Anybody out making smoke on June 25?
- Thread starter Beagle333
- Start date
Model12Win
Moderator
Sure am makin' smoke down here at the compound!
Note grouping as well as I'd hoped, still fun! LOVE ME SOME BLACK POWDAH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Note grouping as well as I'd hoped, still fun! LOVE ME SOME BLACK POWDAH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
bedbugbilly
New member
Beagle - I didn't make smoke but I did pull out my 7 1/2" 45 Colt SAA and gently look it over.
Custer was not lucky for my family - my g-g-uncle was a Sgt. in Troop B, 7th Michigan Cavalry as a part of Custer's Michigan Cavalry Brigade. He was capture on July 6 in Maryland while they chased Lee's army after Gettysburg - eventually paroled and he returned to the regiment eventually being mortally wounded near Winchester, VA in 1864. Sgt. william Laird - my g-grandfather's brother-in-law who was married to my g-grandfather's youngest sister.
My grandfather, whose uncle was mortally wounded near Winchester, was the youngest boy of my g-grandfather's twelve children - nine of which lived to maturity. He never knew his uncle but when the Little Big Horn took place, he was 9 years old. He raised and raced sulky horses and was on the New York racing circuit and at the Buffalo Exposition when Prsident McKinley was shot. My father often told of his Dad telling about that experience.
And then - a distant relation on my mother's side was with Custer at the Little Big Horn - needless to say, Custer was not "lucky" for him either.
For over thirty years I performed "first person/living history" storytelling programs - primarily Civil War and I performed all over Michigan. I became acquainted with an individual who portrays Custer and his wife portrays Libbey - he is a spitting image of Custer. I haven't talked to hi in a few years but the last I knew, they had purchased the Custer him in Monroe, MI and were beginning to do a complete restoration of it. When I performed in that area, I often went through Monroe and by the Custer statue that is located there.
Custer was not lucky for my family - my g-g-uncle was a Sgt. in Troop B, 7th Michigan Cavalry as a part of Custer's Michigan Cavalry Brigade. He was capture on July 6 in Maryland while they chased Lee's army after Gettysburg - eventually paroled and he returned to the regiment eventually being mortally wounded near Winchester, VA in 1864. Sgt. william Laird - my g-grandfather's brother-in-law who was married to my g-grandfather's youngest sister.
My grandfather, whose uncle was mortally wounded near Winchester, was the youngest boy of my g-grandfather's twelve children - nine of which lived to maturity. He never knew his uncle but when the Little Big Horn took place, he was 9 years old. He raised and raced sulky horses and was on the New York racing circuit and at the Buffalo Exposition when Prsident McKinley was shot. My father often told of his Dad telling about that experience.
And then - a distant relation on my mother's side was with Custer at the Little Big Horn - needless to say, Custer was not "lucky" for him either.
For over thirty years I performed "first person/living history" storytelling programs - primarily Civil War and I performed all over Michigan. I became acquainted with an individual who portrays Custer and his wife portrays Libbey - he is a spitting image of Custer. I haven't talked to hi in a few years but the last I knew, they had purchased the Custer him in Monroe, MI and were beginning to do a complete restoration of it. When I performed in that area, I often went through Monroe and by the Custer statue that is located there.
The 141st anniversary. Custer with two brothers and a nephew all wore arrow shirts that day. George was awarded the medal of honor during the civil war, and his brother Tom was awarded two medals of honor during that war. IIRC, Boston and Reed? were not in the military. I popped off a couple of rounds from my trapdoor on Sunday.
Lee44ShooterCnB
New member
Custer
In Vietnam, it was estimated that some firefights had 50,000 bullets fired for each soldier killed. In the Battle of the Rosebud, eight days before the Little Bighorn fight, General George Crook’s forces fired about 25,000 rounds and may have caused about 100 Indian casualties–about one hit for every 250 shots. One of the best showings ever made by soldiers was at Rorke’s Drift in an 1879 battle between the Zulus and the British infantry. There, surrounded, barricaded soldiers delivered volley after volley into dense masses of charging natives at point-blank range where it seemed that no shot could miss. The result: one hit for every 13 shots.
