I think I would take the opinion of an expert over a TSA worker
And with all due respect, you're an armchair expert who's "read an article" so you know how it works, correct? I have 9 years experience in TSA. Although I agree that the methods used by TSA are ineffective, the machines, with some notable exceptions (failures in current full body scanners, the old ETP machines), the equipment in use by the TSA is actually very good, and very effective.
Larry Wansley, the former head of security for American Airlines on the "Puffer machines"
Please explain to me what a puffer machine is? If you're talking about the
ETP machines also known as puffers, they haven't been in used in the US for 5 or 6 years now (EDIT: they began to remove them in 2008, and the last were removed in 2010)...and at their peak, there were less than 100 in use. Why? They were ineffective, maintenance was difficult, and they were expensive.
The technology, which is meant to detect trace amounts of explosives, is "not really operationally viable," said Norman Shanks, who once was in charge of security at the British Airports Authority, which rejected such a system a decade ago.
Since you're the expert, please tell me what "operationally viable" means. He is not saying "They don't work!!!" He's saying that for some reason, they could be inefficient, there could be a better option, they are a pain for maintenance purposes (this is VERY true of these machines...very maintenance heavy, and if they get contaminated, you have to send them back to the manufacturer) or any number of things.
Since I actually have the experience, allow me to relate an anecdote. We had an EOD tech from the Air Force come in once and do a demonstration. He had brought real samples of explosives. Our trainer wanted to do a demonstration, so he asked for a wrapper from a block of C4. The EOD tech gave it to him, and he wiped it on his shoe. He had a screener test is, and of course, it went off. It showed the exact correct type of explosive that make up C-4 (it's RDX, actually). No one was surprised by this. But here's the interesting part. About once a month, this trainer would come in and have someone test his shoes. For the next two years, his shoes set the machine off, without fail. Last I saw, he had tested his shoes about 2 weeks before I left, and it went off that time as well.
The machines are incredibly accurate, and incredibly sensitive. They are a bear for maintenance, and as a result of the extreme sensitivity have a relatively high false positive rate. Contamination of equipment, search tables, and even screeners hands all have a contribution to this. You have to be meticulous about cleaning up the equipment to ensure contamination doesn't occur. Screeners change their gloves, 8-10 times an hour to prevent contamination. This is most likely what was meant by "not operationally viable." If they didn't work, he'd have just said that. Instead, he was intentionally vague because he wants to discredit the TSA.
The chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee, Rep. John L. Mica, a Florida Republican, called the planned system "semi-ineffective."
What planned system? Are we talking about the ETPs I mentioned above? If so, yeah...that's why they aren't used anymore.
So like I said, if you don't know what you're talking about, you should probably not say anything at all.
I agree, the process and procedures used by the TSA are ineffective. But most of the equipment works very well for their intended purposes.
EDIT: Since you didn't add a link to your source, I found it. You are talking about the defunct ETP machines. These are the tall portals that would puff air on you and supposedly detect trace explosives. See my note in my second paragraph.
The machines used today are called ETD (for Explosive Trace Detection) machines. They use a swab to collect a sample that is analyzed. They are extremely effective. I can't really talk about why they actually do work (pesky NDA I had to sign on my last day, with scary things that talked about fines and possible jail time), why you don't actually have to swab an explosive for it to work, and why sampling in certain areas is nearly 100% sufficient to get an alarm on a bag that has an IED in it. If you can find an article that debunks the ETD machine, I'd love to see it. But showing articles about machines that aren't in service anymore as proof as to why ALL explosive detection machines don't work proves my initial reply to your first comment.
