I'll let these two stories speak for themselves. WARNING: If you have high blood pressure or have just come in after a hard day and are already short-fused. You might want to take short breaks as you read this, breathe slowly and deeply. This is pretty nasty stuff.
*The second story will be in the second message in this thread.*
********************************************
Dr. Natalie J. Goldring
Gun violence as a world epidemic
Hague Appeal for Peace
14 May 1999
Note: This outline presents the talk as prepared; because of time
constraints, some portions were not delivered. Please feel free to quote,
but please acknowledge.
INTRODUCTION
About the Program on General Disarmament
Introduction to the overall program; how this fits in
Network on General Disarmament and how to join. Handouts on front table.
There is a tendency in both the academic and policy communities to view
light weapons, major conventional weapons, and nuclear weapons as
completely different issues. But my recent research points to common
factors and assumptions affecting policy on these issues. For example,
after investigating recent conflicts, I concluded that light and major
conventional weapons have been used in many if not most current conflicts.
In earlier research, I concluded that it will be difficult if not
impossible to control the international trade in light weapons without
effective domestic gun control. This analysis goes further, and deals with
what I'm calling a "chain of violence" that extends from guns to nuclear
weapons.
I will talk about six of these themes; framing them in terms of
assumptions reflected in current policy. Then I'll suggest some
recommendations for countering or changing these assumptions.
WHY CURRENT POLICY NEEDS TO BE CHANGED:
THEMES THAT CUT ACROSS WEAPONS CATEGORIES
This section deals with six apparent themes or assumptions of current
policy, with brief explanations as to why they're incorrect.
1. Assumption that violence can deter violence, and that violence is an
appropriate first response to violence.
This assumption is used as rationale for owning, threatening to use, and
using guns, major conventional weapons, nuclear weapons.
But if the only tool in your tool box is a hammer, every problem is going
to look like a nail.
US response to attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam with
its own attacks, apparently without solid evidence that the places the US
bombed in Afghanistan and Sudan were terrorist sites.
Kosovo — one of the core arguments was that the bombings were going to
prevent more deaths.
With respect to nuclear weapons – the United States has been threatening
various countries with nuclear weapons for 50 years. A colleague says,
"Isn't it conceivable that this helps create a culture of violence?"
The assumption that violence is a legitimate tool in a wide variety of
circumstances seems to lead to a sort of stockpile mentality, where people
gather more weapons than they could possibly need in case some of them
don't work, are declared illegal, etc. According to news accounts, the
demand for the guns used in the Littleton massacre increased just
afterward, apparently from fear that they'd be banned.
And the stockpile mentality certainly seems to be part of the US and
Russian approach to nuclear weapons.
It's not clear that weapons alone cause wars. But open access to weapons
seems to increase both the likelihood of violence and the consequences.
Without guns, massacres are still possible, but they're much more
difficult to carry out.
2. Assumption that it's feasible and desirable to make small distinctions
among types of weapons.
There's a myth that these weapons are easily divided according to use or
type of weapon. Some examples:
Civilian light weapons are ok; it's the military ones we need to worry
about. Not true.
Light weapons control and domestic gun control are two different things.
Possible. But if you don't control domestic weapons, you haven't a chance
of controlling the international trade. This means that an International
Action Network on Small Arms won't work without domestic gun control. Gun
control has to be a core issue for the coalition, or it will fail. It
can't just be one in a list of items that are given rhetorical attention.
It's ok to sell defensive weapons to our friends and allies; the offensive
weapons are the problem. But defensive shields can also be used
offensively.
On the nuclear front, the United States is trying to get everyone to
accept our assessment of defensive vs. offensive use of nuclear weapons.
3. Assumption that what the US military and US society do is ok, because
the United States can be trusted. It's our adversaries/other people who
can't.
Government officials assume that they can determine which countries are
appropriate recipients of its weapons, and predict which ones will remain
stable. But many of these weapons last for decades, and our predictive
capability has not always been very good.
Many governments are willing to talk about the illegal weapons trade, but
are wary of tackling the legal weapons trade. Look at the OAS convention.
Governments argue that their weapons transfers are ok; others are not.
Similarly, there's a perception that guns owned by Americans are not the
problem; illicit weapons are.
Nuclear weapons possessed by the United States aren't the problem; nuclear
weapons possessed by other countries are. They helped make us a
superpower, but other people shouldn't have them. This particular strain
of hypocrisy continues to be quite strong.
4. Assumption that it is possible to make a safe weapon.
In the gun control community, there is a dispute over child safety locks
and other safety measures. Some argue that this perpetuates the myth of
the safe gun; others say that if there are going to be guns around, they
should be as safe as possible. Interesting issue in that it divides both
the pro- and anti-gun communities.
