The Supreme Court has held that a misdemeanor battery conviction qualifies as a domestic violence conviction for purposes of disqualifying the offender from purchasing/possessing firearms under federal law even if the state crime does not include a statutory element that it was against a domestic partner/member. Instead, you actually look at the facts of the case. From a colleague of mine:
The bold emphasis is mine.On March 26, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit regarding the definition of "a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" in 18 U.S.C. Section 922, subsections (a)(33)(A) and (g)(9). The Court held that the statute applied to the defendant's conviction in Tennessee state court for intentionally or knowingly causing injury to the mother of his child in violation of TCA 39-13-111(b). The federal statute prohibits those with such convictions from possessing a firearm. This opinion allows the government to proceed with the prosecution of the defendant for this crime in federal court by reversing the dismissal of the indictment for two counts of that offense. United States v. Castleman, 2014 WL 1225196 (March 26, 2014)(no. 12-1371), reversing, 695 F.3d 582 (6th Cir.).
The Supreme Court applied the test for evaluating a state court conviction by using the conduct that the defendant was actually charged with and convicted of in state court, and did use not the so called "categorical test" in which the federal court must consider every possible alternative element as stated in the statute. The majority summarized the Court's holding as to the primary issue as follows:
[quote begins]
In sum, Johnson [v. United States, 599 U.S. 133 (2010), defining "violent felony" and "physical force" in deciding which state court convictions satisfy the federal statutory definitions] requires that we attribute the common-law meaning of "force" to § 921(a)(33)(A)'s definition of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" as an offense that "has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force." We therefore hold that the requirement of "physical force" is satisfied, for purposes of § 922(g)(9), by the degree of force that supports a common-law battery conviction.
[quote ends]
The Court warned that recklessly causing injury and certain types of threats without injury may not be sufficient to satisfy the federal definition for a domestic violence misdemeanor (see especially footnote 8). Thus, certain acts that violate TCA 39-13-111(b) will not apparently be sufficient to satisfy the federal statutory definition.
Although all nine justices agreed that the Sixth Circuit was wrong when the Sixth Circuit upheld dismissal of the indictment, three justices concurred in the result by separate opinions. Justice Scalia concurred in part and in the result on the ground that the Court improperly considered external definitions of domestic violence that had no bearing on the statute. Justice Alito concurred in the result, joined by Justice Thomas, on the ground that Johnson v. United States, 599 U.S. 133 (2010), was incorrectly decided, but agreed that the Court is correct in applying the common law definition of battery.