Nuclear reactor attacked-S. Africa

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A Nuclear Site Is Breached
South African Attack Should Sound Alarms

By Micah Zenko
Thursday, December 20, 2007; Page A29

An underreported attack on a South African nuclear facility last month demonstrates the high risk of theft of nuclear materials by terrorists or criminals. Such a crime could have grave national security implications for the United States or any of the dozens of countries where nuclear materials are held in various states of security.

Shortly after midnight on Nov. 8, four armed men broke into the Pelindaba nuclear facility 18 miles west of Pretoria, a site where hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade uranium are stored. According to the South African Nuclear Energy Corp., the state-owned entity that runs the Pelindaba facility, these four "technically sophisticated criminals" deactivated several layers of security, including a 10,000-volt electrical fence, suggesting insider knowledge of the system. Though their images were captured on closed-circuit television, they were not detected by security officers because nobody was monitoring the cameras at the time.

So, undetected, the four men spent 45 minutes inside one of South Africa's most heavily guarded "national key points" -- defined by the government as "any place or area that is so important that its loss, damage, disruption or immobilization may prejudice the Republic."

Eventually, the attackers broke into the emergency control center in the middle of the facility, stole a computer (which was ultimately left behind) and breached an electronically sealed control room. After a brief struggle, they shot Anton Gerber, an off-duty emergency services officer. Gerber later explained that he was hanging around because he believed (reasonably, in retrospect) that his fiancée -- a site supervisor -- was not safe at work. Although badly injured, Gerber triggered the alarm, setting off sirens and lights and alerting police stationed a few miles away.

Nevertheless, the four escaped, leaving the facility the same way they broke in.

Amazingly, at the same time those four men entered Pelindaba from its eastern perimeter, a separate group of intruders failed in an attempt to break in from the west. The timing suggests a coordinated attack against a facility that contains an estimated 25 bombs' worth of weapons-grade nuclear material. On Nov. 16, local police arrested three suspects, ranging in age from 17 to 28, in connection with this incident.

In response to the successful attack, the South African Nuclear Energy Corp. suspended six Pelindaba security personnel, including the general manager of security, and promised an "internal investigation which will cover culpability, negligence and improvements of Security Systems." It should be noted that Pelindaba's security was considered to have been upgraded after a break-in there two years ago (one individual was detained shortly after breaching the security fence).


It is still unclear why the two groups of intruders sought to break into this particular facility. More important, however, is that had the armed attackers succeeded in penetrating the site's highly enriched uranium storage vault, where the weapons-grade nuclear material is believed to be held, they could have carried away the ingredients for the world's first terrorist nuclear bomb.

As this incident shows, nuclear terrorism is a global issue, extending far beyond the familiar policy talking points of U.S. cooperation with Russia over its nuclear stockpiles, the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the face of threats from Islamic extremists, and concerns that if Iran acquires nuclear capabilities it could provide a bomb to sympathetic terrorist organizations.

Indeed, the essential ingredients required for making a nuclear weapon exist in more than 40 countries, in facilities with differing levels of security. Unfortunately, there are still no binding global standards on how to secure nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material. In the absence of sustained political leadership from the world's nuclear powers to develop, agree to and implement effective nuclear security standards, armed attacks such as the one at Pelindaba could become commonplace.

Micah Zenko is a research associate in the project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The views expressed here are solely those of the author.

From the Washington Post
 
If rent-a-cops can't secure a nuclear power plant, how (even armed) are they supposed to secure a mall?
 
What the heck would weapons grade uranium be doing in a lightly guarded power plant? I kinda doubt it.
Maybe they consider radioactive material suitable for a "dirty bomb" to be weapons grade now.

"hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade uranium" would be enough to build one hell of an arsenal for a small country. "weapons grade" is highly refined U-235 not the 3 per cent or so used in a fuel rod.
Fuel rods, new or old, ain't gonna go boom. Looks like a bit of sensationalizing of an alarming story.
 
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There are tons of nuclear grade fissionables floating around the former Warsaw pact nations. We had a deal to buy that stuff up but our current president pretty much punted on the agreement.
Lost fissionables in South Africa just make it a bit worse.
 
Yea, I can't believe that they would put weapons grade stuff at a power plant. My guess is that it was the regular 3% reactor fuel.
 
Not enough info....

"weapons grade material" can be anything from completely refined and machined material ready to be put into a bomb to the irradiated reactor fuel rods (which cannot be used in a weapon) or any stage in between. Since this material is stored at a reactor, it is likely that it is not readily usable in a nuclear weapon, but without more exact info, we have no way of knowing, for sure.

"Weapons grade material" can be extracted from any spent nuclear fuel, even commercial power reactor fuel. What varies is the difficulty extracting and refining it, and the yield per ton of fuel. Nations producing material for nuclear weapons run a specific enrichment of fuel, and it is run for a specific time in the reactor it maximize the yield per ton of fuel, but the "special nuclear material" is present in all spent fuel. The difference between a few grams and as much as a kilogram of "weapons grade material" per ton of spent fuel is dependant on many factors, but it is present in all spent fuel, no matter the source.
 
Even if you get the material there is no easy way to refine it. U-238 and U-235 are chemically identical. The only way to separate them involves taking advantage of their different atomic weights, not an easy thing to do. Normally this is done using Uranium hexafluoride, an unstable compound that is about as dangerous as they get. Certainly not a backyard operation.
 
Without placing my name on top of the targeted bad man list, I just wish to say that a nuc is not as hard to make as the general public are lead to believe. Safe handling of the material is most bad mans down fall. They don't live long enough to use what they make or attempt to make. Viable information is common on the Internet.


http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/uranium.htm



I would fear the dirty bomb! a little bit of materials dispersed in the correct manner could render a large city inhabitable.

Disclaimer: I am not Disseminating information of the Terrorist Nature. This and all content is commonly available on the Net or other available Text!
 
The world has been incredibly lucky to date. How long that luck will continue is another question.

The US acted with poor judgment providing Israel with nuclear weapons (rather than giving them a bomb to use in an appropriate situation) as this has created pressure for other states in the region to develop bombs of their own.

Added to the number of bombs in the former USSR that are not properly contained and the presence of nuts in the world who regard death as a glorious thing, and states who are prepared to sell the technology I think we are entering a period far scarier than the cold war.

At least the Russians appreciated the risk posed by Mutual Assured Destruction.
 
More scary, is when the USSR disassembled, there seems to be some toys missing! Just a matter of accountability? I don't think so!:rolleyes:
 
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