Similarly, there is a dispute in the nuclear community over the extent to
which weapons can or should be made safe. For example, some argue that the
United States should provide countries like Israel, India, and Pakistan
with permissive action links; nuclear safety devices that help prevent
weapons from being used accidentally or by unauthorized people. Others
argue that this simply legitimates their nuclear weapons and that it's a
slippery slope.
5. Assumption that we get to make the last move.
The US government apparently assumes that we're going to deploy missile
defense systems and our adversaries will not respond. It has apparently
sold Taiwan on this idea. Does anyone think China would not respond if
Taiwan deployed theater missile defenses?
Some gun controllers and legislators assume that they can ban specific
types of guns, and that gunners won't find ways around those restrictions.
Evidence suggests they're wrong.
6. Assumption that it's ok to have a disconnect between what we teach our
children and what we do.
We teach our children that violence is an inappropriate response to
violence. We teach our children that you can't stop a bully by bullying
him. We're taught that even after you drown proof children, they still
need constant supervision when they're in or near the water. We are taught
not to spank our children, because that teaches them that force is an
acceptable way to get what they want.
Some may say this is a simplistic way to look at international relations.
But look at the US treatment of Milosovic. They kept saying he was a
bully; that he'd back down. But you don't use force against a bully. You
protect his target, remove him from the situation or isolate him, and try
to determine and eliminate the causes of his aggression – though the
latter admittedly often seems to be unsuccessful.
So what? Why does all of this matter? In part because many of us are
participating in campaigns and movements to counter these assumptions, but
we've often not worked together. If we recognize common interests and
common barriers to change, we have a better chance of overcoming these
obstacles. In addition, successful strategies in one issue area may be
applicable to another.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Assumption that violence can deter violence, and that violence is an
appropriate first response to violence.
Violence should be the last resort; we need to spend significantly more
effort and resources on alternatives. And we need to be willing to invest
in them. This means fully funding the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, and working to make it effective. It means paying
our UN dues. It means investing in violence prevention, rather than in the
tools of violence. One B-2 mission to Kosovo costs $350,000 – and that's
before they use any weapons. The US cruise missiles cost $1 million to $2
million each.
With respect to the tendency to stockpile weapons, the policy response
seems obvious. Destroy surplus weapons and those that remain when
conflicts end. Anything less risks recirculation. This is true for nuclear
weapons and major conventional weapons as well as for handguns. Just look
at Russia, Albania.
One obvious recommendation is to decrease the violent role models. But it
is not clear that this has been effective in the past.
2. Assumption that it is feasible and desirable to make fine distinctions
among types of weapons.
Don't let people get away with saying that we only need to control
military weapons; that civilian weapons are ok. Don't let people get away
with saying that illicit weapons are the problem – gray area weapons and
legal weapons kill lots of people too – and they're not easy to tell
apart.
Do develop marking systems so that you can tell which weapons are illegal
and where they came from – so that you can punish the people who let the
weapons go to the illegal market. Do register all gun purchases.
Don't trade off one type of weapon for another, by giving countries
conventional weapons in the hope that they won't develop nuclear weapons.
It didn't work with Pakistan, it didn't work with Israel; it's not likely
to work with any determined proliferator. Do try to reduce nuclear and
conventional forces at the same time. Don't ignore conventional weapons in
efforts to get rid of nuclear weapons – otherwise you simply make those
regions safe for conventional war.
3. Assumption that what the US military and US society do is ok, because
the United States can be trusted. It's our adversaries/other people who
can't.
Probably don't have to say it in this group – but don't take governments
at face value. Challenge their decisions; look at their assumptions.
Press officials to say what your countries would do if your adversaries
took the steps your government is contemplating.
Remember that much of this is driven by profit motives; we're up against
powerful adversaries.
4. Assumption that it is possible to make a safe weapon.
It's a slippery slope. Be very careful about endorsing so called safe
guns, or safe nuclear weapons for that matter. It gives legitimacy to
these weapons.
Creating "personalized weapons" also creates new markets for the weapons
dealers, who can then "resell the market". And based on recent patterns,
the new weapons will probably be more powerful than the ones they're
replacing, so a simple trade-in approach is likely to be
counterproductive.
Still, we have to insist that as long as guns continue to be allowed in
private possession, they must be stored as safely as possible. It is a
question of priorities, and of tradeoffs. It's hard to believe that gun
owners would value their so-called Second Amendment rights over their
children's safety.
