This editorial from the Washington Times (which each of you should read for national political news rather than your local rag) exposes this "program" for the sham that it is. The very same dollars could save a few of the innocent lives that our benevolent President so readily sacrifices at his own alter. We all "feel his pain" -- right in the ass!
The $15 million gun folly
By Edmund McGarrell
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The horrendous crimes in Columbine, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Illinois and Indiana, have resulted in a frenzy of new gun control proposals. Perhaps none are as silly as President Clinton's call for $15 million to be used for gun buy-back programs. Although well-intentioned when called for by local residents fed up with firearms violence, the president must know better.
In the mid-1990s, the Justice Department commissioned a major review of the effectiveness of crime prevention programs by a team of leading criminologists at the University of Maryland. Un-covering three evaluations of gun buy-back programs in St. Louis and Seattle, the authors found these programs failed to reduce gun violence. The authors suggested three reasons for the programs ineffectiveness: They attract guns from outside the target city, they attract guns that were safely kept in homes rather than guns used in crime, and they may provide a vehicle for gun offenders to use the cash to purchase more expensive and lethal weapons. The authors concluded, "Given their high cost and weak theoretical rationale, however, there seems little reason to invest in further testing of the idea."
The shame of the matter is that it comes at a time when we have evidence of promising firearms violence strategies. Justice Department-sponsored studies in Kansas City and Indianapolis have shown that police patrols directed at illegal gun carrying in violent crime hot spots can result in reductions of 40 percent to 50 percent in gun crime. These studies also showed that the citizens of the targeted neighborhoods were very supportive of the increased patrol. New York City's aggressive enforcement of weapons laws and its consequent dramatic decline in violent crime provides another example of the benefits from proactive and strategic enfor-cement. In Richmond, Va., the Project Exile program involving aggressive enforcement of federal prohibitions against felons in possession of firearms has gen-erated significant reductions in homicide. Following the success of the Boston gun project, Indianapolis and High Point, N.C., have witnessed declines in homicide and firearms violence through the collaborative efforts of local, state, and federal law enforcement, in collaboration with the community, to address gun crime.
The problem with the gun buy-back proposal is not simply that it lacks empirical support but there are opportunity costs imposed when the $15 million is spent in this manner rather than on promising strategies. The Kansas City and Indianapolis projects mentioned above cost approx-imately $150,000 for overtime police patrols. What if the $15 million was used to support these types of patrols in the 65 cities that account for approximately one-half of the homicides in the United States? How many federal prosecutors could be hired to specialize on gun crime prosecutions? The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has 1,631 agents, nine more than in 1973. If the $15 million were used to hire more agents, how many illegal weapons traffickers could be put out of business? How many felons found to be illegally attempting to purchase weapons through background checks could be arrested and prosecuted?
If President Clinton is opposed to increasing funding for enforcement, the funds surely could be used more effectively for promising prevention efforts. In Boston and Indianapolis, members of the 10 Point Coalition walk the streets in high-violence neighborhoods working with youths to stay out of gangs and to avoid drugs. The Coalition, led by local ministers and neighborhood leaders, also provides mentoring opportunities for youths arrested with guns and for ex-offenders returning to the community from prison. What could these groups do with just a small portion of the gun buy-back funds? Similarly, given the tie between drugs and violence, why not use the $15 million to support local drug courts that mandate drug treatment and strict monitoring through drug testing? How about funding an experiment to test the effectiveness of trigger locks in preventing gun crime and accidents?
For anyone waffling on the need for substantial tax cuts, the gun buy-back proposal ought to make the case. If there is $15 million to be spent not merely on an untested idea, but for an idea that has been shown to be ineffective, then clearly the budget surplus is too much of a sugar daddy to leave in Washington.
Edmund F. McGarrell is the director of the Crime Control Policy Center at the Indianapolis-based Hudson Institute and chair of the Department of Criminal Justice at Indiana University.
The $15 million gun folly
By Edmund McGarrell
---------------------------------------------
The horrendous crimes in Columbine, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Illinois and Indiana, have resulted in a frenzy of new gun control proposals. Perhaps none are as silly as President Clinton's call for $15 million to be used for gun buy-back programs. Although well-intentioned when called for by local residents fed up with firearms violence, the president must know better.
In the mid-1990s, the Justice Department commissioned a major review of the effectiveness of crime prevention programs by a team of leading criminologists at the University of Maryland. Un-covering three evaluations of gun buy-back programs in St. Louis and Seattle, the authors found these programs failed to reduce gun violence. The authors suggested three reasons for the programs ineffectiveness: They attract guns from outside the target city, they attract guns that were safely kept in homes rather than guns used in crime, and they may provide a vehicle for gun offenders to use the cash to purchase more expensive and lethal weapons. The authors concluded, "Given their high cost and weak theoretical rationale, however, there seems little reason to invest in further testing of the idea."
The shame of the matter is that it comes at a time when we have evidence of promising firearms violence strategies. Justice Department-sponsored studies in Kansas City and Indianapolis have shown that police patrols directed at illegal gun carrying in violent crime hot spots can result in reductions of 40 percent to 50 percent in gun crime. These studies also showed that the citizens of the targeted neighborhoods were very supportive of the increased patrol. New York City's aggressive enforcement of weapons laws and its consequent dramatic decline in violent crime provides another example of the benefits from proactive and strategic enfor-cement. In Richmond, Va., the Project Exile program involving aggressive enforcement of federal prohibitions against felons in possession of firearms has gen-erated significant reductions in homicide. Following the success of the Boston gun project, Indianapolis and High Point, N.C., have witnessed declines in homicide and firearms violence through the collaborative efforts of local, state, and federal law enforcement, in collaboration with the community, to address gun crime.
The problem with the gun buy-back proposal is not simply that it lacks empirical support but there are opportunity costs imposed when the $15 million is spent in this manner rather than on promising strategies. The Kansas City and Indianapolis projects mentioned above cost approx-imately $150,000 for overtime police patrols. What if the $15 million was used to support these types of patrols in the 65 cities that account for approximately one-half of the homicides in the United States? How many federal prosecutors could be hired to specialize on gun crime prosecutions? The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has 1,631 agents, nine more than in 1973. If the $15 million were used to hire more agents, how many illegal weapons traffickers could be put out of business? How many felons found to be illegally attempting to purchase weapons through background checks could be arrested and prosecuted?
If President Clinton is opposed to increasing funding for enforcement, the funds surely could be used more effectively for promising prevention efforts. In Boston and Indianapolis, members of the 10 Point Coalition walk the streets in high-violence neighborhoods working with youths to stay out of gangs and to avoid drugs. The Coalition, led by local ministers and neighborhood leaders, also provides mentoring opportunities for youths arrested with guns and for ex-offenders returning to the community from prison. What could these groups do with just a small portion of the gun buy-back funds? Similarly, given the tie between drugs and violence, why not use the $15 million to support local drug courts that mandate drug treatment and strict monitoring through drug testing? How about funding an experiment to test the effectiveness of trigger locks in preventing gun crime and accidents?
For anyone waffling on the need for substantial tax cuts, the gun buy-back proposal ought to make the case. If there is $15 million to be spent not merely on an untested idea, but for an idea that has been shown to be ineffective, then clearly the budget surplus is too much of a sugar daddy to leave in Washington.
Edmund F. McGarrell is the director of the Crime Control Policy Center at the Indianapolis-based Hudson Institute and chair of the Department of Criminal Justice at Indiana University.