Blackhawk Down - SS109 too little?

B

Bartholomew Roberts

Moderator
Since the 5.56 vs. 7.62x39 thread has kicked up this debate again, I thought we might share our knowledge of the issues involved and see if we can reach a consensus on what happened or at least make better informed criticisms.

A couple of points I am curious about:

A) I've heard that the Rangers and Delta were using a new AP round and not SS109. The author doesn't have any military experience and isn't clear on the matter but it sounds like they are using SS109. Does anybody have some solid information one way or the other?

B) 7.62mm NATO is also mentioned as failing during the battle. Yet this is regarded as THE battle rifle round

C) I've heard people advance the idea that Delta was using the older 10.5" or 11.5" barrelled Commando's instead of M4s. They claim that the resulting drop in velocity is the reason for the poor performance.

I'd note that Howe mentions being able to visually see the rounds strike and witness the loose shirts being pulled up by the rounds ripping through them. To me, that sounds like he should be close enough that the fragmentation described by Fackler should be taking place.
 
Well I'm a big fan of that book and yes the SS109 was the "new" AP round in use, no destabilizing tumble, expansion going on there. The 7.62 rounds mentioned as lacking were I believe by one of the machine gunners, Nelson I believe. He was shooting SLAP rounds which are a sabot AP round, not conventional ball. Consider Howe's retrospective on Shugart's M-14, once hit folks tended to stay down. most likely w/ conventional ball. I did however note there were no failures noted w/ the Ma Deuce. A few rounds from a MK-19 failed because they were to close to arm, just punched 40mm holes and kept on going. Target still stopped though. For a more critical, but I believe factually accurate account, check Col Hackworth's "Hazardous Duty".
 
I know one of the Ranger SAW gunners that was on the ground right from the beggining of the operation, and know for a fact that he was using green tip ammo, I assume it was SS109.

I think many of the observed "hits" may have been near misses. Skinny bodies + very baggy clothing = lots of room for bullets to pass through clothing without touching flesh. In the heat of combat, I'm sure it would be hard to tell the difference.
 
Navy Joe - I don't think we can accept Howe's post-action commentary on Shugart's M-14 as gospel.

Howe noted that they gave Shugart a hard time about carrying the M-14 prior to going into this battle. This seems to suggest to me that Howe didn't consider the M-14 a good idea at the time he armed himself for this fight (and his choice of a CAR-15 would tend to support that).

At the same time, Howe never saw Shugart or the effect of his rifle in this battle since Shugart was riding in the helo and Howe was on the ground. Even when Shugart went in to the ground battle, he was too far away for Howe to make any observations. So I don't see how Howe could make any informed comparison of Shugart's M-14 and his CAR-15.

He expressed his opinion that his CAR-15 wasn't getting the job done; but his opinions about what Shugart's rifle could do are just hypothesis unless the author or Howe left out some pertinent details.
 
Just guesses on my part:

Bartholomew Roberts:

First, congrats on mentioning the failure to stop with the 7.62 NATO in the book Blackhawk Down. Most discussions on the book and bullet ineffectiveness seem to ignore that incident.

Now for my guesses. I am NOT an expert, just a Reasonably Knowledgeable Individual (RKI). As such, my points may be completely wrong I admit from square one. I wasn't there and I sure don't want to come across as second guessing the brave soldiers who were there. OK, enough of my disclaimers.

1) The wound ballistic info I've seen from Dr. Martin Fackler on .223 in soft tissue is that it goes like 4" before yawing and breaking up (velocity permitting). Some Somalis might be too skinny for the best bullet breakup effect. I have heard similar stuff from Viet Nam vets who said the .223 seems to work great on well fed/beefier Industrialized nation people but not so hot on Third World skin and bones types. All this assumes you don't hit a bone or vital organ I would guess.

2) I had heard some talk about Somalis didn't grow up watching TV where every bad guy falls to one shot from the hero's peashooter. In other words, they weren't conditioned to give up after being hit like many Westerners weaned on Hollywood hokum are. On the flip side, US soldiers might be conditioned to expect the bad guy to fall with one hit anywhere. How much military firearms training emphasizes bad guys who Don't Give Up? (I really don't know the answer to that question but I fear it's not enough)

3) Many Somalis might have been hopped on drugs or whatever controlled substances are popular in Mogadishu.

