LEO Situational Awareness

booker_t

New member
Over the weekend a MD State Trooper was shot and killed outside a restaurant where he was working a security detail and had removed a patron who was disputing/refusing to pay his bill.

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/lo...blic-safety/md-state-police-officer-shot.html

What can we learn from this?

Had the Trooper not been on his cell, would he have been more aware of what was about to happen? We don't know what distance he was shot at, unfortunately. After having removed this person, should be have been on alert when leaving that night? What triggers/flags are there for an increased threat level while on security detail?

A lot of police work security details while off-duty. Some local departments even encourage it, to have a greater (hopefully positive) presence in the community, around where people shop, eat, socialize and try to enjoy what their community has to offer, be it a beach town or a major metropolis.

That said, it is easy being human to get complacent while off duty and just "working security." After several years of security shifts and no action, maybe an occasional drunk, is it not possible to get into a lax mindset? Talking on the cell phone, not bringing the extra magazine, not wearing your vest, listening to your iPod, and other digressions.

What can humans do to stay sharp, not just physically but mentally? To maintain an alert ("tactical") mindset even during a mundane security detail, without adding unnecessary stress to your system?
 
Real true stories of the Highway Patrol..

In my area(a med size city with a large metro/suburb pop) a young city police officer was busted for a recent sex assault on a female patron. Another member of the same PD got caught on video pushing a drunk woman down a stairwell. Both off duty uniformed LEOs were paid about $43.00/hr per union-PBA set-up.
Another guy told me how a local suburb PD officer was let go from
a off duty detail for sleeping on post. The property mgr said; "hit the road".
I know many bars, nightclubs, hotels, malls etc use uniformed state troopers or police officers but many are bitter, burned out or POed. They sit in marked cars and refuse to patrol or assist a property's contract security guard at all.
I've seen that over & over in my area. The county sheriff limited the amount of off duty employment to 30 hours per week/payperiod. That seems very fair to me but many sworn LEOs-union members still complain.
I see the value in some sworn LEOs working off duty but many don't act like mature adults and only want the quick $$$.
The property mgr where I live cut his off duty deputy(who made about $35.00/hr as he sat in an UNMARKED pick up griping about the sheriff's office).

CF
 
What can humans do to stay sharp, not just physically but mentally? To maintain an alert ("tactical") mindset even during a mundane security detail, without adding unnecessary stress to your system?

Contrary to what many claim, nobody remains in condition yellow for extended periods of time short of being clinically paranoid and even then the process will be full of gaps. To attempt to do so will add considerable stress to your system.

What triggers/flags are there for an increased threat level while on security detail?
Things out of the ordinary, out of sequence, out of time, out of proper attire, inappropriate behavior, etc. So the guy who looks normal, in place, at the appropriate time, etc. will not raise any red flags.
 
DoubleNaught, your 2nd comment reminds me of an interesting piece I saw a few months ago, which highlighted security in Israeli airports. Unlike here in the good ol' US-of-A, they allow (encourage, train for..) all sorts of profiling to be done not only by their security personnel, but by the employees who work ticket counters, baggage check-in, even the concession stands.

The security manager explained it this way. The people who work those jobs see many thousands of passengers a day. Millions over the years. They know instinctively how people act, and can pick up on very subtle differences because it's what they see day after day. It's behavior profiling, not race/ethnic/nationality profiling that he claimed, in the end, is the most effective (in terms of cost and performance) security/prevention measure.

Hard to put a dollar value on a pair of human eyes separated by some halfway functional grey matter, eh?
 
And that will work for a lot of situations. Then again, if you have a certain percentage of those thousands of customers a day who have all sorts of abnormal behaviors. They don't like crowds, fear human contact, are afraid to fly, etc. and they behave atypically as well.

It's behavior profiling, not race/ethnic/nationality profiling that he claimed, in the end, is the most effective (in terms of cost and performance) security/prevention measure.

You can bet that race/ethnic/nationality profiling comes very much into play, and especially religious profiling at Israeli airports.

