A large part of the issue
is whether Wilson lied; it leads to various areas and in various directions. As for his analysis, he originally claimed as part of his analysis that he knew the documents delivered to the U.S. embassy in Rome were forgeries. That is impossible for him to have known.
Also, his analysis cast no new doubt on the matter nor helped settle anything. He only said that the Iraq-Niger link was "unlikely." According to the Senate report, "DIA and CIA analysts said that when they saw the intelligence report they did not believe that it supplied much new information and did not think that it clarified the story on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal." (p. 46)
In fact, other parts of his analysis worked in favor of an Iraq-Niger link. According to the Senate report, the CPD (Counterproliferation Divison) reports officer said that Wilson's report "did not provide substantial new information." He said that "the most important fact in the report was that the Nigerian Prime Minister believed the Iraqis were interested in purchasing uranium, because this provided some confirmation of foreign government service reporting." (p. 46)
Ultimately, "Because CIA analysts did not believe that the report added any new information to clarify the issue, they did not use the report to produce any further analytical products or highlight the report for policymakers. For the same reason, CIA's briefer did not brief the Vice President on the report, despite the Vice President's previous questions about the issue." (p. 46)
However, Wilson claimed in the New Republic article that Cheney's office had seen the report of his findings: "He returned after a visit to Niger in February 2002 and reported to the State Department and the CIA that the documents were forgeries. The CIA circulated the ambassador's report to the vice president's office, the ambassador confirms to TNR. But, after a British dossier was released in September detailing the purported uranium purchase, administration officials began citing it anyway, culminating in its inclusion in the State of the Union. 'They knew the Niger story was a flat-out lie,' the former ambassador tells TNR."
The British dossier was released a month before the U.S. embassy in Rome received the forgeries, which are different documents. So how did Wilson warn anyone that the "Niger story was a flat-out lie"? Also, the Senate report shows that Cheney's office did not see Wilson's report.
So when Wilson makes claims about retribution, I have to wonder about the validity of those claims given the poor record of his other claims. It will be most unlikely that any court will proceed with Plame's case without questioning Wilson, and therein will come the problems with his lies.
You might want to read the Report on the
U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/
Pages 36-72 are of the most interest regarding Plame and Wilson.
Be warned: The file is 24Mb