Two laws being proposed in WA

rickyrick

New member
http://www.king5.com/mb/news/politics/two-proposals-to-tighten-washington-state-gun-laws/395807388
I do agree to securing your guns, but not on an annual semi auto permit, or any permit really.

OLYMPIA, Wash. -- Anti-gun advocates met in Olympia on Thursday to rally behind two proposals that would tighten Washington state gun laws.
House Bill 1387 would require an annual license from a local law enforcement agency to own, buy or sell a semi-automatic rifle. The bill also enhances the background check process for this kind of firearm.
HB 1122 would require safe storage of weapons around children. It would make it a guaranteed misdemeanor or felony -- depending on how the gun is used -- if the unsecured firearm is illegally used by someone else.
 
My state requires safe storage if there are children under the age of 16 in the house. I don't totally disagree with that, but I don't like it. Fortunately, my daughter is well over 16 and doesn't live with me so it's not an issue for me.

But ... felony or misdemeanor depending on what kind of crime the gun is used in? No, NO NO! That's making someone who may not have had possession of a stolen firearm (which may have passed through multiple hands before being recovered at a crime scene) for years responsible for how some third party uses the gun. That's unacceptable.
 
I don't fully disagree with a safe storage law, but this one is poorly written and vague. North Carolina's safe storage law is much more precise, is a misdemeanor, and provides a number of exceptions. For example, if the gun is stolen during an unlawful entry you can not be prosecuted. Also the law is specifically related to minors, not "prohibited persons." By Washington's logic, if a convicted felon happens to be your cable guy and happens to see the rifle under your bed while running a wire, you can literally be a class C felon if he sells it to a gang member who kills someone with it after it's stolen. Heck, Washington's law doesn't even provide an exception for it being stolen during a burglary.

At any rate, how are they going to prove you didn't have a lock on it unless you admit it. All they are really doing is giving people incentive to be dishonest, which really isn't in the government's best interest.

And the annual permit required to own a semi-automatic rifle? Seriously?
 
5whiskey said:
And the annual permit required to own a semi-automatic rifle? Seriously?

How can stuff like this be effective unless there is some kind of registration? Registration is probably the next step along with other unsavory restrictions and costs for annual permits to your Second Amendment rights.
 
I wonder what the fee is for this annual permit. Having to traipse down to the local police chief yearly to get permission to own a semi-automatic rifle? That's right boys, my Marlin model 60 is so dangerous it needs an annual registration :mad:

I hope the national NRA is going full throttle on this. If nothing else I may earmark a donation to WA state NRA if they plan to contest this.
 
5whiskey said:
By Washington's logic, if a convicted felon happens to be your cable guy and happens to see the rifle under your bed while running a wire, you can literally be a class C felon if he sells it to a gang member who kills someone with it after it's stolen. Heck, Washington's law doesn't even provide an exception for it being stolen during a burglary.
I'm not so sure this is true.

The first section of the bill reads:
A person who stores or leaves a firearm in a location where the person knows, or reasonably should know, that a prohibited person likely to gain access...
In order for the actor to know or have reasonable cause to know that a prohibited person is likely to gain access, the actor must realize that (a) the person is a prohibited person, and (b) that the person is likely to gain access.

If the person is a stranger, the actor would have no obvious reason to suspect that he or she is prohibited from lawfully possessing a firearm. If the firearm is located on private property to which the prohibited person does not have legal unrestricted access, the actor would not reasonably conclude that it is likely for that person to gain access.

IOW the crime is contingent upon an element of recklessness in the actor's conduct.

That said, IMHO there IS some room for creative or even maliciously incorrect interpretation of the law, and I would feel better if additional exceptions were added to Subsection (3) to clarify that it does not apply when the access was clearly unlawful.

Actually, IMHO the main problem with this law is NOT the situation you describe; it's that the actor can take reasonable action via legal channels to recover the firearm, and yet he or she can still be prosecuted if it's used in a crime after the actor does so. :mad: Taken together with the basic 5A protection against self-incrimination, the law would provide a perverse incentive for the actor to keep his or her mouth shut and hope for the best. :eek:

If the actor took reasonable actions through proper legal channels to recover the firearm prior to the incident of community endangerment, the punishment should be downgraded to a minor misdemeanor at most.

