This is too good to lose, so I'm posting the article:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30901-2000Apr27.html
INS Says It Feared Violence in Raid
By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, April 28, 2000; Page A01
Immigration and Naturalization Service agents charged with setting up and executing the seizure of Elian Gonzalez had identified as many as two dozen potentially armed individuals--many known to have concealed weapons permits and criminal records--around his Miami home who agents believed were prepared to thwart any government operation, INS officials said yesterday
All of those individuals, the officials said, were involved in a structured security system designed to prevent Elian's removal from his relatives. They said the system included a five-man contingent of bodyguards around the family itself, one of whom had been seen by a government informer carrying a gun inside the Gonzalez house.
These revelations were part of a concerted effort by the government yesterday to justify the level of INS force and weaponry used in the operation. Republican members of Congress have described the agents as "jack-booted thugs" and "storm troopers" and charged that unwarranted combat tactics were used against a defenseless family and a largely docile crowd of innocent demonstrators outside.
To counter the charges in advance of a congressional hearing next week, the INS yesterday made available for interviews two senior officials--the supervisory agent in charge of intelligence for the operation, and James D. Goldman, the assistant Miami district director for investigations who personally led the raid.
Together, they described the two separate but related tasks they were assigned: determining the level of threat and using that information to develop and train for the best and safest way to extricate Elian from the house and remove him from the area.
Their efforts included the use of aerial surveillance, covert agents and local informers. Over the course of a week, a special tactical unit was brought in from Texas for possible forced entry, supplementing INS agents gathered from throughout Florida. Actual preparation for the operation included everything from developing mock-ups and diagrams of the house itself on an empty, locked floor of the local INS building to outfitting all vehicles with puncture-proof tires.
Photographs of the Gonzalez front door were taken from an anti-Castro Web site and blown up to study the structure and locks. Repeated test runs were held--of the entry and exit of the house, the vehicle escape route along a local highway, the helicopter flight to Homestead Air Force Base south of Miami.
The intelligence officer, who asked not to be identified by name, said that their orders came from the Justice Department on April 14, the day that Elian's great-uncle, Lazaro Gonzalez, defied an INS order to deliver Elian for return to his Cuban father.
"There was a difference between the information collection process prior to the 14th and after the 14th," Goldman said. "Since day one, we've listened, we've been all ears. But starting on the 14th, the whole complexion of the problem kind of changed."
"We were required to gather as much intelligence information as we could about the environment around the Gonzalez residence and any persons or groups who might pose a possible threat," the intelligence agent said. Using "the whole gamut of information-gathering . . . we basically determined . . . that there was in fact a layered threat element that we had to deal with, to overcome in any enforcement."
The first layer, he said, was "an immediate bodyguard contingent" of five men who "provided immediate, close-in security for the Gonzalez family and Elian." All of the five were found to have concealed weapons permits. "Source information told us that part of what they were to do, if needed, was to help prevent the recovery of Elian from the house . . . and that while they were on the scene, they might well be armed."
A second layer, he said, consisted of a "cadre of between 15 and 20 individuals" headquartered directly behind the Gonzalez residence in the home of an elderly woman who had accepted their activities.
"We were successful in identifying about eight or nine of these individuals," the intelligence agent said. "Virtually all had notable criminal histories, including convictions for crimes such as armed robbery, weapons, aggravated assault. They were acting in a robust and somewhat structured security effort. Sources told us [they] viewed their mission as alerting the Gonzalez family to any attempt by the government to recover [Elian] as well as, if possible, to thwart that effort."
Using walkie-talkies and cell phones, traveling on foot and on bicycle, the individuals had set up observation posts and maintained a link to a local Spanish-language radio station, which they contacted to broadcast a call for large quantities of demonstrators whenever they felt it was necessary.
A third layer, he said, was the crowd itself. "We knew that there were people in the crowd who, perhaps rhetorically, had threatened to literally die" to prevent Elian's removal. The agents also identified a cadre of five members of Alpha 66, a radical anti-Castro group that employs paramilitary and weapons training, which was active in the crowd.
"With all of these elements combined," the agent said, "we knew that we had a significant potential threat to our operation, not only to the safety of our officers, but to innocent people."
Asked whether the Gonzalez family was involved in the security efforts, the agent said there was no information that the family "controlled or commanded" the operations. "However, we do know from direct observation and sources and informants that the family and the bodyguard contingent had regular communication with the people in the house behind and with the Alpha 66 people. They were observed talking to them, meeting with these individuals on a regular basis. . . . We don't believe they actually called the shots . . . but we're certain they were at least aware" of their operations.
Even as intelligence-gathering continued, a BORTAC--Border Patrol Tactical Unit--was brought in from El Paso, along with additional INS agents from Jacksonville, Orlando and Tampa--for a total of about 140 agents who rehearsed commands in Spanish and practiced hold techniques.
"We couldn't just show up in a public park," Goldman said. "BORTAC and some of the recovery teams isolated a floor in an INS building. . . . We changed the locks to simulate the house, set up desks and chairs to show halls and entryways."
"Detail was the name of the game," Goldman said. "The three white vans were selected . . . because of sliding doors on both sides." Tires were changed and tinted windows installed. "There was some defensive driving training."
Two helicopters were stationed at the transfer point on nearby Watson Island. In case of bad weather or breakdown, a "go-fast boat" was stationed in Biscayne Bay.
Meanwhile, covert intelligence teams were deployed to the street around the house to determine the complexity and size of the crowds at different times of day and to probe the security response time to perceived threats.
On Tuesday, April 18, the team reported "that we were mission-capable," Goldman said. "When asked, I stated that I would prefer to have a couple more days under our belt so we could collect a little more intelligence, drill and rehearse. Thursday was a possible date. Saturday was a possible date. Saturday had 'win-win' written all over it."
The government, he said, "attempted to maintain a moral high ground; they were disinclined to effect a search warrant on Good Friday or Easter Sunday. Saturday had advantages over work days: . . . different traffic patterns, life begins a little earlier" during the week. School days were a problem, lest the agents not be off the street by 6 a.m. "There were a multitude of issues that made early morning, Saturday, a good time, an optimum time."
The agents started assembling at midnight Friday, even as last-minute negotiating attempts were still underway among mediators working with the relatives, Attorney General Janet Reno, and the lawyer for Elian's father, Juan Miguel Gonzalez. The agents had told Reno they needed an hour between the go-ahead signal and the actual raid--which was tentatively scheduled for 4 a.m. At 3 a.m., she told them to stand down and wait. At 4 a.m., Reno has said, she determined there was no hope for the negotiations. She told the agents to proceed.
Goldman, who was at the front of the six-agent tactical team that entered the house, along with a female agent to take charge of Elian, insisted yesterday that, had the relatives cooperated, the raid might not have taken place the way it did. "If they had . . . and complied with the demands to open the door, if they had let me in, in all probability I would have been in a position to explain the circumstances and tell them I had a warrant, that I was recovering Elian and was not taking him to Cuba."
As it was, he said, "we met resistance in the front yard," as the officers were charged and demonstrators attempted to wrap them in television cables lying in the yard. The relatives placed a couch in front of the door, he said.
"In 22 years in federal law enforcement, the intensity level, the effort to stop us, I've never seen anything like it before," Goldman said.
[This message has been edited by Jeff Thomas (edited April 28, 2000).]