4) I hate to suggest this, but perhaps a few bad incidents gave a disproportionate negative reaction to the equipment used? I point this out because not every shooting in the book seems to lead to a failure to stop. A good question might be, how often can we expect a good stop when the baddie is hit? The 7.62 NATO incident suggests that in every case it is a Good Idea to assume the baddie still has some fight left. This might be The Final Lesson: always be ready to pop the bad guy again regardless of what you're using. There are no magic bullets.

I want to end on a positive note about the soldiers in Task Force Ranger. I read Blackhawk Down in awe of those guys, like the ones who came back to the compound and immediately geared up to go back out into that firestorm. Thank God we have men like this defending our country.

Edmund
 
Who knows really.

I have talked to a Nam vet who used to carry the pig (M60) on LRRP missions. He has stated that he has had multiple hits on a VC who was running away with the 7.62x51 coming out of his M60. He heard the bullets slap and knew he hit him multiple times. Despite that knowledge, the guy kept running. I think as with hunting, a lot of times you never know. In hunting we usually have the benefit of stationary targets and we are using scoped precision rifles. This might lead to pretty consistant stopping power.

In combat, there are no stationary targets. Generally the rifles used are not scoped and are not precision instruments as compared to a bolt gun. So who knows really what is good and what isn't. I don't think the rules will always apply. However, I think it is safe to say that the bigger the bullet, the more likely you are going to cause greater damage. I would imagine using simple logic this is going to be the general rule. If I shoot a bad guy with a .223, it is usually better if I can shoot him with a 16 inch naval gun. The potential for damage is much higher.
 
Navy Joe - I don't think we can accept Howe's post-action commentary on Shugart's M-14 as gospel.

Howe noted that they gave Shugart a hard time about carrying the M-14 prior to going into this battle. This seems to suggest to me that Howe didn't consider the M-14 a good idea at the time he armed himself for this fight (and his choice of a CAR-15 would tend to support that).

At the same time, Howe never saw Shugart or the effect of his rifle in this battle since Shugart was riding in the helo and Howe was on the ground. Even when Shugart went in to the ground battle, he was too far away for Howe to make any observations. So I don't see how Howe could make any informed comparison of Shugart's M-14 and his CAR-15.

He expressed his opinion that his CAR-15 wasn't getting the job done; but his opinions about what Shugart's rifle could do are just hypothesis unless the author or Howe left out some pertinent details.


I also doubt this account for another reason: Bowden says that Shughart was mocked for carrying an M14 rather than an M16...but Shughart was a Delta SNIPER! He wouldn't be carrying an M16 of any sort, not because of stopping power but because of range. This makes me doubt that Bowden ever had that conversation.
 
Stop calling it SS109, it is M855. Although the SS109 and the M855 are basically the same round we don't shoot FN made SS109, US forces use M855 NATO ball.
 
In regards to the XM177 statement; I was wrong. Acording to my source, and verified by Janes Infantry Weapons 1997/98, the Delta operators were using M16A2 Carbines (pre-M4s) with 14.5" barrels.

FWIW,
BB
 
Edmund Rowe: I tend to agree with your assessment, particularly point 4. I've been reading the Army Historical Series on Combat Actions in Korea and it is simply amazing how often these soldiers kept on fighting after getting hit with full-bore rifle rounds.

The stories sound just like the ones in Blackhawk Down except instead of shooting 5.56mm and 7.62mm they are shooting .30 Carbine and .30-06 M2 Ball.

I think you also made a good point that several anedoctes from the book show the SS109 round to have made good stops during the battle. I also imagine that even if the failures only represent 1% of the incidents, they probably stand out very prominently in the minds of the men with their lives on the line.

It seems to me that the critical factor is that human beings are just some incredibly tough animals and that the no magic bullet theory is 100% correct.

Should we be teaching soldiers that multiple hits from any round are absolutely required?
 
