I think that instead of resurrecting an older thread, in order to respond to something I missed the the first time around, I'll start a new thread.
The reasoning is simple. The older threads have, at their core, concepts that are not the main reason for my response, and would therefore drag the older thread (further) off topic.
What I would like to attempt here, is to flesh out the original public meaning of the term, "commerce," and thereby ascertain what, if any, limits this places upon Congress.
You may wish to read the actual decisions of the 2 cases that have direct bearing upon Commerce Clause definitions.
Wickard v. Filburn
Gonzales v. Raich
To that end, here are some individual posts, to refresh our memories.
From this thread, Ricky B explains how the Commerce Clause began to be interpreted, via the decision in Wickard v. Filburn: Here.
Here, publius42 explains some reasoning's the Court used in Lopez, that relate to the Commerce Clause.
I responded to Ricky, here, where I disagreed with a specific interpretation and expanded upon what I believed the Court really said.
Here, Ricky responded to both publius42 and my own post.
Publius42 rounds out my references by explaining what two core principles that the Court has used, here.
Moving on to the part I glossed over (missed) in the original thread....
The problem with the highlighted portion of the quote above, is that manufacture and production, in and of themselves, are not commerce. Bold statement? Not when you stop and understand what the words meant, at the time of the founding.
From Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913 + 1828):
COMMERCE, n.
COMMERCE, v.i.
You will notice that the link to the definition, also contains the 1913 edition's definition. Further, that the two definitions did not change in any appreciable manner during the ensuing 100 years.
A further search on words of that era produce no results for the word, "economic." The word, "economics," returns singular result for the word in the 1913 edition. The word, "economy," returns results from both dictionaries. However those definitions have little to do with the word as we understand it today, or as understood in the "New Deal" era.
In short, economics, as a term simply did not exist.
So that in attempting to understand the current meaning of, "To regulate Commerce ... among the several States," you can only shake your head. The current meanings have little, if anything, to do with how the phrase was understood during the founding era.
Attempting to tie a non-existent (at the founding) term to Commerce, is at best, disingenuous. While economics has everything to do with financial matters today, it had nothing to do with commerce, as it was understood at the time the Constitution was written and voted upon by the public.
Commerce was simply the trade in and of produce, or other manufactured goods, between people. Regulation of Intrastate commerce was wholly a function of the general police powers of the State.
The regulation of Commerce only came under Federal authority, when transport occurred between the States (Interstate). Once movement of the product ceased (between the States), ipso facto Federal authority also ceased.
That is the key to understanding Original Public Meaning of the Commerce Clause: Actual movement of goods in trade, between one State and another. Then and only then, may the Congress exert regulation. However, once the movement of goods has ceased to flow from State to State, Congressional reach also ceases.
Wickard, its progeny (up to and including Raich), were decided upon terms that held no public meaning at the time the Constitution was written and are therefore not just wrong, but Constitutionally void.
The reasoning is simple. The older threads have, at their core, concepts that are not the main reason for my response, and would therefore drag the older thread (further) off topic.
What I would like to attempt here, is to flesh out the original public meaning of the term, "commerce," and thereby ascertain what, if any, limits this places upon Congress.
You may wish to read the actual decisions of the 2 cases that have direct bearing upon Commerce Clause definitions.
Wickard v. Filburn
Gonzales v. Raich
To that end, here are some individual posts, to refresh our memories.
From this thread, Ricky B explains how the Commerce Clause began to be interpreted, via the decision in Wickard v. Filburn: Here.
Here, publius42 explains some reasoning's the Court used in Lopez, that relate to the Commerce Clause.
I responded to Ricky, here, where I disagreed with a specific interpretation and expanded upon what I believed the Court really said.
Here, Ricky responded to both publius42 and my own post.
Publius42 rounds out my references by explaining what two core principles that the Court has used, here.
Moving on to the part I glossed over (missed) in the original thread....
However wrongly Wickard might have been decided in terms of individual production and consumption of wheat, quite clearly a substantial amount of intrastate commerce in 50 states can affect interstate commerce. So even without Wickard, and without Raich, a good argument could be made that Congress can regulate intrastate manufacture and trading of a product that is a substitute for a product that is traded in interstate commerce.
The problem with the highlighted portion of the quote above, is that manufacture and production, in and of themselves, are not commerce. Bold statement? Not when you stop and understand what the words meant, at the time of the founding.
From Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913 + 1828):
COMMERCE, n.
1. In a general sense, an interchange or mutual change of goods, wares, productions, or property of any kind, between nations or individuals, either by barter, or by purchase and sale; trade; traffick. Commerce is foreign or inland. Foreign commerce is the trade which one nation carries on with another; inland commerce, or inland trade, is the trade in the exchange of commodities between citizens of the same nation or state. Active commerce.
2. Intercourse between individuals; interchange of work, business, civilities or amusements; mutual dealings in common life.
3. Familiar intercourse between the sexes.
4. Interchange; reciprocal communications; as, there is a vast commerce of ideas.
2. Intercourse between individuals; interchange of work, business, civilities or amusements; mutual dealings in common life.
3. Familiar intercourse between the sexes.
4. Interchange; reciprocal communications; as, there is a vast commerce of ideas.
COMMERCE, v.i.
1. To traffick; to carry on trade.
2. To hold intercourse with.
And looks commercing with the skies.
2. To hold intercourse with.
And looks commercing with the skies.
You will notice that the link to the definition, also contains the 1913 edition's definition. Further, that the two definitions did not change in any appreciable manner during the ensuing 100 years.
A further search on words of that era produce no results for the word, "economic." The word, "economics," returns singular result for the word in the 1913 edition. The word, "economy," returns results from both dictionaries. However those definitions have little to do with the word as we understand it today, or as understood in the "New Deal" era.
In short, economics, as a term simply did not exist.
So that in attempting to understand the current meaning
Attempting to tie a non-existent (at the founding) term to Commerce, is at best, disingenuous. While economics has everything to do with financial matters today, it had nothing to do with commerce, as it was understood at the time the Constitution was written and voted upon by the public.
Commerce was simply the trade in and of produce, or other manufactured goods, between people. Regulation of Intrastate commerce was wholly a function of the general police powers of the State.
The regulation of Commerce only came under Federal authority, when transport occurred between the States (Interstate). Once movement of the product ceased (between the States), ipso facto Federal authority also ceased.
That is the key to understanding Original Public Meaning of the Commerce Clause: Actual movement of goods in trade, between one State and another. Then and only then, may the Congress exert regulation. However, once the movement of goods has ceased to flow from State to State, Congressional reach also ceases.
Wickard, its progeny (up to and including Raich), were decided upon terms that held no public meaning at the time the Constitution was written and are therefore not just wrong, but Constitutionally void.