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The Gadahn Tapes: Freelance Impulse or al Qaeda Psyops?
By Fred Burton
As might have been expected, al Qaeda has made a move at a key inflection point in the United States -- rearing its head in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in the media milieu surrounding the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. A round has been fired -- a videotape threatening attacks against Los Angeles and Melbourne, Australia -- but it is not at all clear whether the group is shooting more than blanks.
The tape is, of course, interesting, as are all pronouncements by al Qaeda. In every respect, it seems to have been a calculated attempt to terrify the U.S. public: It features a U.S.-born militant, was released on the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, and names as targets two major cities that are centers of Western culture. Given these factors, it is even more interesting, in our eyes, to note the results: an abject failure to terrify. Even Los Angeles, an icon of Western "decadence" personifying all that al Qaeda hates, refused to raise its alert level -- though a massive and accidental power outage a few days after the tape appeared did bring the threat to mind.
Now, all of this could be a sign that Americans have simply grown inured to the terrorist threat and are now complacent -- which is inevitable during the course of a drawn-out war, and something terrorists watch for as part of their planning cycles. But tactical analysis of the videotape indicates to us that there is more afoot. In fact, this particular release could reveal as much about al Qaeda's weaknesses as it does about its strengths.
Let's begin with the speaker featured on the tape: Adam Yahiye Gadahn. He's a 27-year-old California native (born Adam Pearlman) who converted to Islam as a teenager and is now believed to be in Pakistan. The tape released Sept. 11 is the second featuring Gadahn; the first appeared in late October 2004, just prior to the U.S. presidential election.
Clearly, a militant like Gadahn has value to al Qaeda: He is able to speak directly to the American public in unaccented English -- which increases the speed of media exposure for his remarks. Since his speeches don't have to go through a difficult translation, they can be aired around the globe within hours rather than days. (This might be why Gadahn's tapes seem to appear on the eve of important political events in the United States, though -- with only two releases featuring him to date -- there is not enough data to do more than speculate on that point.) Moreover, the use of Western-born militants and converts sends a psychological message: It is an attempt by al Qaeda to show that support for its cause is broad, and comes even from within target countries.
In Gadahn's case, his personal knowledge of the Los Angeles area obviously adds to the concerns of U.S. officials. And analysis of his teenage writings shows he is both intelligent and articulate, which adds to his utility as a mouthpiece.
But he is not, in our view, a member of the core group Stratfor refers to as "al Qaeda prime," and we find it doubtful that Gadahn -- a Westerner and a convert -- ever would be taken into the confidence of true al Qaeda leaders like Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri.
For all his ability to quote from the Koran, Gadahn's statements are jarringly at odds in a certain respect from those of his leaders, who tend not to name specific cities as targets prior to an attack. In the past, al Qaeda has threatened countries -- Australia, France, Italy, Britain -- without more specificity. This serves both to heighten the terror potential of the threats and give the militants an out if attacks cannot be carried out. Ambiguity safeguards credibility.
There is no doubt that Los Angeles or Melbourne -- among other cities -- would be enticing targets for al Qaeda, and an attack in either place could have the combined political, economic and media effects that are the hallmarks of a truly effective strike. But this has been well-known for quite some time, and it is not characteristic for al Qaeda to telegraph its punches.
Based on what we know at the moment, there are two not mutually exclusive possibilities here. First, Gadahn -- who reportedly was an angry youth even after his conversion to Islam -- might be freelancing. Psychological profiling paints him as a young man with an overwhelming need to belong, and videotaping statements on his own initiative -- and using his own targeting criteria -- might be one way of proving his worth to the organization he admires. Or, second, because of his linguistic value to al Qaeda, he is being used to deliver a message -- but not necessarily one that is true to his words.
What the statements mean and whether they can be taken seriously are standard questions asked by government intelligence agencies when videotapes like this are released -- part of a flurry of tactical and forensic activity that follows all al Qaeda statements. Every time a videotape is issued, literally all facets are examined: whether the camera used was digital or VHS, the type and make of the video cassette, the physical appearance and medical condition of the speaker, whether any objects are shown in the background and what they convey, all sounds transmitted on the tape (which can convey location, the size of a room, whether the speaker's voice has been archived by intelligence agencies before, and so forth). In addition, investigators perform forensic tests on the videotapes, which could be used as evidence in any subsequent prosecutions, and conduct a psycholinguistic analysis of the speakers' words. There also is a contextual assessment of the release: Each tape is placed in chronological order with its counterparts and cross-referenced against past statements and histories of attacks.
Because these processes take several days to complete, government intelligence agencies don't yet have a comprehensive read on the latest Gadahn tape. It is known that the 11-minute tape, which was produced by al Qaeda's Sahab Institute for Media Production, was delivered to an ABC News outlet in Pakistan on Sept. 10 and shown, around the same time, to the Christian Science Monitor in Kabul. The fact that Sahab produced the tape indicates that it has been blessed, if not directly commissioned, by al Qaeda.
to be continued......