>It seems to me that the critical factor is that human >beings are just some incredibly tough animals and that the >no magic bullet theory is 100% correct

Mr Roberts:

You hit the proverbial nail on the head. There are no magic (or majik) bullets regardless of caliber. 30 caliber has advantage at range and for penetration of cover but 223 ought to be enough for the urban ranges discussed. The solution is in all probability multiple hits. Of course, the folks (Rangers) are not exactly amateurs either, so I do believe it is the few but very notable incidents of failure that are disproportionately taking the forefront here especially given the presence of 7.62 failures noted.

Penetrating trauma is a funny thing. Some folks are just like a "Timex": takes a perforating and keep on ticking (at least until exsanguination eventually occurs).

Regards,

Bob
 
IIRC, in the Philippine Insurrection they were shooting the Moros with 30/40 Krag and not getting one shot stops. The 30/40 uses a 220 grain JRN bullet and is not much under 30'06 or 308 in power. With the round nose it should be a much better stopper than either if in a vital area though.

This was also the time when the 38 Long Colt was weighed in the balance and found wanting, leading to the search that yielded the inestimable 45 ACP.
 
This was one of the few books I read in a few sittings. It was hard to put down... (just one more chapter...). FYI, this series came out in the Philadelphia Inquirer before it went into the book. It's still online here:

http://www.philly.com/packages/somalia/sitemap.asp

Check out the forums. There are numerous comments from guys who were there and they seem to concur that Bowden's recounting of events is pretty accurate. I too, have heard that Ranger operators were using 14.5" barreled carbines. However, if they were using 10.5-11.5" barreled XM177s as speculated, the velocity of M855 ball would drop below the "magic" 2500 fps about 5' out of the barrel. This would certainly lend credence as to why it would have been ineffective. IIRC, M855 ball fragments in tissue out to about 100 yds. or so out of a 14.5" barrel.

I think the firefights in the streets of Mogadishu were fairly close range, less than 100 yards.

As an aside, I hear they're making "Blackhawk Down" into a movie. I also hear they're making "We Were Soldiers Once, and Young" into a movie, about the battle of Ia Drang. I'm sure veterans will be their toughest critics.
 
Guns,movies and ammo

Yes-they have just finished the Fort Benning sequences of "Blackhawk Down" and "We Were Soldiers Once,And Young"-My roomate is in the latter as are some people from my unit here. The former I believe is starring the fellow from "train spotting" and who played the young Obi-Wan in Star Wars 1, I can't quite remember though. But Mel Gibson as Col. Hal Moore And Sam Elliot as SGM. Basil Plumley for the latter, and a-lot of Fort Benning soldiers in both.

Also the 5.56mm is under scrutiny at this time. The Data is not just from Somalia but any conflict that we have been involved in w/the 5.56mm. Time and time again I have heard more vets. state that they are unhappy w/the terminal side of the 5.56mm ctg. from Infantry to S.F. and it seems to have more detractors (could be the "grass is greener" idea) than pro. Also the idea that drugged up people aren't always stopped is true-but conversely I want what will give me the best chance to stop anyone period, that is still feasible to carry and employ. Not some fair weather fully fed and standing still only on the third Sunday of the month ctg. My belief being that the .224" is good for varmints and some people in the hands of an expert. But alas I am not an expert so give me all the margin for error possible in the "stopping power" dept. Also Dr. Fackler warns that if you base "stopping power" on temporary cavity (it starts to close on itself immediatly after it is made) you may be disapointed in the end. Permenant cavity is the one unchanging element-it is always at least the diameter of the bullet. Also as to the point of lack of "stopping power" in other ctgs. has anyone done an detailed analysis of mean rounds per stop for all U.S. service ctgs. (45/70-5.56mm)to determine which actually works best and fastest? hmm.
 
Fackler made that comment about temporary cavity with regards to HANDGUN rounds, IIRC. The temp cavity from rifle rounds causes permanent damage due to bursting blood vessels.
As for this supposed unhappiness with the 223, it has not come to the attention of any of my friends who in the combat arms. Do you have a reference?
 