I'm not opposed to safe storage laws on general principle, but the devil is in the details, and this law is sloppy.
 
I have been assured that neither of these bills have a chance of passing. All three of my representatives are totally against these laws and what they represent. I will continue to watch and write, call and email all the congress critters to remind them that holding an owner responsible for the actions of another is WRONG and that storing guns in any way that limits my access to defend myself is an unlawful act and completely unenforceable. If a locked home is not enough to stop someone then either is a safe or lock box.

If the semi auto bill becomes law then I have three firearms that will be affected and if they expect me to get another permit for then they might as well pound sand. The supreme court has said that arms used by the current military are protected by the right to keep and bear arms so my sporting rifles and semi-auto pistols are beyond their reach.

Neither of these bills hold the criminal liable for their own actions which is where the liability should be placed.
 
An ironic sort of inverse "parallel" to all these registration schemes is that those of us who fall within the age group (I'm too old) ARE the militia. The current version of the Militia Act establishes the age for male members of the unorganized militia as 17 through 44 years of age:

10 U.S. Code § 311 said:
10 U.S. Code § 311 - Militia: composition and classes

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.
(b) The classes of the militia are—
(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.

So maybe you're a member of the militia. Now ... what did the original Milita Act say?

Militia Act of 1792 said:
The Militia Act of 1792, Passed May 8, 1792, providing federal standards for the organization of the Militia.

An ACT more effectually to provide for the National Defence, by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States.

I. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is or shall be of age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia, by the Captain or Commanding Officer of the company, within whose bounds such citizen shall reside, and that within twelve months after the passing of this Act. And it shall at all time hereafter be the duty of every such Captain or Commanding Officer of a company, to enroll every such citizen as aforesaid, and also those who shall, from time to time, arrive at the age of 18 years, or being at the age of 18 years, and under the age of 45 years (except as before excepted) shall come to reside within his bounds; and shall without delay notify such citizen of the said enrollment, by the proper non-commissioned Officer of the company, by whom such notice may be proved. That every citizen, so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch, with a box therein, to contain not less than twenty four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball; or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch, and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise or into service, except, that when called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack. That the commissioned Officers shall severally be armed with a sword or hanger, and espontoon; and that from and after five years from the passing of this Act, all muskets from arming the militia as is herein required, shall be of bores sufficient for balls of the eighteenth part of a pound; and every citizen so enrolled, and providing himself with the arms, ammunition and accoutrements, required as aforesaid, shall hold the same exempted from all suits, distresses, executions or sales, for debt or for the payment of taxes.

Basically, members of the militia were required to be armed, and they were required to be "enrolled" in the local militia company. However, they had up to six months after enrollment to procure their firearm. Thus, in the technical sense, while as a general rule of logic it could be assumed that each militiaman had a firearm, the reality was that there was no requirement to register the firearms -- only a requirement to register their persons.

I wonder if there might be any validity to an argument by those who fall within the current definition of the unorganized militia that their automatic enrollment in the militia creates a duty for them to be armed with weaponry as similar as is legally possible to that used by the Army and the "Organized Militia" (the National Guard), i.e. AR-15 type rifles. And that the Militia Act does not require militiamen to register their firearms.
 
I have been assured that neither of these bills have a chance of passing

That may be true, but it is likely that when the legislature does not pass them, these bills will be proposed as initiative petitions. The last time that happened, we got I-594, which the voters of Washington state passed.
 
If the actor took reasonable actions through proper legal channels to recover the firearm prior to the incident of community endangerment, the punishment should be downgraded to a minor misdemeanor at most.

Got to disagree in principle with this..

Nichts, Nein, and HELL NO!!!!!!!

There should be NO PUNISHMENT!!! period.

ANY and Every legislator who suggests or actually believes that innocent people should be punished for the criminal acts of others ought to be "water boarded" and by water boarded, I mean put on a board, and shoved out into the Pacific, while we wave bye-bye....

We are NOT GUILTY of ANYTHING if we don't store our private property in a fashion that does not meet with their approval, and we are no more "guilty" if we have minor children in residence or if we don't.

OK, I just realized that under a different law, if your gun is STOLEN, we might be guilty of allowing a transfer without a background check!!!