Indeed, it was at times even difficult to get soldiers to fire at all. After the Battle of Gettysburg, 24,000 loaded muskets were recovered; only 12,000 of them had been loaded more than once, 6,000 had from three to 10 rounds in the barrel, and one weapon had been loaded 23 times! One conclusion is that a great number of soldiers are simply posturing and not trying to kill the enemy.
At the Little Bighorn, about 42,000 rounds were either expended or lost. At that rate, the soldiers hit one Indian for about every 840 shots. Since much of the ammunition was probably lost–Indians commented on capturing ammunition in cartridge belts and saddlebags–the hit rate must have been higher. Yet the results do not speak highly of a supposedly highly trained, ‘crack’ cavalry regiment.
High fire very plainly took place at the Little Bighorn, most notably on Reno’s skirmish line in the valley. Troopers went into battle with 100 rounds of Springfield ammunition and 24 rounds of Colt ammunition. About 100 troopers on Reno’s line may have fired half of their ammunition toward the southern edge of the Indian village. The 5,000 bullets only hit one or two Indians, but they certainly damaged the lodges. A Hunkpapa woman, Moving Robe, claimed ‘the bullets shattered the tepee poles,’ and another Hunkpapa woman, Pretty White Buffalo, stated that ‘through the tepee poles their bullets rattled.’ The relatively low muzzle velocity of the Springfield meant that the soldier would have had to aim quite a bit over the head of an Indian for any chance to hit him at long distance. If the officers called for the sights to be set for 500 yards to hit Indians issuing from the village–and did not call for a subsequent sight adjustment–by the time the Indians approached to 300 yards, the bullets would be flying 12 feet over their heads. As a comparison, the modern M-16 round, traveling at 3,250 feet per second, has an almost flat trajectory, and the bullet will hit where it is aimed with very little sight adjustment.
The soldiers’ difficulty in hitting their targets was also increased by the fact that the Indians stayed out of harm’s way for almost all of the battle. One archaeological field study located the Indian positions and discovered that nearly every location was 300 to 1,200 yards away from the troopers. Given the distances involved, the fact that soldiers tended to shoot high, the lack of marksmanship training and the conscious or subconscious posturing involved, it is not surprising that the troopers scored so few hits.
Seemingly out of supporting distance of his comrades, the individual trooper found himself desperately alone. The ‘bunkie’ was not close enough. The first sergeant was far away. The lieutenant was nowhere to be seen. The trooper responded as well as he could have been expected to. He held his ground and fought, he fired into the air like an automaton, he ran, he gave up. Some stands were made, particularly on and within a radius of a few hundred yards of the knoll that became known as Custer Hill, where almost all of the Indian casualties occurred. When it came down to one-on-one, warrior versus soldier, however, the warrior was the better fighter.
George Armstrong Custer may have done almost everything as prescribed. But it was not enough to overcome the combination of particular circumstances, some of his own making, arrayed against him that day. Inadequate training in marksmanship and poor fire discipline resulting from a breakdown in command control were major factors in the battle results. Neither Custer’s weapons nor those the Indians used against him were the cause of his defeat.
In Vietnam, it was estimated that some firefights had 50,000 bullets fired for each soldier killed. In the Battle of the Rosebud, eight days before the Little Bighorn fight, General George Crook’s forces fired about 25,000 rounds and may have caused about 100 Indian casualties–about one hit for every 250 shots. One of the best showings ever made by soldiers was at Rorke’s Drift in an 1879 battle between the Zulus and the British infantry. There, surrounded, barricaded soldiers delivered volley after volley into dense masses of charging natives at point-blank range where it seemed that no shot could miss. The result: one hit for every 13 shots.
Indeed, it was at times even difficult to get soldiers to fire at all. After the Battle of Gettysburg, 24,000 loaded muskets were recovered; only 12,000 of them had been loaded more than once, 6,000 had from three to 10 rounds in the barrel, and one weapon had been loaded 23 times! One conclusion is that a great number of soldiers are simply posturing and not trying to kill the enemy.