5. Assumption that we get to make the last move.
In terms of the gun laws in particular, it's important to think about what
a determined gun seller or user will try to do to get around the laws. One
strategy is to avoid excessive specificity, in contrast to the assault
weapons ban that only covered specific weapons.
Some people support salami tactics, arguing that small measures can have a
cumulative effect. But small measures can also consume momentum and
energy, and may be circumvented. After the massacres in Port Arthur and
Dunblane, each government banned the weapon used in the massacre in its
country. But each government failed to ban the weapon used in the massacre
in the other's country.
6. Assumption that it's ok to have a disconnect between what we teach our
children and what we do.
We teach our children to cooperate – we need to do the same. We're
spending too much time arguing among ourselves, and dealing with process.
If we can't figure out a common agenda, how do we expect to prevail?
It's not clear that there's a right answer on this issue. Part of it deals
with language, and how we describe what we're doing. You can't have a war
on war. It doesn't make sense. And you certainly want to avoid glorifying
the people we're trying to change or neutralize – use Philip's example
about the press in Australia. Point out the Chicago Sun Times refusal to
cover Littleton on the front page.
Conclusion
The bottom line: One questioner at an earlier panel said that it is
important to go through the back door in dealing with the NRA. I disagree.
It's time to go through the front door – with the gun lobbies and with our
governments. We have the right and the responsibility. We need to keep in
mind who we're dealing with. John Conyers introduced a bill that bans gun
possession by or transfer to someone who is legally drunk. The NRA says
that's an anti-gun bill.
John Coale, one of the lawyers suing the gun industry, was quoted recently
as saying, "If we've reached the point where the parents of America have
had enough, there's nothing the NRA can do. I don't know if this is the
one. That's the big question."
In November 1963, Martin Luther King said, "By our readiness to allow arms
to be purchased at will and fired on a whim; by allowing our movies and
television screens to teach our children that the hero is the one who
masters the art of shooting and the techniques of killing¼we have created
an atmosphere in which violence and hatred have become popular pastimes."
In the long run, disarmament is the only real answer. Anything else is a
partial solution.
Thank you.
Contact information:
Dr. Natalie J. Goldring
Executive Director, Program on General Disarmament
Department of Government and Politics
3140 Tydings Hall
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
[This message has been edited by rod (edited July 24, 1999).]
*The second story will be in the second message in this thread.*
********************************************
Dr. Natalie J. Goldring
Gun violence as a world epidemic
Hague Appeal for Peace
14 May 1999
Note: This outline presents the talk as prepared; because of time
constraints, some portions were not delivered. Please feel free to quote,
but please acknowledge.
INTRODUCTION
About the Program on General Disarmament
Introduction to the overall program; how this fits in
Network on General Disarmament and how to join. Handouts on front table.
There is a tendency in both the academic and policy communities to view
light weapons, major conventional weapons, and nuclear weapons as
completely different issues. But my recent research points to common
factors and assumptions affecting policy on these issues. For example,
after investigating recent conflicts, I concluded that light and major
conventional weapons have been used in many if not most current conflicts.
In earlier research, I concluded that it will be difficult if not
impossible to control the international trade in light weapons without
effective domestic gun control. This analysis goes further, and deals with
what I'm calling a "chain of violence" that extends from guns to nuclear
weapons.
I will talk about six of these themes; framing them in terms of
assumptions reflected in current policy. Then I'll suggest some
recommendations for countering or changing these assumptions.
WHY CURRENT POLICY NEEDS TO BE CHANGED:
THEMES THAT CUT ACROSS WEAPONS CATEGORIES
This section deals with six apparent themes or assumptions of current
policy, with brief explanations as to why they're incorrect.
1. Assumption that violence can deter violence, and that violence is an
appropriate first response to violence.
This assumption is used as rationale for owning, threatening to use, and
using guns, major conventional weapons, nuclear weapons.
But if the only tool in your tool box is a hammer, every problem is going
to look like a nail.
US response to attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam with
its own attacks, apparently without solid evidence that the places the US
bombed in Afghanistan and Sudan were terrorist sites.
Kosovo — one of the core arguments was that the bombings were going to
prevent more deaths.
With respect to nuclear weapons – the United States has been threatening
various countries with nuclear weapons for 50 years. A colleague says,
"Isn't it conceivable that this helps create a culture of violence?"
The assumption that violence is a legitimate tool in a wide variety of
circumstances seems to lead to a sort of stockpile mentality, where people
gather more weapons than they could possibly need in case some of them
don't work, are declared illegal, etc. According to news accounts, the
demand for the guns used in the Littleton massacre increased just
afterward, apparently from fear that they'd be banned.
