MicroBalrog
New member
December 02, 2005
December 02, 2005
The Rise, Peak, Decline and Defeat of Iraq's Insurgency
The insurgency in Iraq has now dragged on for 30 months and the price is apparent in terms of financial cost and human lives. In addition, it's also caused a fair segment of the population to lose faith in the effort and question the ongoing commitment. I don't hesitate to say that a large segment of those who trumpet out body counts, invoke terms like "Vietnam" and "Quagmire", or call for exit strategies are doing so without understanding the strategy and successes achieved in Iraq. If you can't distinguish between places in Iraq like Husaybah, Mosul, Ramadi or Tal Afar, and can't give any kind of explanation of what is going on in those places and around Iraq in general beyond the car bomb and the IED, you are realistically in no position to make an educated decision about the correct course of action to pursue in Iraq. I can only imagine the perception that many Americans have of Iraq; some nation in the Middle East where jihadists multiply, the Iraqi security forces resemble the keystone cops, U.S. forces are helpless against roadside bombs, and the situation is so dire that only disengagement can solve the problem.
The following is by no means a comprehensive study on Iraq or intended to represent the full scale of the achievements and successes, but instead offers some basic perspective of what I see as an insurgency in transition from the third phase to the fourth phase, and ultimately defeat. The U.S. military will not be defeated, it is American public opinion that has been dragged onto the front lines of the battlefields, and therefore it is the American people that must remain resolved and steadfast, and be convinced that the situation in Iraq is winnable and real progress is being made.
I. The Rise (May 2003-March 2004 - 10 months)
The handling of the immediate post-major combat operations in Iraq has been heavily criticized. Specific points of contention include the choice to disband the Iraqi army, the number of U.S. troops used, equipment issued to those troops, and failure to identify the insurgency earlier and take measures to prevent or minimalize it. What Iraqi security forces there were performed poorly in combat, and they suffered from enemy infiltration and desertion. On a positive note, U.S. forces killed Uday and Qu'say Hussein in Mosul, and captured Saddam Hussein outside of Tikrit. The Iraqi interim governing council was also established, with the coalition provincial authority handling Iraq's government affairs.
U.S. Combat Deaths: 302
U.S. Combat Deaths per month: 30.2
U.S. Troops Wounded in Action: 2,200
U.S. Troops Wounded per month: 220.0
Insurgents estimated killed/detained: 15,750
Insurgents estimated killed/detained per month: 1,575
Iraqi Security Forces average: 55,000
II. The Peak (April 2004-November 2004 - 8 months)
The summer of 2004 was the darkest moment in fighting the insurgency, topped off by the death of 137 U.S. troops in November alone. The Abu Ghraib scandal broke, the American public came to the realization that there would be no quick victory and for the first time politicians in Washington began advocating exit strategies. The future of Iraq truly hung in the balance and success appeared unlikely at best. Coalition forces found themselves fighting not only Sunni insurgents and foreign jihadists, but Shi'ite militiamen loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr. One of the few sustaining sources was the transfer of power from U.S. authorities to an interim Iraqi government, and the knowledge that national elections in January were rapidly approaching, although a cloud of skepticism hung over those as well.
U.S. Combat Deaths: 530
U.S. Combat Deaths per month: 66.25
U.S. Troops Wounded in Action: 7,055
U.S. Troops Wounded per month: 881.88
Insurgents estimated killed/detained: 16,220
Insurgents estimated killed/detained per month: 2027.5
Iraqi Security Forces average: 96,000
December 02, 2005
The Rise, Peak, Decline and Defeat of Iraq's Insurgency
The insurgency in Iraq has now dragged on for 30 months and the price is apparent in terms of financial cost and human lives. In addition, it's also caused a fair segment of the population to lose faith in the effort and question the ongoing commitment. I don't hesitate to say that a large segment of those who trumpet out body counts, invoke terms like "Vietnam" and "Quagmire", or call for exit strategies are doing so without understanding the strategy and successes achieved in Iraq. If you can't distinguish between places in Iraq like Husaybah, Mosul, Ramadi or Tal Afar, and can't give any kind of explanation of what is going on in those places and around Iraq in general beyond the car bomb and the IED, you are realistically in no position to make an educated decision about the correct course of action to pursue in Iraq. I can only imagine the perception that many Americans have of Iraq; some nation in the Middle East where jihadists multiply, the Iraqi security forces resemble the keystone cops, U.S. forces are helpless against roadside bombs, and the situation is so dire that only disengagement can solve the problem.
The following is by no means a comprehensive study on Iraq or intended to represent the full scale of the achievements and successes, but instead offers some basic perspective of what I see as an insurgency in transition from the third phase to the fourth phase, and ultimately defeat. The U.S. military will not be defeated, it is American public opinion that has been dragged onto the front lines of the battlefields, and therefore it is the American people that must remain resolved and steadfast, and be convinced that the situation in Iraq is winnable and real progress is being made.
I. The Rise (May 2003-March 2004 - 10 months)
The handling of the immediate post-major combat operations in Iraq has been heavily criticized. Specific points of contention include the choice to disband the Iraqi army, the number of U.S. troops used, equipment issued to those troops, and failure to identify the insurgency earlier and take measures to prevent or minimalize it. What Iraqi security forces there were performed poorly in combat, and they suffered from enemy infiltration and desertion. On a positive note, U.S. forces killed Uday and Qu'say Hussein in Mosul, and captured Saddam Hussein outside of Tikrit. The Iraqi interim governing council was also established, with the coalition provincial authority handling Iraq's government affairs.
U.S. Combat Deaths: 302
U.S. Combat Deaths per month: 30.2
U.S. Troops Wounded in Action: 2,200
U.S. Troops Wounded per month: 220.0
Insurgents estimated killed/detained: 15,750
Insurgents estimated killed/detained per month: 1,575
Iraqi Security Forces average: 55,000
II. The Peak (April 2004-November 2004 - 8 months)
The summer of 2004 was the darkest moment in fighting the insurgency, topped off by the death of 137 U.S. troops in November alone. The Abu Ghraib scandal broke, the American public came to the realization that there would be no quick victory and for the first time politicians in Washington began advocating exit strategies. The future of Iraq truly hung in the balance and success appeared unlikely at best. Coalition forces found themselves fighting not only Sunni insurgents and foreign jihadists, but Shi'ite militiamen loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr. One of the few sustaining sources was the transfer of power from U.S. authorities to an interim Iraqi government, and the knowledge that national elections in January were rapidly approaching, although a cloud of skepticism hung over those as well.
U.S. Combat Deaths: 530
U.S. Combat Deaths per month: 66.25
U.S. Troops Wounded in Action: 7,055
U.S. Troops Wounded per month: 881.88
Insurgents estimated killed/detained: 16,220
Insurgents estimated killed/detained per month: 2027.5
Iraqi Security Forces average: 96,000
