Hitchman's Operational Requirements for an Infantry Hand Weapon

[Bartholomew Roberts]

If you would like to see the 1960 ORO study that was the genesis of the M16, 5.56x45mm and many of the other basic approaches the military uses to infantry rifle combat, CFS Press has a copy of the now declassified report online at:
http://www.cfspress.com/sharpshooters/pdfs/Operational-Requrements-For-An-Infantry-Hand-Weapon.pdf

One of the things the Hitchman report did was take soldiers who had qualified at expert (16) and marksman (16) and have them shoot at targets with limited time, psychological duress, and a random order of exposure. Hitchman's study determined that the soldiers in the test had a sharp decline in accuracy after 100yds - so much so that the difference between an Expert and a Marksman was mostly academic in their ability to hit a target.

One of the conclusions of the study was "... it is not likely that training alone could be effective in materially raising the standards of all men to exceed the level of expert performance indicated by the Belvoir tests*. Significant gains in man-weapon effectiveness are to be obtained only by combining improvements in weapon design with good training."

As a result of this conclusion, the study concluded that the best method for increasing hit probability and lethality was to fire a 5-shot salvo that would maintain a certain dispersion.

However, the study itself never sought to answer the question of whether training could be effective in increasing the standards. Instead it simply observed that under the current training, there wasn't a lot of difference between how "experts" and "marksmen" performed on their test.

However, I notice that when it comes to our elite troops, we don't pursue the doctrine outlined by Hitchman as much. Having seen six guys roll up with a 2.5 ton truck loaded with ammo just for them and their training, it seems that at the elite levels of our military there is a belief that training can be effective in increasing lethality and accuracy.

So I am curious - is there a training system, that would be feasible to implement across the United States military that would prove Hitchman's assessment of the value of additional training wrong? Was the problem all along simply that training for infantryman wasn't realistic?

*A footnote on Page 19 here notes that one expert rifleman displayed a skill in marksmanship that was actually close to the mechanical limit of the weapon and that the Sergeant in question estimated it would require 9 years of continuous training on firearms to develop that level of skill. The study also estimated that less than 10% of men in the normal recruit stream could even reach that level in that time.

 

[BlueTrain]

The study, which I can only glance at for the moment, is fascinating, although it has limitations (which I'll get to). And you raise some excellent points about the study and its conclusions.

It is interesting that you use the expression "elite troops." You used to hear the expression "crack troops" in the past. While elite has more than one meaning, it has to at least mean above average. In other words, in some ways, the elite troops are select soldiers. Can everyone be above average? That is a high expectation and that may be the main problem here. Those trainees who made expert (I didn't when I was in) presumably went through the exact same training as the ones who merely qualified. I'd suggest that something additional is present in those who qualified as expert. They have additional abilities that produces better shooting, possibly additional experience and just plain talent. If you were going to outfit your battalion with a squad of snipers, you'd pick the best shots to begin with, wouldn't you?

Being a good shot does not necessarily translate into being the best combat infantryman but it helps. I've heard some tales that it was an effort to get infantrymen just to fire their weapons in combat but I don't know if it was just the poor shots who were reluctant to shoot at the enemy or not. It is just as likely that battlefield conditions just do not lend themselves to accurate shooting and that shouldn't be hard to understand.

The study was dated in 1960 and small bore weapons had been explored for some time by then, although the sorts of intermediate cartridges that were appearing in the 1940s and 1950s were quite different from those of the past. Earlier cartridges of 6.5mm and less were essentially "rifle caliber" and not exactly intermediate but were still less powerful than the .30 caliber cartridges, which itself was considered a small bore weapon when it was introduced, starting with the 8mm Lebel and for us, the .30 Government. Armalite was hardly the only one doing something.

Yet another problem with training is that a certain level is reached, beyond which there will be some falling off in the skill level. That isn't the fault of the training exactly, so much as the inability of a human to maintain peak condition without continual training. A race horse will run around the track most every day, while an infantry soldier will not go to the range every day. But all a race horse does is run; a solder has more to do. Shoot, move and communicate but notice shoot came first. This is true for entire units, too, and not just for individuals.

The well-informed will realize their conclusions were reached over 15 years earlier and actually put into practice. Perhaps the problem is that too much emphasis is being laid on the rifleman to the exclusion of other infantry weapons, like machine guns. Do you suppose there were similiar studies about machine guns?

Lastly, you will notice that right away in the study they do mention increasing the lethality of the infantry rifle.