What is the "punishment" if your car is stolen??? If your car is stolen and the thief runs over someone and kills them? Is it different if they do it before you report your car stolen? After???

Here's one for our legal eagles, is our "protected" right to militia arms applicable ONLY to those in the militia??? Do we LOSE that right when we pass the upper age limit of militia service???

I would think that such a constitutionally protected right does not expire when you reach 45(46) but then, I'm not trained in interpreting the law the same way some people are....

Another proposed gun law was mentioned on the 10 o'clock news last night, (bill 5050, they said) that would increase background check requirements on "assault weapons" and limit magazine size to 10 rounds. The news did report that all 6 sponsors of the bill were Democrats, and all from the Sea-Tac metro area.

I have been assured that neither of these bills have a chance of passing. All three of my representatives are totally against these laws and what they represent.

While this is a good thing, it does NOT stop the danger that these bills represent. After defeating, soundly, the back ground check law in the legislature TWICE, (if not more times) they took it to a ballot initiative. Anti gun billionaire's money bought TV time and other misleading/lying propaganda, and the people of the 5 counties in the I-5 corridor passed it (no other county in the state passed it), and those 5 counties had the numbers to make it state law.

I do wonder, if these things become law (no matter how they get there), that when we go, cap (and wallet) in hand, to humbly beg our betters for the privilege of paying for permission to continue to own what we have had all our lives (and for all of generations past), will we also be required to give the straight arm salute???
:rolleyes:
:mad:
 
How can stuff like this be effective unless there is some kind of registration? Registration is probably the next step along with other unsavory restrictions and costs for annual permits to your Second Amendment rights.
Slippery slope fallacy.

Firearm licenses, permits, registration, and their associated fees are perfectly consistent with current Second Amendment jurisprudence.

And that a given firearm regulatory measure might be perceived as ‘unsavory’ doesn’t make them un-Constitutional.
 
44 AMP said:
...We are NOT GUILTY of ANYTHING if we don't store our private property in a fashion that does not meet with their approval, and we are no more "guilty" if we have minor children in residence or if we don't....

It's important when these "safe storage" issues come up to distinguish between possible criminal liability and civil liability. This bill would make a failure to safely store a firearm a crime under some circumstances, and as has been outline there are a number of objections to that.

But we as gun owners should understand that even in the absence of a safe storage law like this, we could well face civil liability if we improperly store a gun, it gets taken and used to hurt someone. Even without any statute on the books we have a legal duty to store our guns in a non-negligent manner.

A negligent act which results in the injury or death of another can subject the actor to civil liability to compensate the person who was injured. Negligence in law is basically:
A failure to behave with the level of care that someone of ordinary prudence would have exercised under the same circumstances. The behavior usually consists of actions, but can also consist of omissions when there is some duty to act (e.g., a duty to help victims of one's previous conduct).
Negligence is generally a question for a jury. If one is sued for damages base on an injury allegedly arising from his negligence the jury will need to decide, after all the evidence about what took place and what everyone said or did is presented whether the defendant acted as a reasonable and prudent person would in the same situation.

So if you leave your loaded gun out on the coffee table while you're away for the weekend, someone breaks in, steals it and murders someone, you very well could have problems. If the gun was locked in a safe, you'll most likely be off the hook. If the gun was tucked away in your sock draw? There's no way to know for sure.

In this case in Montana about gun storage, the language of the appellate court decision gives us some clues as to how a court might look at the question of the standard of care where guns are concerned, Estate of Strever v. Cline, 278 Mont. 165 (Mont., 1995), at 174 -- 175 (emphasis added):
...A firearm, particularly one that is loaded or has ammunition in close proximity, is considered a dangerous instrumentality and therefore requires a higher degree of care in its use or handling. This concept is set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:

Care required. The care required is always reasonable care. This standard never varies, but the care which it is reasonable to require of the actor varies with the danger involved in his act, and is proportionate to it. The greater the danger, the greater the care which must be exercised.

As in all cases where the reasonable character of the actor's conduct is in question, its utility is to be weighed against the magnitude of the risk which it involves. [Citation omitted.] The amount of attention and caution required varies with the magnitude of the harm likely to be done if care is not exercised, and with the utility of the act. Therefore, if the act has little or no social value and is likely to cause any serious harm, it is reasonable to require close attention and caution. So too, if the act involves a risk of death or serious bodily harm, and particularly if it is capable of causing such results to a number of persons, the highest attention and caution are required even if the act has a very considerable utility. Thus those who deal with firearms ... are required to exercise the closest attention and the most careful precautions, not only in preparing for their use but in using them....