While not exactly addressing the cartridges in question, the following interesting tidbit I found at
http://guns.connect.fi/gow/suomi1.html helps to illustrate that "stopping power" is not merely a technical issue. It describes the experiences of Finnish Suomi sub-gunners (9mm) in fighting the Russians in WWII:


Semi-automatic shooting was the recommendation during the Thirties. The doctrine was to use the KP/-31 as a self-loading carbine and save the option of burst-fire for urgency only. The Winter War experience taught the submachine gunners to shoot bursts of two to three rounds and during the 1941 - 1944 war it was known that no fewer than five or six 9 mm bullets were a sufficient dose of medicine. Wounded with shorter bursts, enemy soldiers could often continue fighting when they recovered from the initial shock even if the hits would prove fatal after a short while.

The Finnish proverb "Siberia shall teach" was true also in the form: "Siberians shall teach". Many "Russian" invaders in the Winter War of 1939 - 1940 were actually conscripts from Ukraine and other south-western republics of Soviet Union. Many Russian soldiers of the north-western front in the 1941 - 44 war against Finland were tough and persistent natives of the Siberian wilds and forests. Some Finns knew them from the earlier war.

"They were formidable opponents. We were urged to kill almost every Siberian twice, and most tough boys still a third time", told many Finnish veterans of wars: "Russian lads, coming against us in closed formation, intoxicated with vodka and singing Le Internationale, were bunny-boys but the Siberians were born soldiers! We met them in February 1940 and we learnt to respect those slant-eyed imps... !" Two bullets were enough for "bunny-boys" but five hits were necessary to dispatch a Siberian "imp". Sometimes they fought back despite ten or twelve wounds from 9 mm bullets.
 
In rely the to temp. cavity only applying handguns-why is it called temp cavity for rifles then? please illuminate (a co-worker who I work with attended a wound ballistics seminar that Dr. Fackler lectured at and he came away with the same ideas on cavity that I have just posted). I am not authorized to go into detail of certain 5.56mm findings so I cannot tell you everything I know. As to what people who I have been in contact with about findings 13+ years in the military have left me at a loss for some names. And I will not release to you or any other person names because I'd have to track down those I can remember to get their permission to do so. But I have talked recently to active serving S.F. troops who know more than most and none of them are impressed w/5.56mm. I also used to serve in an S.F. Guard unit (about 30% Vietnam vets) and listen to their commentary and a few who had served elsewhere as active S.F. plus various active duty stations have allowed me to run into many vets. and I am unafraid to ask them questions. Also my father worked in the Army Ordnance Corps for 26 years (doing everything from R&D to Safety)and some of what I've heard in passing from him. I used to fully believe in the 5.56mm without a doubt but in the last year or two I have begun to question it's efficacy since I have certain resources availble to me now that I did not have before.

And also if memory serves me correctly Dr. Fackler wrote an intro for the 2nd printing of Gunshot Injuries by LaGarde where he calls into question some of the 5.56mm's inadequacies (Cannot find my copy)-and that is what started my quest for knowledge on the 5.56mm ctg. I also will state that I am not an expert on ballistics or wounding but I am learning from whatever resources I can get a hold of. Or am I an expert on weaponry no-I just work on it everyday and help to do minimal R&D input.
 
There are two kinds of stretch cavities- permanent and temporary. Permanent strech cavities are what you want to inflict, and are the result of very-high velocity projectiles. The temp ones are more common in handgun and medium-velocity rifle rounds.
 
teufelmann, I don't know if Fackler has modified his position, but the last thing I heard from the IWBA was that the 223 outperformed the 7.62x39 by a large margin on the battlefield.
I don't know about your SF friends, I can only say that my friends and acquaintances in the 82nd and 101st Airborne and those SEALs and SF personell to whom I have spoken at MacDill AFB in Tampa have expressed no misgivings about the 223.
Also, a good portion of the training cadre in the ROTC unit through which I obtained my comission were combat vets. One of the officers was a special forces veteran who'd been field-promoted from E-5 to 1LT in Vietnam, the SgtMajor had been in the 82nd and one of the Master Sgts had been in the 101st at the battle depicted in the movie "Hamburger Hill." The PMS at the unit was a Special Forces LTC who had extensive experience in Central America. As I was headed to active duty infantry, and had always had an interest in firearms, I asked them their opinion of the M16 and the 223 round as compared to the AKs they had faced.
To a man, they said they preferred the M16, and the Vietnam mustang in particular told me that he had noticed some particularly horrendous wounds from the 223.
 
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