 

[Jimro]

Hitchman was testing infantrymen in an unfamiliar test with deliberate stressors. Considering that the "difference" between marksman and experts can be as little as 7 shots out of 40 his conclusion that there is real little world difference in performance isn't unrealistic. Going from a qual range training regiment to a combat training regiment is usually painful at first.

But a Special Forces ODA team of 12 men has a larger ammo budget per year than an Infantry Company of 144 men. Rangers in Regiment routinely wear out an M4 barrel every year.

Of course STRAC ammo allocations are miserly at best. And STRAC outlines the minimum training events for a generic unit over the course of a year. SOCOM routinely ignores STRAC.

So yes, more trigger time is better trigger time. Training to qualify on the range doesn't translate into training to win a fight, but you have to qualify on the range before you can even begin to train to fight. But if qualification and mandatory training eats up your yearly ammo budget....

Any weapon system is just a piece of equipment. The biggest improvement we've seen is with red dot sights because it is easier to train someone to use a red dot than irons. After all, marksmanship is all about keeping the sights on target all the way through trigger follow through.

Jimro

 

[Clifford L. Hughes]

Bartholomew Roberts:

I havn't read the 1960 ORO study so I can't comment on it. However I can report on my Marine Corps 1954 boot training in regards to my shooting a M1 Garand. My platoon consisted of about forty recruits. Most of them had never fired a rifle before. Out of the forty recruits only about seven failed to qualify as at least marksman. The Marines qualified on ten inch diameter bullseye at two and three hundred yards slow fire and for rapid fire the shot at about an eighteen inch silhouettes of the head and shoulder of a man. The five hundred yards was shot on a twenty inch bullseye. For someone to claim that this skill won't carry over into combat is fallacious. About 1960 the ten inch diameter able target's bullseye was changed to twelve inches.

Semper Fi.

Gunnery sergeant
Clifford L. Hughes
USMC Retired

 

[Slamfire]

One of our Vietnam war veterans was at the National Guard range when machine gun teams were shooting. The M60 machine gunners had spotters with scopes and were firing full automatic, belts of fully automatic fire, from the 600 yard berm at the standard 6 foot by 6 foot target.

Bud was able to examine the targets and said he found only 4 or 6 hits on them. I believe that was the total number of hits for all targets. Bud was very disappointed in the results. Since that test is somewhat similar, except for the spotters, to some of these Hitchman tests, I guess we can conclude that machine gun fire is also ineffective.

Last match at the same range I kept all my bullets within 24 inches of center and most within 12 inches, given that I shot a 194-6X. So I actually shot better than a line full of machine gunners. I don’t think any of the “expert” marksman in the Hitchman report would classify as NRA “Expert”, certainly not Master or High Master. It would have blown his preconceptions all to hell if he had some real AMU quality shooters on the line.

So I am curious - is there a training system, that would be feasible to implement across the United States military that would prove Hitchman's assessment of the value of additional training wrong? Was the problem all along simply that training for infantryman wasn't realistic?

The fundamental problem is that training budgets are the first thing to be cut in every drawdown after every war. Everything is cut except major weapon system procurements. Those budgets go up. Hitchman and his ilk were just providing the justification for weapon system procurements. His was the typical “technology not only can substitute for skills, but that expensive technological hardware is better than skills.”

There won’t ever be sufficient training because training budgets are not high on the priority list of the military-industrial complex.

 

[NWPilgrim]

I think the report is full of holes. Shooters trained on a firing line for disciplined fire are thrown into a confusing test environment and the expert range shooters fare little better than the non-marksmen. Big surprise. The fallacy is to conclude no training will help them improve to respond to surprise conditions.

America Rifleman has a good article about military marksmanship training. They conclude it is not practical to train every service member to be expert marksmen. BUT, that is no reason NOT to train those with interest and aptitude. They suggest providing advance combat shooting training to those with the interest so that at least every squad has a couple of advanced marksmen that can shoot to several hundred yards accurately. I know some people in the military that get virtually no training on the rifle beyond the basics but would jump at the chance to get advanced rifle and handgun training. Basically expand training to those who want it but not expect every trooper to be forced to get it. The title of the article is something like "Let the shooters shoot."

 

[kraigwy]

"... it is not likely that training alone could be effective in materially raising the standards of all men to exceed the level of expert performance indicated by the Belvoir tests*.

I don't know that I would agree with that statement...................Yes I do, I know I don't agree with it.

Training builds Muscle Memory. An sub-conscience act if you will. Being sub-conscience you don't have a choice. Kind of like breathing. Sure you can deliberately hold your breath, but if you aren't thinking about it you breath. The same thing with Marksmanship Fundamentals. If you develop the muscle memory to the point that it becomes sub-conscience, then you will fall back on the fundamentals whether its a conscience act or not, even under stress.