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 298 cmt. b (1965).

Accordingly, given the foreseeability of the risk involved in the improper and unsafe use and storage of a firearm; given the strong policy considerations favoring safe and prudent use and storage; and on the basis of the law as set forth in §§ 1-1-204, 27-1-701 and 28-1-201, MCA, our decisions in Limberhand, Maguire, Phillips, Mang and Busta and the above referred to standards of care set forth in Prosser and Keeton on Torts and in comment b to § 298 of the Restatement, we hold that, as a matter of law, the owner of a firearm has a duty to the general public to use and to store the firearm in a safe and prudent manner taking into consideration the type of firearm, whether it is loaded or unloaded, whether the ammunition is in close proximity or easily attainable, and the location and circumstances of its use and storage.

Because we conclude that Susanj owed a legal duty to the general public to store his firearm and ammunition in a manner consistent with this standard of care,...
So in this storage case the court found a duty to store a gun and ammunition in a manner consistent with a very high standard of care.
 
And that a given firearm regulatory measure might be perceived as ‘unsavory’ doesn’t make them un-Constitutional.

Sadly, nothing makes it unconstitutional until/unless the Supreme Court finally rules on it. In the meantime, decades may pass...
 
"...The right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

I believe that statement on the protection of our right is free from government intervention on any constitutional level. There are a number of unconstitutional acts that pass for laws but in no way do they reflect any level of constitutionality.

If you choose to allow your rights to be limited then you stand alone.
 
I moved to Washington from Texas. Washington is the most gun loving place I've ever seen, I don't get how they let this nonsense happen.
 
ShootistPRS said:
"...The right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

I believe that statement on the protection of our right is free from government intervention on any constitutional level. There are a number of unconstitutional acts that pass for laws but in no way do they reflect any level of constitutionality......
No doubt you believe that. But what you believe and what is true in real life in the real world aren't necessarily the same thing. And what you believe doesn't change what is true in real life in the real world.

So let's look at what's true in real life.

What our Constitution states and how it applies has been a matter for dispute almost as soon as the ink was dry. Hylton v. United States in 1796 appears to be the first major litigation involving a question of the interpretation and application of the Constitution. Then came Marbury v. Madison decided in 1803; and McCulloch v. Maryland was decided 10 years later, in 1813.

The Founding Fathers assigned the role of deciding what the Constitution means and how it applies to the federal courts (Article III, Sections 1 and 2):
Section 1.

The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish....​

Section 2.

The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution,...​

The exercise of judicial power and the deciding of cases arising under the Constitution necessarily involves interpreting and applying the Constitution to the circumstances of the matter in controversy in order to decide the dispute. Many of the Founding Fathers were lawyers and well understood what the exercise of judicial power meant and entailed.

Thus if there is disagreement about whether a statute enacted by Congress applies to decide a controversy or the application of the statute is barred by the Constitution, the matter is one within the province of the federal courts to decide. As the Supreme Court ruled back in 1803 (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), 1 Cranch at 177 -- 178):
...It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.

So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.

If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply....

It's well settled law that under certain circumstance and to some extent a constitutionally protected right may be regulated. What those circumstance might be and the nature and extent of permissible regulation will be worked out by the courts. To do so, a court will consider, among other things, the nature of the right, the nature of the regulation, and the governmental purpose intended to be served.

For the purposes of illustration, let's consider the regulation of rights protected by the First Amendment. While the First Amendment protects freedom of speech, assembly and religion against laws that abridge those rights we know there has been a history of certain regulation of speech, assembly and religion. A few examples are:

  1. Various laws (both state and federal) prohibiting such things as false advertising, fraud or misrepresentation. There are also state and federal laws requiring certain disclosures in connection with various transactions, would are valid and routinely enforced even though such laws do impinge on the freedom of speech.