By Fred Burton
As might have been expected, al Qaeda has made a move at a key inflection point in the United States -- rearing its head in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in the media milieu surrounding the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. A round has been fired -- a videotape threatening attacks against Los Angeles and Melbourne, Australia -- but it is not at all clear whether the group is shooting more than blanks.
The tape is, of course, interesting, as are all pronouncements by al Qaeda. In every respect, it seems to have been a calculated attempt to terrify the U.S. public: It features a U.S.-born militant, was released on the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, and names as targets two major cities that are centers of Western culture. Given these factors, it is even more interesting, in our eyes, to note the results: an abject failure to terrify. Even Los Angeles, an icon of Western "decadence" personifying all that al Qaeda hates, refused to raise its alert level -- though a massive and accidental power outage a few days after the tape appeared did bring the threat to mind.
Now, all of this could be a sign that Americans have simply grown inured to the terrorist threat and are now complacent -- which is inevitable during the course of a drawn-out war, and something terrorists watch for as part of their planning cycles. But tactical analysis of the videotape indicates to us that there is more afoot. In fact, this particular release could reveal as much about al Qaeda's weaknesses as it does about its strengths.
Let's begin with the speaker featured on the tape: Adam Yahiye Gadahn. He's a 27-year-old California native (born Adam Pearlman) who converted to Islam as a teenager and is now believed to be in Pakistan. The tape released Sept. 11 is the second featuring Gadahn; the first appeared in late October 2004, just prior to the U.S. presidential election.
Clearly, a militant like Gadahn has value to al Qaeda: He is able to speak directly to the American public in unaccented English -- which increases the speed of media exposure for his remarks. Since his speeches don't have to go through a difficult translation, they can be aired around the globe within hours rather than days. (This might be why Gadahn's tapes seem to appear on the eve of important political events in the United States, though -- with only two releases featuring him to date -- there is not enough data to do more than speculate on that point.) Moreover, the use of Western-born militants and converts sends a psychological message: It is an attempt by al Qaeda to show that support for its cause is broad, and comes even from within target countries.
In Gadahn's case, his personal knowledge of the Los Angeles area obviously adds to the concerns of U.S. officials. And analysis of his teenage writings shows he is both intelligent and articulate, which adds to his utility as a mouthpiece.
But he is not, in our view, a member of the core group Stratfor refers to as "al Qaeda prime," and we find it doubtful that Gadahn -- a Westerner and a convert -- ever would be taken into the confidence of true al Qaeda leaders like Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri.
For all his ability to quote from the Koran, Gadahn's statements are jarringly at odds in a certain respect from those of his leaders, who tend not to name specific cities as targets prior to an attack. In the past, al Qaeda has threatened countries -- Australia, France, Italy, Britain -- without more specificity. This serves both to heighten the terror potential of the threats and give the militants an out if attacks cannot be carried out. Ambiguity safeguards credibility.
There is no doubt that Los Angeles or Melbourne -- among other cities -- would be enticing targets for al Qaeda, and an attack in either place could have the combined political, economic and media effects that are the hallmarks of a truly effective strike. But this has been well-known for quite some time, and it is not characteristic for al Qaeda to telegraph its punches.
Based on what we know at the moment, there are two not mutually exclusive possibilities here. First, Gadahn -- who reportedly was an angry youth even after his conversion to Islam -- might be freelancing. Psychological profiling paints him as a young man with an overwhelming need to belong, and videotaping statements on his own initiative -- and using his own targeting criteria -- might be one way of proving his worth to the organization he admires. Or, second, because of his linguistic value to al Qaeda, he is being used to deliver a message -- but not necessarily one that is true to his words.
What the statements mean and whether they can be taken seriously are standard questions asked by government intelligence agencies when videotapes like this are released -- part of a flurry of tactical and forensic activity that follows all al Qaeda statements. Every time a videotape is issued, literally all facets are examined: whether the camera used was digital or VHS, the type and make of the video cassette, the physical appearance and medical condition of the speaker, whether any objects are shown in the background and what they convey, all sounds transmitted on the tape (which can convey location, the size of a room, whether the speaker's voice has been archived by intelligence agencies before, and so forth). In addition, investigators perform forensic tests on the videotapes, which could be used as evidence in any subsequent prosecutions, and conduct a psycholinguistic analysis of the speakers' words. There also is a contextual assessment of the release: Each tape is placed in chronological order with its counterparts and cross-referenced against past statements and histories of attacks.
Because these processes take several days to complete, government intelligence agencies don't yet have a comprehensive read on the latest Gadahn tape. It is known that the 11-minute tape, which was produced by al Qaeda's Sahab Institute for Media Production, was delivered to an ABC News outlet in Pakistan on Sept. 10 and shown, around the same time, to the Christian Science Monitor in Kabul. The fact that Sahab produced the tape indicates that it has been blessed, if not directly commissioned, by al Qaeda.
to be continued......