laborers in this State drawn here for the purpose of working in turpentine and lumber camps. The same condition existed when the Act was amended in 1901 and the Act was passed for the purpose of disarming the negro laborers and to thereby reduce the unlawful homicides that were prevalent in turpentine and saw-mill camps and to give the white citizens in sparsely settled areas a better feeling of security. The statute was never intended to be applied to the white population and in practice has never been so applied." - Watson v. Stone, 4 So.2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941)
In 1927, Michigan copied this same basic system. Not as a public safety measure: it was a direct response to a landmark acquittal of members of an African-American family who shot at a charging lynch mob, and the statute was lobbied for by the Klu Klux Klan. See also:
http://www.detroitnews.com/EDITPAGE/9903/04/sweet/sweet.htm
You should also find historian Clayton Cramer's landmark thesis paper interesting: "The Racist Roots Of Gun Control" was first published in the Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy, 4:2 [Winter, 1995]:
http://www.ggnra.org/cramer//racism.htm
Now, if indeed the California version of the statute has such directly racist origins, the Fed Supreme Court had some pertinent commentary on applying "strict scrutiny" to a different "Jim Crow relic" state law in Hunter vs. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
It is my contention that PC12050's "good cause" requirement in particular is impossible to apply in a manner fully consistent with constitutional equal protection principles, especially if the "good cause" is being used in a highly restrictive manner. And equal protection is most definitely a factor in CCW issuance: see also Guillory vs. Gates 731 F.2d 1379 (9th Circuit supporting equal protection in CCW) and CBS vs. Block 230 Cal.Rptr. 362 (check the reasons the CA Supremes ordered CCW records made public). You might also review Salute vs. Pitchess 61 Cal. App. 3d 557 - it established a standard of "individual investigation and determination into the merits of every applicant's case" that the defendants have collectively refused to honor.
The fact that PC12050 was designed as an inducement to bigotry doesn't indemnify the defendants in my case - they eagerly used PC12050 as a tool of civil rights abuse and personal political and financial gain. They acted in ways deliberately designed to create a "racial and social bias" in permit issuance by conspiring to blanket-block lower-income and high-minority-demographics areas by incorporated city. They knew their policies would result in a "racial bias", they took specific measures to cover up the abuses with illegal policies, and much more.
I anticipate a "flurry of motions" breaking out approximately 30 to 60 days into the process. I am reasonably confident that after approximately 60 to 90 days tops, I'll have revealed my "full hand", all of my current documentation and other evidence on the problems. As that occurs, I will forward all related motions, points and authorities and exhibits to your department.
Alternatively, if your Civil Rights Enforcement Section wants to investigate the charges I've made in the pleading, please send me notice to that effect along with a written guarantee that any such evidence and notes will NOT be passed along to the named defendants in this case, or their agents, counsel or associates, and will be kept in strict confidence used purely to further the investigation until these facts and bits of evidence come to light during the course of the action. Upon receiving such a guarantee of confidentiality, I'll show you what I've got. Failing that, when everything is already exposed to the opposition, I'll file a formal complaint with your civil rights section against the defendants, complete with evidence and full details.
In short, the defendant's collective actions are so obviously repugnant that your only chance to "save" PC12050 in it's current form will be to attack their handling of PC12050 and argue that it's possible to administer the law fairly. I await any such arguments on your part with anticipation and an open mind.
On the other hand, if your goal becomes one of trying to help completely exonerate the defendants…well, good luck. The sheer number of different screwups argues strongly for deliberate ill will.
Thank you for your kind attention in this matter,
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James March,
Pittsburg, CA