I don't mind it either. I think both the increased hunting lands, AND the PR windfall it would/could earn us is more than worth it. I was just wondering.
In Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), (Same Year as Pittman Robertson Act) The Supreme Court upheld State level poll taxes.
These taxes were, by the way, applied to generally everyone, then certain exemptions were allowed. Non-voting women, the blind, and those under 21, or over 60.
With just a little research, I believe but don't know for sure, the voting age at this time was actually 21. So those under 21 not charged a poll tax could not vote. And the over 60 was held in the decision as congruent with those exempted from military service and jury duty.
This case was reversed in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966),
Which held, among other things:
(b) Fee payments or wealth, like race, creed, or color, are unrelated to the citizen's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process. Pp. 383 U. S. 666-668.
(e) Classifications which might impinge on fundamental rights and liberties -- such as the franchise -- must be closely scrutinized. P. 383 U. S. 670.
Fee payments or wealth, like race, creed, and color are unrelated to a citizen's ability to intelligently participate in the fundamental right to self defense.
In
Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm'r - 460 U.S. 575 (1983) The court held
(b) But by creating the special use tax, which is without parallel in the State's tax scheme, Minnesota has singled out the press for special treatment. When a State so singles out the press, the political constraints that prevent a legislature from imposing crippling taxes of general applicability are weakened, and the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute. That threat can operate as effectively as a censor to check critical comment by the press, thus undercutting the basic assumption of our political system that the press will often serve as an important restraint on government. Moreover, differential treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression, and such goal is presumptively unconstitutional. Differential treatment of the press, then, places such a burden on the interests protected by the First Amendment that such treatment cannot be countenanced unless the State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve without differential taxation. Pp. 460 U. S. 581-585.
Leaving the impression that ax extra tax on the Press is unconstitutional, and a special exemption to a tax on the press is also unconstitutional given the effects such treatment would have on a free press.
Applied to the second amendment, one could extrapolate a special tax on arms, and an exemption from a general tax on commerce would be unconstitutional given the same conflict-of-interest or intimidatory type of effect on the People.
As additional food for thought, we have:
To recognize a power in the State not only to single out the press, but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press, presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the scheme. Pp. 460 U. S. 591-592.
Can they single out owners of new arms, over used? Modern designs over curios and relics? Does the fact that it singles out people who want arms over those who don't have a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by the State can justify the scheme?
In
Murdock v. Pennsylvania - 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
We have
2. The mere fact that the religious literature is "sold", rather than "donated" does not transform the activities of the colporteur into a commercial enterprise. P. 319 U. S. 111.
4. A State may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution. P. 319 U. S. 113.
5. The flat license tax here involved restrains in advance the Constitutional liberties of press and religion, and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. P. 319 U. S. 114.
6. That the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory," in that it applies also to peddlers of wares and merchandise, is immaterial. The liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment are in a preferred position. P. 319 U. S. 115.
The mere fact that arms are sold, rather than issued, does not transform the activity of keeping and bearing arms into commerce.
A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right, and through reverse incorporation, I would put to you that the Federal Government may not charge for the enjoyment of a right.
The excise tax here involved restrains in advance the Constitutional liberties of keeping, and bearing arms, and invariably tends to suppress their exercise as the economically challenged may not be able to pay the tax.
That the excise tax is non-discriminatory, as it applies to all purchases of new arms, the liberties guaranteed by the Second Amendment are in a preferred position.
As for the concept of Reverse incorporation: If a State may not do such a thing, and the 14th amendment has been used to prevent the States from doing things the Federal Government may not do, as incorporation, we have the theory of Reverse Incorporation, housed in the 5th Amendment, and explained in the case
Bolling v. Sharpe - 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause, as does the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and therefore we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
And further from this decision we have:
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.
ETA: As for casting doubt on the NFA, I would point to the language in the Heller decision regarding dangerous and unusual weapons that was an obvious attempt to maintain the class of firearms we may generally purchase as "arms" and those restricted by the NFA as not "arms" but instead dangerousn and unusual.
