I really think the Leon Day article (whomever Leon Day was, I have my suspicions as to who used that pen name, and no it wasn't Jeff Cooper) REALLY does everyone and everything a disservice.
The author injects ENORMOUS biases into it, biases that are in fact his own.
He makes many assertions as if they are facts without considering that he's viewing T-L's efforts with 100 years of historic hindsight.
He's also attributing to T & L actions that simply cannot be attributed to them because there's absolutely no evidence to support it outside of the T&L tests, and one simply can't arrive at credible postulations about individuals' beliefs based solely on what was a very small snapshot of their career and experiences and what I believe to be a very imperfect interpretation of those experiences.
Throughout his article Day essentially faults T&L for not conducting a ballistic testing experiment as it would have been conducted in 1983.
Problem is, that's like faulting Henry Ford for not designing the Ford Mustang in 1902.
The only thing that might be even remotely true in Day's claims is that T&L sort of knew what outcome they wanted.
But, as I've said before, they had the results of the .38 Long Colt's use during the Philippines Expedition/Insurrection to form a baseline for what didn't work in handgun stopping power.
Were they unduly influenced by the incidents in the Philippines? Very likely so.
But it's very interesting that their recommendations really matched closely with what was seen in the real world of shooting events right up to the dawn of modern, reliably expanding hollow point bullets, which really has only been with us since the middle 1990s.
It's also very interesting that the British essentially went backwards from the .455 Webley to the .380, which in a lot of ways mirrored the performance of the .38 Long Colt, and which accumulated a rather dubious performance record while in use during World War II.