Using a volunteer force may produce high performance given the cost, but when your cost is zero for volunteers, any benefit is free.
 
security details; due diligence, sworn LE & PSCs/armed security...

The Israeli security methods & ops have merit but are completely unrealistic or practical in the US.
$$$ is a big factor. I saw a top Israeli security expert on a US cable news program drone on & on about how the "best" security agents should have 4 year college degree, advanced weapon/skill training, speak foreign languages, be in top shape, etc. These "super-agents" do not exist in the private sector! :(
Anyone who meets these strict requirements would not be working for low wages or under the conditions of a FAM(federal air marshal) or contract security at a US airport.
Private security companies are for profit. They want $$$. Many public service agencies & private businesses want to save $$$ too. Like it or not the hiring standards are low and the quality reflects that.
Even high pay & good company benefits can't prevent fraud/waste/abuse. The ArmorGroup GS4 scandal in Kabul's AmEmbassy compound and the Iraq Xe-Blackwater events show that. These "high speed" operators & armed guards ruined the companies they worked for.
Due dilligence & ethics should mean something in armed security details but those concepts are going down more & more.
 
DoubleNaught; no doubt. I would certainly take the Israeli security manager's words with a grain of salt as well, as I'm sure he's speaking politically. Regarding behavior profiling, I would say that even those nervous about flying, anxious around crowds, etc, still fit a behavior profile that many airport employees see on a regular basis, and can differentiate (with some reasonable degree of reliability) from a potential threat.

From my own study on Black Widow bombers in Russia during their conflicts with Chechnya, quite often the would-be suicide bombers and backpack/pipe bomb deliverers would be heavily medicated or affected by the situation in ways that belie their intentions. Younger females who had been indoctrinated at training camps would quite literally be dazzled by the lights, sounds and experience of being in downtown Moscow, seeing things and people that contradicted everything they had been taught. Eventually, it led to the necessity for a supervisor to accompany them with a remote detonator, as they would frequently get cold feet, have second thoughts, be unable to find their target, etc. The practice died out, although recently (within the last year) there were two Black Widow style bombings near Moscow, with only moderate success as I believe the explosives employed were of very low grade.

Clyde; I'm not sure I agree with you. The investment in an hour or two of training every year for airport employees is fairly low. Legislation would put the cost onto the airlines and other staffing companies, even if it showed up in ticket prices I'd pay an extra $1 per ticket if there were metrics in place to show an increased security posture with no impact on my transit time. Occasionally ending OPFOR-trained individuals through airports in with the general population as training exercise is equally simple, the people to do it are already on payroll. Leverage available resources before layering on beaurocratic red tape and unproven, controversial technology.

Private companies are for profit, and while Blackwater had it's legal issues, there are many highly regarded private security firms that have not. Triple Canopy is a great example.

Regarding armed security, there are thousands of capable veterans coming out of military service looking for work. Given their skill set, security is often an excellent fit. Many of them join private security firms that pay very well given the individual's experience and availability, and many of those private security firms were founded by ex-military and ex-paramilitary (Army Rangers, USMC, SEALs, FBI SAs, etc.).

-BREAK-

Back to the idea of situational awareness, should limits be put on how much time an officer can work private details? If they are already working a full week (say local patrol without a partner), how many hours should they be allowed to work private? 20? 30? At what point does it degrade their work performance, and pose a risk to their safety? Does it vary widely by individual?
 
Last edited:
PMCs-PSCs: federal reviews, armed security SOPs...

BT:
I agree with part of what you are saying but I'd add that there are many documented cases of fraud-waste-abuse by armed PSCs/PMCs all over. Yes there are many retired veterans or "tier-1" spec ops type PMCs who are ethical/hard workers but they get $400-$500 per day.
If you research the FPS; Federal Protective Service GAO(general accounting office) review of DC area security contracts showed wide-spread graft/misconduct/etc. Many of these armed officers were former LE or military veterans too.
 
DoubleNaught; no doubt. I would certainly take the Israeli security manager's words with a grain of salt as well, as I'm sure he's speaking politically.
Then why bother posting that which you don't yourself believe to be factual?