And the stockpile mentality certainly seems to be part of the US and
Russian approach to nuclear weapons.
It's not clear that weapons alone cause wars. But open access to weapons
seems to increase both the likelihood of violence and the consequences.
Without guns, massacres are still possible, but they're much more
difficult to carry out.
2. Assumption that it's feasible and desirable to make small distinctions
among types of weapons.
There's a myth that these weapons are easily divided according to use or
type of weapon. Some examples:
Civilian light weapons are ok; it's the military ones we need to worry
about. Not true.
Light weapons control and domestic gun control are two different things.
Possible. But if you don't control domestic weapons, you haven't a chance
of controlling the international trade. This means that an International
Action Network on Small Arms won't work without domestic gun control. Gun
control has to be a core issue for the coalition, or it will fail. It
can't just be one in a list of items that are given rhetorical attention.
It's ok to sell defensive weapons to our friends and allies; the offensive
weapons are the problem. But defensive shields can also be used
offensively.
On the nuclear front, the United States is trying to get everyone to
accept our assessment of defensive vs. offensive use of nuclear weapons.
3. Assumption that what the US military and US society do is ok, because
the United States can be trusted. It's our adversaries/other people who
can't.
Government officials assume that they can determine which countries are
appropriate recipients of its weapons, and predict which ones will remain
stable. But many of these weapons last for decades, and our predictive
capability has not always been very good.
Many governments are willing to talk about the illegal weapons trade, but
are wary of tackling the legal weapons trade. Look at the OAS convention.
Governments argue that their weapons transfers are ok; others are not.
Similarly, there's a perception that guns owned by Americans are not the
problem; illicit weapons are.
Nuclear weapons possessed by the United States aren't the problem; nuclear
weapons possessed by other countries are. They helped make us a
superpower, but other people shouldn't have them. This particular strain
of hypocrisy continues to be quite strong.
4. Assumption that it is possible to make a safe weapon.
In the gun control community, there is a dispute over child safety locks
and other safety measures. Some argue that this perpetuates the myth of
the safe gun; others say that if there are going to be guns around, they
should be as safe as possible. Interesting issue in that it divides both
the pro- and anti-gun communities.
Similarly, there is a dispute in the nuclear community over the extent to
which weapons can or should be made safe. For example, some argue that the
United States should provide countries like Israel, India, and Pakistan
with permissive action links; nuclear safety devices that help prevent
weapons from being used accidentally or by unauthorized people. Others
argue that this simply legitimates their nuclear weapons and that it's a
slippery slope.
5. Assumption that we get to make the last move.
The US government apparently assumes that we're going to deploy missile
defense systems and our adversaries will not respond. It has apparently
sold Taiwan on this idea. Does anyone think China would not respond if
Taiwan deployed theater missile defenses?
Some gun controllers and legislators assume that they can ban specific
types of guns, and that gunners won't find ways around those restrictions.
Evidence suggests they're wrong.
6. Assumption that it's ok to have a disconnect between what we teach our
children and what we do.
We teach our children that violence is an inappropriate response to
violence. We teach our children that you can't stop a bully by bullying
him. We're taught that even after you drown proof children, they still
need constant supervision when they're in or near the water. We are taught
not to spank our children, because that teaches them that force is an
acceptable way to get what they want.
Some may say this is a simplistic way to look at international relations.
But look at the US treatment of Milosovic. They kept saying he was a
bully; that he'd back down. But you don't use force against a bully. You
protect his target, remove him from the situation or isolate him, and try
to determine and eliminate the causes of his aggression – though the
latter admittedly often seems to be unsuccessful.
So what? Why does all of this matter? In part because many of us are
participating in campaigns and movements to counter these assumptions, but
we've often not worked together. If we recognize common interests and
common barriers to change, we have a better chance of overcoming these
obstacles. In addition, successful strategies in one issue area may be
applicable to another.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Assumption that violence can deter violence, and that violence is an
appropriate first response to violence.
Violence should be the last resort; we need to spend significantly more
effort and resources on alternatives. And we need to be willing to invest
in them. This means fully funding the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, and working to make it effective. It means paying
our UN dues. It means investing in violence prevention, rather than in the
tools of violence. One B-2 mission to Kosovo costs $350,000 – and that's
before they use any weapons. The US cruise missiles cost $1 million to $2
million each.
With respect to the tendency to stockpile weapons, the policy response
seems obvious. Destroy surplus weapons and those that remain when
conflicts end. Anything less risks recirculation. This is true for nuclear
weapons and major conventional weapons as well as for handguns. Just look
at Russia, Albania.