The Army Marksmanship Unit addressed this in their joint CMP/AMU DVD on "Close Quarters Marksmanship".

An example, the AMU stressed ALWAYS USE YOUR SIGHTS, (as opposed to point shooting) even at close range. You do this in training it builds muscle memory. When the time come and its necessary, you'll "point shoot" but you'll never know it. If you practice point shooting and the time comes you'll try to point shoot at distance or when pin point targets need to be engaged. Where as if you only practice using your sights you'll sub consciencly use them, but if quick point shooting is required it will happen.

I don't want to get into a debate on point shooting VS using the sights. Regardless on our opinions, those boys at the Army Marksmanship Unit know what they are talking about. I just used the above as an example of training.

There are a lot of training DVDs put out by the CMP/AMU, if one was to study and practice the information they provide, you'll develop the muscle memory you need, and will use in in stressful situations whether you realize it or not.

The problem in the 1960s is the same problem we have now. Soldiers are giving a basic marksmanship PMI, qualify once or twice a year, but aren't giving enough training and practice to develop the Muscle Memory needed to in-brain marksmanship fundamentals into the sub-conscience.

It's not about ammo, its about training time. The ammo is there, I've taught classes on how to order and receive ammo for the National Guard and Regular Army. In fact I (and one other Captain) was sent to the NGBMTU to write the ammo policy for the NG State's Marksmanship Team. It's really simple, you just document what training you will do, how many to be trained, etc etc, and your ammo budget will be approved. However, you must do a 'after action report" showing the usage, and if it matches your budget, you'll get next years budget approved, if not, then your next budget will be cut.

It's not about the rifle or the ammo, its about training, or lack there of.

 

[BlueTrain]

I certainly believe that training and practice are essential but at this point, I'd like to say that the army doesn't do everything wrong. There are lots of people in the army who know the score, aren't tied to the past and have the resources and foresight to produce effective small combat units. It is more than individual training, too. Soldiers go to war as a unit, not as individuals.

Here are a couple of examples of ways in which the army is progressive.

There is the designated marksman program. The men who go for additional training and who receive additional appropriate equipment are, I am told (and hope) are picked for their shooting abilities. In fact the army goes rather overboard and apparently men from all sorts of units participate. I am likewise told that it is an unappreciated thing in some units because it is somewhat incompatible with their particular mission but hopefully regular infantry units benefit from all this.

You all know how optical sights are widely used in the army and that probably can't help but increase hit probability. I just hope no one thinks that's cheating.

When I stated that being a good shot does not necessarily mean you are going to be the best combat infantryman (I also said it helps, however), I was merely pointing out several things. Obviously a battlefield in no way resembles a target range, with stationary targets, known distances and no one shooting back. But equally obvious should be the other requirements of the infantry soldier that have to be met, most of which will be anyway. Less obvious is the agressive nature required in combat. But I suspect most soldiers by the time they arrive on the scene will be mad enough at the world to shoot anyone anyway.

 

[Jimro]

Right now the "solution" for arming SDM's is everything from rack grade M4s to AMU tuned M16A5s to M14 EBRs as part of Theater Provided Equipment.

Obviously there is a capability difference between a rack grade M4 shooting M855 and an EBR shooting M118lr. No matter what the system we can train our SDMs to engage out to the maximum range of the system. The hard part is inserting SDM training into the training cycle. The Infantry is supposed to do a squad live fire twice a year minimum, but there is no "standard" for an SDM task list for that live fire training exercise. And Officers in charge of training will not plan training that isn't on the checklist.

We didn't need an SDM program before the War on Terror, and we haven't gotten a good answer as to what an SDM program will look like when we don't have Theater Provided Equipment to use. Heck, Fort Lewis (now JBLM) had only ONE team fire popup range with popups beyond 300 meters for the SAW gunner and SDM to engage.

Heck, it took the "war on terror" to cause the Army to dust off the old qual standard of Standing, Kneeling, and prone. Anyone who served in the "peacetime Army" remembers "prone supported" and "prone unsupported" qual tables.

Jimro

 

[kraigwy]

Fort Lewis (now JBLM) had only ONE team fire popup range with popups beyond 300 meters for the SAW gunner and SDM to engage

Ft Lewis has a KD range to 1000 yards, I use to shoot there in their 4th of July Matches the WANG sponsered. More then sutable for a SDM program.

If the commander want a SDM program all he has to do is contact the AMU. They send teams supplemented by CMP Master Instructors to provide the training. The Units don't have to send the students to Benning. The trainers will come to them.