At the Little Bighorn, about 42,000 rounds were either expended or lost. At that rate, the soldiers hit one Indian for about every 840 shots. Since much of the ammunition was probably lost–Indians commented on capturing ammunition in cartridge belts and saddlebags–the hit rate must have been higher. Yet the results do not speak highly of a supposedly highly trained, ‘crack’ cavalry regiment.
High fire very plainly took place at the Little Bighorn, most notably on Reno’s skirmish line in the valley. Troopers went into battle with 100 rounds of Springfield ammunition and 24 rounds of Colt ammunition. About 100 troopers on Reno’s line may have fired half of their ammunition toward the southern edge of the Indian village. The 5,000 bullets only hit one or two Indians, but they certainly damaged the lodges. A Hunkpapa woman, Moving Robe, claimed ‘the bullets shattered the tepee poles,’ and another Hunkpapa woman, Pretty White Buffalo, stated that ‘through the tepee poles their bullets rattled.’ The relatively low muzzle velocity of the Springfield meant that the soldier would have had to aim quite a bit over the head of an Indian for any chance to hit him at long distance. If the officers called for the sights to be set for 500 yards to hit Indians issuing from the village–and did not call for a subsequent sight adjustment–by the time the Indians approached to 300 yards, the bullets would be flying 12 feet over their heads. As a comparison, the modern M-16 round, traveling at 3,250 feet per second, has an almost flat trajectory, and the bullet will hit where it is aimed with very little sight adjustment.
The soldiers’ difficulty in hitting their targets was also increased by the fact that the Indians stayed out of harm’s way for almost all of the battle. One archaeological field study located the Indian positions and discovered that nearly every location was 300 to 1,200 yards away from the troopers. Given the distances involved, the fact that soldiers tended to shoot high, the lack of marksmanship training and the conscious or subconscious posturing involved, it is not surprising that the troopers scored so few hits.
Seemingly out of supporting distance of his comrades, the individual trooper found himself desperately alone. The ‘bunkie’ was not close enough. The first sergeant was far away. The lieutenant was nowhere to be seen. The trooper responded as well as he could have been expected to. He held his ground and fought, he fired into the air like an automaton, he ran, he gave up. Some stands were made, particularly on and within a radius of a few hundred yards of the knoll that became known as Custer Hill, where almost all of the Indian casualties occurred. When it came down to one-on-one, warrior versus soldier, however, the warrior was the better fighter.
George Armstrong Custer may have done almost everything as prescribed. But it was not enough to overcome the combination of particular circumstances, some of his own making, arrayed against him that day. Inadequate training in marksmanship and poor fire discipline resulting from a breakdown in command control were major factors in the battle results. Neither Custer’s weapons nor those the Indians used against him were the cause of his defeat.
We are a bit late but this Saturday our CW Skirmish group will do our annual "Free Military" match: any military firearm allowed, flintlock to black rifle. (Matchlocks also welcome if ya got one).
I will bring my .45-70 Trapdoor carbine and my .50-70 Sharps carbine conversion to make smoke. Couple other TD carbines also should be there. Fun to shoot but I'd have preferred a Spencer on June 25 1876.
I'll also bring my MAS 49/56, MAS 1873 revolver and Mark VI Webley. Always interesting to see who and what shows up at this event.
Seamus
I will bring my .45-70 Trapdoor carbine and my .50-70 Sharps carbine conversion to make smoke. Couple other TD carbines also should be there. Fun to shoot but I'd have preferred a Spencer on June 25 1876.
I'll also bring my MAS 49/56, MAS 1873 revolver and Mark VI Webley. Always interesting to see who and what shows up at this event.
Seamus
We're they a crack cavalry unit, or were they inadequately trained in marksmanship and fire control? I read the troopers were indeed poorly trained, regular marksmen training was nearly nonexistant prior to this battle many troopers were recent immigrants I've read. I've heard the Indians used cover very well, but the 1200yd firing positions is new to me. Learn something new everyday. I do believe Custer sent Benteen on a wild goose chase so he wouldn't share in the 'glory'. It is a very interesting story.