  2. If you are offering securities or certain other types of investments to the public, your written solicitation materials will have to first be approved prior to use by one or more regulatory agencies. If you are selling medicines in interstate commerce, your labeling will have to be approved in advance by the FDA, and you will have to have demonstrated, through hard, scientific data, that any claims or representations made are true. These are also laws that abridge freedom of speech, and yet they are regularly enforced.

  3. Laws respecting the time, place and manner of speech or assembly have also survived Constitutional challenges. Thus a municipality may require that organizers obtain a permit in order to hold an assembly or a parade and may prohibit such activities during, for example, the very early morning hours. Such regulations would be permitted only to the extent necessary to serve the compelling state interest of protecting public health and safety. Any such regulations, to be constitutionally permissible, could not consider the content of the speech or assembly; and they would need to be applied in an even handed manner based on set guidelines and not subject to the discretion of a public official. See, for example:

    • Hill v Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000), in which the Court, in upholding a Colorado law restricting protesting, educational or counseling activities within 100 feet of the entrance to a health facility, noted:
      ...We are likewise persuaded that the statute is "narrowly tailored" to serve those interests and that it leaves open ample alternative channels for communication. As we have emphasized on more than one occasion, when a content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring requirement...

      • Cf. McCullen v. Coakley (U. S. Supreme Court, No. 12–1168, 2014)

      • In McCullen the Court struck down a new Massachusetts "buffer zone" law. As noted in the opinion the Court had previously sustained a different sort of buffer zone law in Colorado, and nothing in McCullen casts any doubt on the continued validity of the Colorado law (McCullen, slip opinion at 2):
        ….The statute [the prior Massachusetts law] was modeled on a similar Colorado law that this Court had upheld in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U. S. 703 (2000). Relying on Hill, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sustained the Massachusetts statute against a First Amendment challenge. McGuire v. Reilly, 386 F. 3d 45 (2004) (McGuire II), cert. denied, 544 U. S. 974 (2005); McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F. 3d 36 (2001) (McGuire I).

        By 2007, some Massachusetts legislators and law enforcement officials had come to regard the 2000 statute as inadequate.....

    • Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir., 2006) in which the court upheld a Santa Monica ordinance requiring a permit for public assemblies. In fact in Santa Monica Food Not Bombs the court specifically acknowledges that the ordinance may burden the protected right, noting, at pg 1038:
      ...A narrowly-tailored permitting regulation need not be the least restrictive means of furthering a locality's asserted interests. The regulation may not, however, burden substantially more speech than necessary to achieve a scheme's important goals. See United States v. Baugh, 187 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir.1999). "[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied `so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.'" Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985))...

  4. In the leading case on prior restraint (Near v. State of Minnesota Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931)) the Court in striking down a Minnesota statute allowing for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of malicious, scandalous and defamatory news analyzed in considerable detail and depth the scope and extent of the infringement of the freedom of press, the interests served and the availability of other and narrower remedies. And the Court then reached the conclusion that the statute went too far to be a permissible regulation.

    But nonetheless the Court also noted that certain interests, under certain circumstances would justify even prior restraint (Near, 283 U. S. 657, at 715 - 716):
    ...The objection has also been made that the principle as to immunity from previous restraint is stated too broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. That is undoubtedly true; the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. 'When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its error that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.' Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249, 63 L. Ed. 470. No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.6 On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government. The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not 'protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 139, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874.' Schenck v. United States, supra. These limitations are not applicable here. Nor are we now concerned with questions as to the extent of authority to prevent publications in order to protect private rights according to the principles governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of equity...

  5. In the past, laws prohibiting polygamy have been upheld against challenges that they violate the right to free exercise of religion (Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890)).

So in fact the reality is that rights protected by the Constitution may nonetheless be subject to some limited regulation. The foregoing discussion of First Amendment jurisprudence serves the limited purpose of demonstrating that the courts do permit limited regulation of a constitutionally protected right. There are numerous examples of laws sustained by the courts which abridge freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. And First Amendment jurisprudence also offers some clues as to how such regulations will be evaluated by the courts.

We can not expect, nor will we see, perfect correspondence between the regulation of rights protected by the First Amendment and the regulation of rights protected by the Second Amendment. First Amendment jurisprudence is quite mature at this point, but Second Amendment jurisprudence, in the wake of Heller, is in its infancy. However, we can expect some regulation of Second Amendment rights to be upheld by the courts.
 
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