The M-4s can be used. The AMU list the Max. effective range of the M4 at 600 yards. I just got back from a Fun Shoot (Machine Gun Shoot) at Wall SD. There were several M-4s and watching them shoot convinced me the AMU is right with their 600 yard numbers.

Its all about the lack of training, If they (the military) would spend 25% of the training time they allocate to PT & running, to marksmanship, it cannot but help the problem.

 

[Jimro]

KraigWY,

I know, Fort Lewis has plenty of dedicated long range shooting options. What Fort Lewis DOESN'T have is a good answer in how to INTEGRATE a trained marksman into COLLECTIVE TRAINING. Right now it is stupid easy to get the NM ranges for active duty soldiers to shoot on during the work week. When I was working as an XO to stand up the company SDM program with our Sniper team getting marksmanship ranges wasn't the issue.

Getting leaders to think about adding that skillset to the tactical toolbox was very difficult. My lesson learned? We can teach anyone willing to learn to shoot. But that doesn't mean that the individual skill will immediately translate into a more effective team.

How can you expect a Squad Leader to put SPC Snuffy where he can make the shot if he has never had to face that particular problem in training? How do you place the SDM in the squad? Who is his battle buddy? The SAW gunner or a grenadier? And why?

These are all questions that young officers are not asking (and they should be asking) because everybody and their brother has a different way of using SDMs based on what worked for them. Which is fine I guess, if you are planning on fighting the last battle over again, but the 101st experience in East Paktika was very different from 3rd ID in Fallujah. Two very different approaches to SDM training and equipment.

I know how I am going to run my company SDM program, I'm going to make sure that my SDMs attend EVERY machine gun range, and get to engage popup targets along side the SAWs. This will get Team Leaders and Squad Leaders thinking about actually issuing fire commands to riflemen and give the line squad a different option to engage out to 600 than resorting to the SAW. The individual marksmanship training will be universal, every rifleman will shoot on a NM range and engage targets with iron sights at 600 yards (548 meters).

And when it comes time for Team and Squad LFXs, they will have targets that are beyond 300 meters. I've been thinking about this very problem for the last few years, and I'm not sure that my solution is correct, but it sure can't be any worse than other solutions (or lack of solutions) that I've seen.

I just hope that I'll be able to convince my bosses to give me the bullets to train with. I remember how bad it was in the late 90's for ammunition. Probably as bad as it was in 1960 when Hitchman did his study. Training somehow takes a backseat during peacetime.

Jimro

 

[Achilles11B]

Jimro, I think you have a great plan. Back when I was an 11B team leader, I noticed that the problem wasn't training the SDM, it was how to effectively employ him. There was no doctrine, therefore live-fire exercises really didn't include them. Come deployment time, the SDM was used in that role at the discretion of the squad leader. I'd like to think that the program has evolved since then.

 

[BlueTrain]

Excellent comments, Jimro. It is very insightful to observe that, in so many words, a commitment is needed from the top down for something to succeed, though by top, I don't mean the Secretary of the Army. At least it has to happen at division level, however, which is probably the level where there is enough balance between resources and direction is tempered by actual experience on the ground.

It used to be in some armies that relatively low level units (regimental or brigade size) would have so-called battle schools for training "in-theater" for local conditions. With larger armies, operations might be carried out all over the world under wildly different conditions. Yet training for the recruit could only be of a basic sort, which would have to be supplemented, or more correctly, continued when he reached his unit. Sometimes there were bad things in basic training but just as likely, some things were right on target, so to say, and the trainees took them seriously.

It ought to be pointed out that the army is composed of more than infantry, even though a particular operation might call for more ground troops than a battle in a "big war." Still, there are many elements in a brigade or larger unit that do not see things from a rifleman's point of view. But it is usually an all-arms effort and if all those resources are there, they will and should be used. They have their own point of view. But the success of an operation will depend just as much on the commanders and the staff as it does on riflemen.

 

[Jimro]

I don't have a problem selling marksmanship training to the traditional enablers like Field Artillery or Engineers, they spend plenty of time on the pointy end of the spear too.

But the "support" mindset has been thankfully shaken up. The name "Jessica Lynch" ring a bell? Thankfully the "convoy live fire" has been part of required training put forth by CENTCOM. What remains to be seen is whether any of the theater specific training translates into METL changes for support units.

The 14th CSH secured itself when it moved through Baghdad, and they were armed with nothing heavier than an M4/M16 per person because of their medical status. Hardening our logistics/support tail has got to be a continuing priority. Cause if we don't, next time we beat up on a country there will be another "Jessica Lynch" incident.

Jimro