One obvious recommendation is to decrease the violent role models. But it
is not clear that this has been effective in the past.
2. Assumption that it is feasible and desirable to make fine distinctions
among types of weapons.
Don't let people get away with saying that we only need to control
military weapons; that civilian weapons are ok. Don't let people get away
with saying that illicit weapons are the problem – gray area weapons and
legal weapons kill lots of people too – and they're not easy to tell
apart.
Do develop marking systems so that you can tell which weapons are illegal
and where they came from – so that you can punish the people who let the
weapons go to the illegal market. Do register all gun purchases.
Don't trade off one type of weapon for another, by giving countries
conventional weapons in the hope that they won't develop nuclear weapons.
It didn't work with Pakistan, it didn't work with Israel; it's not likely
to work with any determined proliferator. Do try to reduce nuclear and
conventional forces at the same time. Don't ignore conventional weapons in
efforts to get rid of nuclear weapons – otherwise you simply make those
regions safe for conventional war.
3. Assumption that what the US military and US society do is ok, because
the United States can be trusted. It's our adversaries/other people who
can't.
Probably don't have to say it in this group – but don't take governments
at face value. Challenge their decisions; look at their assumptions.
Press officials to say what your countries would do if your adversaries
took the steps your government is contemplating.
Remember that much of this is driven by profit motives; we're up against
powerful adversaries.
4. Assumption that it is possible to make a safe weapon.
It's a slippery slope. Be very careful about endorsing so called safe
guns, or safe nuclear weapons for that matter. It gives legitimacy to
these weapons.
Creating "personalized weapons" also creates new markets for the weapons
dealers, who can then "resell the market". And based on recent patterns,
the new weapons will probably be more powerful than the ones they're
replacing, so a simple trade-in approach is likely to be
counterproductive.
Still, we have to insist that as long as guns continue to be allowed in
private possession, they must be stored as safely as possible. It is a
question of priorities, and of tradeoffs. It's hard to believe that gun
owners would value their so-called Second Amendment rights over their
children's safety.
5. Assumption that we get to make the last move.
In terms of the gun laws in particular, it's important to think about what
a determined gun seller or user will try to do to get around the laws. One
strategy is to avoid excessive specificity, in contrast to the assault
weapons ban that only covered specific weapons.
Some people support salami tactics, arguing that small measures can have a
cumulative effect. But small measures can also consume momentum and
energy, and may be circumvented. After the massacres in Port Arthur and
Dunblane, each government banned the weapon used in the massacre in its
country. But each government failed to ban the weapon used in the massacre
in the other's country.
6. Assumption that it's ok to have a disconnect between what we teach our
children and what we do.
We teach our children to cooperate – we need to do the same. We're
spending too much time arguing among ourselves, and dealing with process.
If we can't figure out a common agenda, how do we expect to prevail?
It's not clear that there's a right answer on this issue. Part of it deals
with language, and how we describe what we're doing. You can't have a war
on war. It doesn't make sense. And you certainly want to avoid glorifying
the people we're trying to change or neutralize – use Philip's example
about the press in Australia. Point out the Chicago Sun Times refusal to
cover Littleton on the front page.
Conclusion
The bottom line: One questioner at an earlier panel said that it is
important to go through the back door in dealing with the NRA. I disagree.
It's time to go through the front door – with the gun lobbies and with our
governments. We have the right and the responsibility. We need to keep in
mind who we're dealing with. John Conyers introduced a bill that bans gun
possession by or transfer to someone who is legally drunk. The NRA says
that's an anti-gun bill.
John Coale, one of the lawyers suing the gun industry, was quoted recently
as saying, "If we've reached the point where the parents of America have
had enough, there's nothing the NRA can do. I don't know if this is the
one. That's the big question."
In November 1963, Martin Luther King said, "By our readiness to allow arms
to be purchased at will and fired on a whim; by allowing our movies and
television screens to teach our children that the hero is the one who
masters the art of shooting and the techniques of killing¼we have created
an atmosphere in which violence and hatred have become popular pastimes."
In the long run, disarmament is the only real answer. Anything else is a
partial solution.
Thank you.
Contact information:
Dr. Natalie J. Goldring
Executive Director, Program on General Disarmament
Department of Government and Politics
3140 Tydings Hall
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
[This message has been edited by rod (edited July 24, 1999).]
This woman would be well served by having a serious and frightening glimpse of violence first hand. She is living in a dream world, and as long as she's willing to live there alone or with her tribe, no problem. It is when nutcases like this want to drag me and my family in with them that I become irate. Natalie needs to get in touch with her inner child - the one that gets scared sh**less when attacked.