Regarding behavior profiling, I would say that even those nervous about flying, anxious around crowds, etc, still fit a behavior profile that many airport employees see on a regular basis, and can differentiate (with some reasonable degree of reliability) from a potential threat.
Really, they can differientiate nervousness of flying from nervousness from being about to commit a crime or terrorist act? How many people do the clerks see on a regular basis about to commit a crime or terrorist act?

From my own study on Black Widow bombers in Russia during their conflicts with Chechnya, quite often the would-be suicide bombers and backpack/pipe bomb deliverers would be heavily medicated or affected by the situation in ways that belie their intentions.
And did we have evidence of this with the 9/11 terrorists? Apparently not. Not everyone needs to be heavily medicated to do what they think is the right thing.

Younger females who had been indoctrinated at training camps would quite literally be dazzled by the lights, sounds and experience of being in downtown Moscow, seeing things and people that contradicted everything they had been taught. Eventually, it led to the necessity for a supervisor to accompany them with a remote detonator, as they would frequently get cold feet, have second thoughts, be unable to find their target, etc.
You are not doing your own arguments any favors. Poorly trained people and amateurs can be spotted, sure enough. If you have to dope them up far enough to be able to deal with the job, then they aren't going to necessarily be very clandestine, but others get through these problems just fine and try to carry out their goals, like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

The practice died out, although recently (within the last year) there were two Black Widow style bombings near Moscow, with only moderate success as I believe the explosives employed were of very low grade.
The success of the events was very good in terms of being able to carry them out without detection. That is what we are talking about here is detection, is it not? So the fact that they didn't kill more because of poor explosives is moot.

Back to the idea of situational awareness, should limits be put on how much time an officer can work private details? If they are already working a full week (say local patrol without a partner), how many hours should they be allowed to work private? 20? 30? At what point does it degrade their work performance, and pose a risk to their safety? Does it vary widely by individual?

Why do you think this shooting has anything to do with situational awareness being tied to hours worked? Do you think the officers killed in a coffee shop in Oregon had situational awareness problems due to the number of hours they worked? How many cop slayings or attacks can be tied to situational awareness deficits due to too many hours worked?

Above you noted...
That said, it is easy being human to get complacent while off duty and just "working security." After several years of security shifts and no action, maybe an occasional drunk, is it not possible to get into a lax mindset? Talking on the cell phone, not bringing the extra magazine, not wearing your vest, listening to your iPod, and other digressions.

You think this happened because he was complacent? There is no evidence for those. He was on the cell phone, but you don't know the reason. You have no idea as to his magazine situation, vest (which he was wearing), or other digressions. He was not listening to in ipod.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/15/AR2010061503397.html

From the article...
About 30 minutes later, a gunman ambushed the trooper as he exited the restaurant.

The ironic thing about ambushes is that they come when people don't expect them. That is why they are ambushes.
 
Then why bother posting that which you don't yourself believe to be factual?

It was a quote/paraphrase. I suspected that readers of the forum were intelligent enough to understand that an Israeli security manager might be speaking with tact, and I don't have to lay out every shred and minutiae of the interpretation of his words.

Really, they can differientiate nervousness of flying from nervousness from being about to commit a crime or terrorist act? How many people do the clerks see on a regular basis about to commit a crime or terrorist act?

Considering nearly all males and the vast majority of females over 18 perform minimum two years military service, I would say a significant portion can make that determination, compared to other western countries' youth. Even without that mandatory service, the Israeli public is highly attuned to human behavior given the frequency of attacks in the past fifty years.

And did we have evidence of this with the 9/11 terrorists?

Indeed we did, but most of it was so disparate that the "dots" weren't connected until much later. Furthermore, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

9/11 terrorists are but a handful of individuals among thousands who have been waging Jihad against the Soviet Union and the western world since the mid-1800s, beginning (more or less) with Imam Shamil (1797-1871). Hate to burst your hubristic bubble, but the "War on Terror" didn't start in 2001, and it didn't start in the USA.

You are not doing your own arguments any favors.

There are no absolutes, some missions were success, some were failure, most were somewhere in-between. You are trying to paint my discussion into a small box that it does not fit. The objectives of terrorist acts are not the same was in conventional warfare. Protracted conflict has effects that extend beyond the initial impact of the attack, from increased security that draws resources, to shift of focus in government from domestic issues, to an altered state of mind among citizens. Make no mistake, terrorism is exclusively a political tool with a political (however religiously motivated) objective, not a military objective. Smaller terrorist acts and planning is often subterfuge, with no intent to execute, rather to test the response of western intelligence and law enforcement, gathering information to better plan future attacks or identify internal security leaks.

The success of the events was very good in terms of being able to carry them out without detection.

If I recall correctly, in one particular event, they were unable to reach the primary target in fear of detection and went for a secondary target area. The dual suicide detonations were supposed to be staggered, the first in a public area, killing/maiming civilians and drawing emergency responders, and the second attacking the responders. The first detonation was low-order, and the second attacker became rattled. I believe she was apprehended prior to detonating her device.

Despite being "detected" the sociological impact was significant, and it redirected the Kremlin's resources for a period of time while putting another shred of doubt into the citizens' minds about whether Putin and the Russian govt could protect its people from foreign threats. Anybody over the age of 16 vividly remembers the Beslan School hostage crisis (2004) and the Nord-Ost seige (2002).

Why do you think this shooting has anything to do with situational awareness being tied to hours worked?

I don't necessarily believe that this shooting was linked to excessive hours worked. I posed the question for input from people who might have personal experience and would be able to lend their first hand knowledge. It is proven that, regardless of profession or task, more hours worked leads to fatigue, lack of concentration, eventually poor judgment, impaired vision, slowed response/reactions and other negative effects. I asked, "At what point does it degrade their work performance, and pose a risk to their safety?"

Whatever he was doing on the cell phone is what is moot, fact is he got shot. Was whatever he was doing on the cell phone more important that being more alert after removing a disorderly customer? Again, how could the events of this tragedy have been changed?

You think this happened because he was complacent?

Again, I posed the question. I'm drawing on a real-life situation, not some hair-brained zombie scenario, and asking, "what could have been done to prevent this?" In life, I've always found it's better to learn from other peoples' mistakes, and avoid making my own whenever possible. Your mileage may vary.

The ironic thing about ambushes is that they come when people don't expect them.

There is no irony here; perhaps you mean the the intrinsic thing about ambushes is that they come when people don't expect them?

Again, I asked the question, when should one expect to be ambushed? A likewise, just because you're ambushed doesn't mean you're dead meat.

Now with that... I find your response to be argumentative and contradictory, consistent with many of your postings I have read. You have taken questions that I posed to the forum, seeking input from those with first hand knowledge they wish to share, and twisted those questions into statements of believe/truth/faith/whatever by me, which they certainly were not.

Your post added absolutely no substance to this thread, and only took it farther off the tracks. You provided no new information, no insight, no facts, and not even much opinion beyond "you're wrong!" Again, looking at "other posts by.." this seems to be a trend in your discussions. A low, basic form of trolling formulated to elicit wild, angry, emotional responses from other posters who take ad hominem attacks to heart.

I've never had to use an ignore user function on the internet before, but it might be just about time to do so. Cheers mate.
 
Last edited:
It was a quote/paraphrase. I suspected that readers of the forum were intelligent enough to understand that an Israeli security manager might be speaking with tact, and I don't have to lay out every shred and minutiae of the interpretation of his words.

No. Now you are covering for bad information. How would anyone know how the supposed Israeli security manager might be speaking with tact when all we have is what was said? You expect people to understand unstated political undertones based on your inexact recitation? You made an unsourced statement of fact and once discovered to be bogus, you are being insulting.

Considering nearly all males and the vast majority of females over 18 perform minimum two years military service, I would say a significant portion can make that determination...

Based on what training? Being in the military in Israel means becoming an expert of human behavior? Please share the specifics.

I don't necessarily believe that this shooting was linked to excessive hours worked.
Really? In the OP you specifically ask what we can learn from THIS shooting which involved an officer working extra hours.
 
Back
Top